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## THE MARITIME FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERIAL HISTORY\*

IN the preface to his *History of Western Philosophy*, Bertrand Russell remarks: "With the possible exception of Leibnitz every philosopher of whom I treat is better known to some others than to me." This afternoon I am surveying more than three centuries of imperial history, and in a field where men of greater distinction than myself have laboured so fruitfully, I am naturally reluctant to claim a Leibnitz. The justification for this extended treatment is not simply that broad interpretations follow the tradition of inaugurals; it is that today we have reached the end of an epoch of empire, which Sir John Laughton, at the beginning of this century, could only dimly visualize.

This Imperial epoch may be said to begin with the first conquest of the ocean by the sailing ship. Some 450 years ago inquisitive Europeans reached out over a round world and discovered vast new continents mutually accessible by water. Between 1487 and 1523 sailing vessels entered the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, traversed the Atlantic and Pacific and circumnavigated the globe.

As a consequence of these explorations, the frame of western European ambitions was suddenly widened; with the conquest of the Atlantic the European centre of balance tended to shift westward as the flag followed the trade. The new overseas plantations quickly developed direct connexion with the European seaboard, and when the defence of their commerce became eventually important to the economic life of the parent states, the ensuing struggle for control of ocean communications became inevitably an expansion of the rivalries of European kingdoms.

Gradually during the next three centuries, in competition first with Spain then with Holland and finally with France, England achieved this control by obtaining what is popularly known as "command of the sea." In the eighteenth century she was able to exercise this "command" so effectively that, despite a relative weakness in man-power, she was in a position, by the time of the Napoleonic Wars, to extend her territorial dominion from its original focus in the North Atlantic to the far distant reaches of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

\*An Inaugural Lecture delivered on November 22, 1949 by Gerald S. Graham, Rhodes Professor of Imperial History in the University of London. The introduction to the Lecture, dealing with the work and personality of previous holders of the Rhodes Chair, has been omitted.

In the beginning, however, there was little beyond the occasional plundering raid to suggest the coming struggle for empire. For half a century after the first Columbus expedition, no European state seriously opposed the claims of Spain or Portugal, as set down so sweepingly in the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494. Anglo-French searches for a Northwest passage to the East were merely cautious attempts to open up trade routes well out of range of the Spanish monopoly in the Caribbean. Colonial projects supported by France or England were concerned only with the outskirts of Spanish or Portuguese territory; the choice of such precarious bases as were established, for example, far up the St. Lawrence River or on the shores of Newfoundland was deliberate because both countries were anxious to avoid military conflict with Spain.

England and France, and subsequently Holland, could do no more than sketch projects of empire until they were in a position to defend their possessions and secure their communications by sea. Frenchmen or Englishmen might harry the Spaniard or the Portuguese, but to attempt colonization in any but the more remote and less profitable regions of the earth, was to invite disaster.

Yet statesmen in England, as elsewhere, were slow to grasp the importance of controlling maritime communications in the interests of expanding trade and national power. It was difficult to understand that in contrast to warfare on land, superiority at sea could mean not only the conclusive elimination of an enemy, but a practical monopoly of ocean communications. Moreover, until Hawkins set down in impressive memorials the strategic advantages of isolating Spain from her Empire, few Englishmen, if any, believed that the cutting of Spanish sea communications could reduce the military capacity of a great European state. The expeditions of the early Elizabethan sea-dogs were semi-piratical raids, wherein hopes of immediate profit and hatred of Popery counted for far more than any strategical design, such as that of defeating Spain by eliminating her flotas. There was no conviction that the ship might be a decisive instrument of national power, or that naval warfare might appreciably affect the result of any European struggle on land.

Nevertheless, national interest was beginning to invade the Atlantic jousting ground. As colonial trade continued to grow, whether in fish or precious metals, jealousy on the part of the "have-nots" inevitably raised the question of exclusive rights. English adventurers, for example, began to prey on Spanish and French shipping to the Newfoundland Banks, and these sporadic

undertakings helped to stimulate colonial rivalries by giving them a pronounced national flavour. Certainly after the accession of Elizabeth, English freebooting like English exploration became increasingly a racial activity.

Moreover, by the eighties, the apparently haphazard character of English raids on Spanish commerce seemed to strike a pattern that revealed itself more clearly after 1585 when plans were projected for attacking not only Spanish coastal harbours, but such strategic areas as San Domingo, Cartagena, and Panama. There were discussions, too, on the possible occupation of Havana and the blockade of Mexican ports.<sup>1</sup> These were more than mere schemes of pillage; they involved an organized offensive against the Spanish colonial empire as the source of Spanish economic power. For example, Drake's onslaughts of 1585-6 helped to paralyse Philip's campaign in Flanders by depriving Parma of the money to keep up his army.

In other words, statesmen were just beginning to associate colonial wealth with military strength. A new element—hardly perceptible at first—had thus been thrown into the scales of the European balance—the overseas colony. In the past, territorial expansion, founded on military land force, had been the principal issue of European rivalry. With the seventeenth century, competition for empire on the oceans very gradually superimposed itself on the traditional pattern of continental relationships. It was becoming obvious that the riches of the New World as well as of Asia could be garnered only by those nations which possessed sufficient well-armed ships to transfer it.

As a consequence of this centrifugal pull from the oceans, European national interests tended to develop a certain dualism. Imperial policies that were concerned with sea routes and colonies sometimes conflicted with policies of continental expansion. But even where continental ambition triumphed, as in the case of France, every European state with a frontage on the Atlantic had, at least, to revise its calculations on the components of national power.

The destruction by Spain of Admiral Coligny's colony in Florida in 1565 had been the first demonstration in modern European history of the value of predominant naval power in the maintenance of overseas bases. Not, however, until the period of the first Dutch War did Englishmen fully grasp this fundamental

<sup>1</sup>J. S. Corbett (ed.), *Papers Relating to the Navy during the Spanish War, 1585-1587* (London, 1898), 69.

principle of colonial practice. The statesmen of the Commonwealth, and especially Blake, were the first to appreciate its full implications, namely, that only constant supremacy at sea could secure England's undisturbed control of colonies and trade routes, and deny them to England's opponents. By the end of that war, and for the first time in English history, the elimination of the naval forces of the enemy became an accepted strategic objective. The primary aim of naval warfare was no longer simply "the defence of the Kingdom," with pillage as a side-line, but the destruction of the enemy's fleets, as a means of disorganizing his finances by depriving him of essential war materials. Once the enemy was reduced in battle or starved by blockade, his colonies and trade routes were at the mercy of the victor, who could thereby add to his own strength at the expense of the defeated.

Thenceforward, the needs of maritime trade dictated English colonial policy; they were responsible for the establishment of a uniform system of regulations, expressed in a growing body of Navigation Laws. The earlier Navigation Laws were not intended to be measures of military security; in practice, however, despite the lack of proper enforcement machinery, they evolved as such. By forbidding the carriage of English goods in ships other than English, and by confining the imports of Asia, Africa, and America to English ships, they encouraged the growth of an English mercantile marine at the expense of Britain's rivals. "National animosity," wrote Adam Smith, with reference to the Navigation Act of 1651, "aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate wisdom could have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of Holland. . . ."<sup>2</sup>

By the second half of the seventeenth century, then, we are at the beginning of a new age. The navy that defended trade was about to become—in the words of Lord Halifax (written in 1694)—"the life and soul of Government."<sup>3</sup> There was now a clear disposition on the part of governments to identify colonial commerce with military strength. Almost half a century after Halifax's pronouncement, the French Foreign Minister Choiseul expressed the new principle of empire when he said: ". . . it is the colonies, trade, and in consequence, sea power, which must determine the balance of power upon the continent."

<sup>2</sup>The effectiveness of this Act in damaging Dutch trade has been questioned by historians; see G. N. Clark, "Historical Revisions—The Navigation Act of 1651" (*History*, Jan., 1923).

<sup>3</sup>Walter Raleigh (ed.), *The Complete Works of George Saville, First Marquess of Halifax* (London, 1912), 175.

Yet colonies, for all their association with policies of wealth and power, remained on the periphery of European diplomacy. Even at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the neglect seems to have been deliberate. There was an apparent effort on the part of all the colonizing nations to prevent colonial rivalries from complicating their European policies. European nations, as Professor Penson has remarked, "put to blind eyes" the telescopes that pointed towards the areas of conflict in their distant possessions.<sup>4</sup>

Certainly British governments were not interested in sending armies to extend Anglo-Saxon dominion overseas. Canada, for example, might have been taken almost any time after 1692 had there been the will. But there was no will for territorial conquest, because colonies counted simply as commerce. According to good mercantilist logic, colonial commerce could be most cheaply secured by means of bases, outposts, or factories supplied and defended by ships of war; defence of colonial trade should not be linked with burdensome territorial expansion across the oceans.<sup>5</sup>

It was not until William Pitt came to power that conquest of enemy overseas colonies became an avowed object of British strategy. But this change must not be interpreted as marking any profound alteration in British policy. Pitt's assault on French possessions was founded partly on a desire to relieve the Thirteen Colonies in North America, and largely on an almost fanatical urge to weaken France in Europe. By totally eliminating the French empire, Pitt intended to safeguard the traditional European balance of power. He was convinced that the destruction of French commerce was the key to Britain's home security. He believed—and the significant thing is that other statesmen now believed—that colonial trade and the sources of colonial trade were not simply important accessories of strength, but elements of decisive weight on the scales of the European balance.

This intensification of British interest in colonial trade expansion was not, of course, a sudden development. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the propaganda of trading and financial interests was already promoting the conviction that maritime commerce and military power were indissoluble. The War of the Spanish Succession had been the first essentially "business man's war," waged quite as much to determine who should possess the Spanish colonial trade, as who should possess

<sup>4</sup>*The Colonial Background of British Foreign Policy; An Inaugural Lecture Given at Bedford College, University of London* (London, 1930), 15.

<sup>5</sup>See Stanley Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun in North America* (New Haven, Conn., 1933), 3.

the Spanish Crown.<sup>6</sup> The sequence had been a "business man's peace," which made provision for Britain's commercial expansion overseas. Thenceforward, the trading, ship-building, and financial interests, on whose support the Hanoverian dynasty relied so heavily, considered naval estimates as necessary business insurance. The records of the Board of Trade are enough to show the ubiquitous activity and mounting influence on government, of highly organized business groups. "Of the greater part of the regulations concerning the colony trade," wrote Adam Smith, "the merchants who carry it on, it must be observed, have been the principal advisers."

Twenty-five years after the Treaty of Utrecht, merchants formed the vanguard of citizen patriots who so vociferously demanded the complete breaking of the Spanish colonial monopoly. In the opinion of the City the capture of each French or Spanish Island represented a double gain, since the resulting increase of English trade was accompanied by a proportionate weakening of French trade. Not many years later, the safety of a West Indian Island—not to speak of a West Indian convoy—was sufficient to influence Cabinet policy in determining the movements of a fleet; and George III had come to believe that the security of the British West Indies was vital to the successful pursuit of any war. This unique identity of colonial trade with national policy tempted a distinguished historian, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, to the conclusion that the effect of commercial considerations in the shaping or deflection of British strategy was even greater in the eighteenth century than in our own.<sup>7</sup>

There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the denial of colonial commerce materially altered the French position on the Continent; there was no "strangulation" of France by English sea power during the two wars between 1744 and 1762, because overseas trade was not the backbone of French national strength. The fact that a high total of French shipping was destroyed or that a large part of the French mercantile marine was unable to leave harbour as a result of a British blockade means little unless the total of overseas trade is measured against the national economy as a whole. Admittedly, the French colonial trade was an extremely valuable war asset, but recent investigations would suggest that it was a useful buttress rather than a foundation. The

<sup>6</sup>See Arthur M. Wilson, *French Foreign Policy during the Administration of Cardinal Fleury, 1726-1743* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), 42.

<sup>7</sup>*The Navy in the War of 1739-48* (3 vols., Cambridge, 1920), III, 243-52.

real security of France lay in the richness of her natural resources, which provided (as the Seven Years' War was to demonstrate) almost complete self-sufficiency. France was to show, as Professor Richard Pares has explained so dexterously, that a nation with the limited help of neutrals could live without colonial trade and still fight a war effectively.<sup>8</sup>

It would be a great mistake, however, to interpret the failure of French maritime policy in terms of French continental self-sufficiency on land; just as it would be a mistake to explain British success by the easy generality that geography produced a "natural sea power" by giving to the English people easy access to the sea and a special aptitude for colonization. The essential difference between the two countries lay in the attitudes of kings and governments, for sea power is basically an artificial creation.

Both Richelieu and Colbert, for example, built fine fleets; and if their achievement was ephemeral it was because their successors could not, or would not, continue their policies—not because Frenchmen lacked a taste for salt water or a zeal for colonial adventure. Certainly the British Admiralty and Board of Trade correspondence do not convey the impression that the Royal Navy felt any overweening sense of superiority in personnel. In the opinion of contemporary British officers, French crews could man a gun or furl a sail as smartly as any, and in some respects their Service showed greater versatility. Indeed, France was as much an amphibious state as Britain. Providence, said Richelieu, has offered us the "empire of the seas" by generously providing excellent harbours on two coasts.

As for the British "natural aptitude"—there was no traditional compulsion to "rule the waves." The English people at the beginnings of their imperial career had no great tradition of the sea to compare, for example, with that of the Scandinavians. Such a tradition—even a family tradition—is valuable to a nation; but the forbears of the Hoods, of Nelson, St. Vincent, Howe, Collingwood, George Byng, and Blake, were country gentlemen, solicitors or parsons, with no salt-water records behind them. (The unconfirmed story of George Monk's initial signal to his squadron during the first Dutch War, is at least symbolic of England's self-made amphibians. The signal read: "By the left, march.") Before the sixteenth century, England had been an agricultural country, continental in her outlook rather than seafaring and expansionist. Until Elizabeth's reign, interest remained chiefly landward, and

<sup>8</sup>*War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-63* (Oxford, 1936), 392-3.

even at the end of Elizabeth's reign the average Englishman, if he thought of North America at all, most likely thought of it as a fishing station near Greenland.<sup>9</sup>

One may say, therefore, that Britannia's sceptre was largely a product of Whitehall and Westminster. It was not the English people who recognized the importance of sea power as the foundation of empire, but their rulers, whether kings or parliaments, who built ships and designed navigation acts in the interests of colonies, commerce, and national power.

And in the building and maintenance of fleets, which alone could secure an empire, British governments were to show greater constancy than did the French simply because they were not handicapped as were the French by the same domestic conflict of interests. It is probably fair to say that a steady concentration on maritime affairs is, or was, only possible in an insular state. Unlike continental countries such as France or Holland, Britain because of the English Channel could afford to neglect her army and still remain a first-class power. An enemy might threaten communications, or attack an overseas colony, but as long as superiority at sea was maintained the soil of Britain was rarely in danger.

Admittedly the exigencies of domestic politics frequently intruded to the detriment of English imperial objectives. The development of a navy, for instance, was seriously affected by the failure of Charles I to convince his subjects that "ship-money" was more than a shabby political manoeuvre. During the War of the Spanish Succession the struggle between Tories and Whigs became in part a struggle between the maritime and continental interests of the nation. The Jacobites of Hanoverian times, the Cobdenites of Victoria's, or the isolationists of our own day have had to be considered before governments could take decisive action in matters of imperial security.

But these conflicts of interest were merely episodic; they were not, as in France, chronic. The French could not escape the political dilemma which confronted every continental power with a frontage on the Atlantic. The long coastline bordering on two seas did stimulate the maritime and commercial ardour of imaginative ministers; but no French statesman could for long take his eyes from *le sol de France*. Apart from the danger of enemy

<sup>9</sup>G. B. Parks, *Richard Hakluyt and the English Voyages*, edited with an introduction by James A. Williamson (American Geographical Society, Special Publication no. 10, New York, 1928), 7.

coalitions, which a shuffle of the diplomatic cards might provoke at any time, the age-old rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg drew like a magnet on the arms of France, making maritime ambition a thing of intermittent enthusiasms. France wanted continental power and security, and she wanted an overseas empire, but even her great resources were not sufficient to achieve both. With the exception of the War of American Independence, when a continental coalition gave her temporary superiority, she had to count on losing the war at sea; and it is hardly surprising that both the Seven Years' War and the Napoleonic Wars were, as contests for overseas empire, very one-sided struggles.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that as long as France could win victories on the Continent, retain a hold on the Low Countries, or occupy Hanover, she could always enter the market of peace negotiations with valuable bargaining counters. What was lost by defeat on the high seas, might be retrieved at the peace table. British ministers were very much aware of this constant factor in peace negotiations; it was not only the needs of home security that prompted Britain's search for allies on the Continent, and costly expenditures on field forces to support these allies.

Indeed, when effective allies were lacking, as during the War of the Austrian Succession, Britain was forced to launch emergency expeditions against French possessions overseas. These expeditions were essentially last-minute diplomatic efforts; they were intended to win bargaining pawns which might be used to balance French victories on the continent.<sup>10</sup>

There still remains a good deal to be learned about the relation between British continental and maritime strategy, and similarly between French European diplomacy and French maritime strategy—and it may be added, British colonial policy only becomes intelligible when examined in the light of both. Fifty years ago maritime and colonial history (even in the hands of great men like Mahan) suffered because historians either ignored or lacked access to the records of high-level political discussions and decisions.

Today the picture is not complete, but at least one broad generalization or speculation may be ventured. In comparison with continental considerations, the French overseas empire in the eighteenth century counted as little more than an important subsidiary. French ministers were not unimpressed by the military

<sup>10</sup>An example in reverse in Choiseul's expedition to conquer Newfoundland in 1762.

advantages of preserving overseas possessions, but because of naval inferiority, colonial policy was continually warped and stunted by lack of faith in ultimate success. Referring to the disasters of the Seven Years' War in his *Précis du siècle de Louis Quinze*, Voltaire has expressed a fatalism common to many more than himself. "Never have the English had such superiority at sea; but they have had it at all times. . . . What is the reason for this continual superiority? Is it not because the English feel they have an essential need for the sea with which the French are able to dispense, and that nations always succeed . . . in the things that are vital to them?"<sup>11</sup>

This reluctance to embark wholeheartedly on a policy of colonial expansion and development was not, as I have mentioned, a static thing; at times the fight for overseas empire had been urgent and exacting. None the less, lack of faith in other than continental programmes runs throughout the history of eighteenth-century France like a dark thread, and after Trafalgar French governments were inclined to accept, almost as a law of nature, the isolation of their few remaining oceanic possessions.

The Second British Empire of 1815 was founded, therefore, on a unique naval predominance that had been shaken only during the War of American Independence. By emphatically establishing her maritime ascendancy over her rivals along the western seaboard of Europe, Britain had been able to ensure a relatively unrestricted freedom to pursue trade and garner strategic possessions all over the world. Before 1815 the Royal Navy was the determining force in the establishment of the Empire; after 1815 and until the dissolution of Pax Britannica in the twentieth century, the Royal Navy was the guarantee of its security and further expansion.

In the nineteenth century this Empire was not only worldwide; it was scattered and therefore it was vulnerable. Yet, allowing for minor lapses, Britain could safely guarantee to defend colonial trade and territories anywhere.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, she was no longer able to maintain by herself this two-hemisphere insurance. With the rise of Japanese and American naval power, the English Channel ceased to be the focal centre for commanding the seas; and to safeguard the United Kingdom in view of mounting German ambitions, the principle of universal command had to

<sup>11</sup>*Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire*, vol. XXII, *Précis du siècle de Louis XV* (Gotha, Ettinger, 1785), 313.

be surrendered in favour of a strategy of local concentration. The Admiralty was no longer in a position to uphold *Pax Britannica* in three great oceans; the Japanese Alliance was the first recognition of the fact that Britain could no longer distribute her naval forces so as to maintain the traditional two-power standard in every part of the world.

Meanwhile, the machines of industry had begun to tilt the scales of the European balance ominously in favour of Germany. In an age when such raw materials as rubber and oil were becoming essential to war production, the security of overseas trade routes became increasingly important to the existence of Great Britain. But even granted a constant supply of vital raw materials, British industries, after the First World War, were no longer adequate to meet the output required by the new scale of competitive armaments. By 1939, Britain, the arsenal of a widely-extended empire, was dependent on the technical and industrial resources of the New World.

In many respects this dependence represented the reversal of a historical process. The survival of the mother country in 1914 and again in 1939 was contingent on the maintenance of maritime connexions with her former colonies. The safe transfer of war materials from the New World of self-governing and independent states was vital to a favourable military balance. Once again, the unity of Britain and her empire, past and present, was to reveal itself, a unity made possible by the allied command of sea communications.

Today, however, the sea is no longer the only condition of such unity. The aeroplane is rapidly taking us back to the world of Ptolemy, to a small and shrunken world, not of oceans containing huge island continents, but of great stretches of land divided by gigantic lakes. Today, as Sir Halford Mackinder once predicted, Europe, Asia, and Africa are becoming one continent, and the unity of the land has become the vital element in what is termed "global strategy."

In the past, a nation that held command of the surface of the sea could not avoid becoming a great imperial power. Indeed, the pieces that make up the incongruous mosaic called the British Commonwealth and Empire were as often the fortuitous products of naval supremacy as the consequences of deliberate national policy. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, Admiral Mahan could reasonably assert that command of the sea was identical with world power. Today, however, imperial dominance based on

control of the sea by ships of war is not possible. When Alcock and Brown took their fragile aircraft across the Atlantic in 1919, the world suddenly began to shrink in time and space, and the dictum of Mahan had lost its old validity. The battleships and frigates which had carved out Britain's destiny were no longer sufficient of themselves to maintain the command.<sup>12</sup>

Today, we have reached one of those great watersheds of history. For nearly four centuries the sea provided the common frontier of seven continents, an unbounded medium that gave enormous mobility to the imperial power that controlled and used it as a highway. That age has come to an end. Looking backward, it seems to me that the past four centuries may be properly recorded as one epoch of history—a clear-cut epoch when the control of the surface of the oceans was the determining influence on the foundation of great empires.

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<sup>12</sup>See G. S. Graham, *Empire of the North Atlantic* (Toronto, 1950), chap. XIV *passim*.

## THE LACONIA COMPANY OF 1629: AN ENGLISH ATTEMPT TO INTERCEPT THE FUR TRADE


THE story of the Anglo-French struggle for North America, from the discoveries of Cabot and Cartier down to the victory of Wolfe, can be written around the theme of competition for the fur trade of the continent. This contest for furs was marked by repeated efforts on the part of the rivals to out-reach their opponents by intercepting the furs at their source but, as civilization marched into the continent, the places from which the richest harvest of furs could be obtained seemed to retreat westwards like a will-o'-the-wisp. As soon as one side had gained an advantage and had entrenched itself in the possession of fur-bearing territory, a decline would set in and it would be necessary to strike yet further into the heart of the continent if the eager demand for furs and competitors' prices were to be met. In such a fluid situation long-sighted initiative could lead to strategic moves which might bring rich reward.

Before England captured New Amsterdam in 1664 and established an advanced base on Hudson Bay in 1670 the advantage lay with the French and the Dutch.<sup>1</sup> The French settlements on the St. Lawrence and the Dutch trading posts on the Hudson gave these two nations command of an immense system of water-ways reaching far into the heart of the continent while the English settlements, penned in by the Appalachians, were compelled from the very first either to turn back to the sea for sustenance and profit or to develop staple crops like tobacco. The English colony which depended most on the fur trade for its early prosperity was that planted by the Pilgrims; but within seven years of its foundation the men of New Plymouth found it necessary to seek a new grant of land in the woods of Maine on the Kennebec River far to the north of their home because the supply of furs nearer at hand had already begun to run out.<sup>2</sup> As the fur-bearing animals were killed off on the New England coastal plain, the supply dwindled rapidly to nothing because it was less possible there than elsewhere to make up for falling returns by attracting pelts from

<sup>1</sup>The significance of the fur trade in the struggle for North America is shown in H. A. Innis, *The Fur Trade in Canada* (New Haven, 1930) and in D. G. Creighton, *Dominion of the North* (Boston, 1944).

<sup>2</sup>W. T. Davies (ed.), *Bradford's History of Plymouth Plantation* (New York, 1908), 208, 223, 233, 304; "Farnham Papers" (*Collections*, Maine Historical Society, Documentary History, 2nd series, VII, Portland, 1901, 108-16).

PART OF CHAMPLAIN'S MAP OF NEW FRANCE, MADE IN 1612.



—Adapted from the Champlain Society edition of Champlain's *Works*.

Indians farther to the west. The reason for this was that the topography of the country discouraged any extensive Indian fur trade from the interior down to the New England coast since the natural outlets for the areas behind New England were down the Hudson or Richelieu Rivers. This fact was not, however, fully understood at the time.

David Kirke's capture of Quebec in 1629 was an attempt to destroy the advantage which the French had gained and to seize the French fur trade.<sup>3</sup> Kirke's contact with the Huguenots of St. Malo probably brought him early news of Richelieu's design to exploit the trade through the newly-formed Company of New France; and the English captain's attack destroyed the first expedition sent out under the auspices of the new French company. As a result the English obtained the mastery of the North American fur trade.<sup>4</sup> By the time Kirke reached Quebec however, the English and French had already, on April 24/May 4, 1629, signed the Treaty of Susa, article seven of which stated that "whatsoever shall be taken during the space of two months after the signature of this present treaty, shall be restored on the one and the other side."<sup>5</sup> Therefore Kirke's frontal assault on the French fur trade was in obvious danger of being checkmated. Charles I delayed the return of Quebec to France for over two years but he was ultimately brought to agree to it in order to obtain the unpaid portions of his wife's dowry. The Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye of March 29, 1632 thus brought about the restoration of the St. Lawrence settlements to the French;<sup>6</sup> and although Charles soon afterwards made reservations in order to restate his claims to the territory,<sup>7</sup> the control of the St. Lawrence fur trade passed back to the French and with it their advantage in the European fur market.

During this period from 1629 to 1632 while English interests were actually enjoying the fur monopoly, some Englishmen made a plan to strike at the sources of the furs. This enterprise was known as the Laconia Company, and its basic idea was to seize territory in the interior and so to gain control of the trade even though the trading posts on the St. Lawrence should eventually be returned to France. The attempt was, of course, a failure; but the story of the Laconia Company is important because it was one of the

<sup>3</sup>Henry Kirke, *The First English Conquest of Canada* (London, 1871).

<sup>4</sup>H. P. Biggar, *The Early Trading Companies of New France* (Toronto, 1901), 149, 154.

<sup>5</sup>"Farnham Papers," I, 94.

<sup>6</sup>Public Archives of Canada, *Report, 1912* (Ottawa, 1913), 21-53.

<sup>7</sup>E. F. Slatter, *Sir William Alexander and American Colonisation* (Boston, 1873), 69n.

first deliberate attempts by one of the rival fur-trading nations to outflank its opponents. Furthermore the Laconia Company's efforts led to a greater understanding of the geography of eastern North America and revealed why the fur trade of New England could not compete with that of the French to the north and the Dutch to the south.

The two men who conceived and executed this great plan were Captain John Mason and Sir Ferdinando Gorges. Up to that year 1629 when the Laconia scheme was first set on foot Gorges had been captain of Plymouth fort, but he had long been interested in colonial schemes and had been one of the chief supporters of the unfortunate Sagadahoc expedition in 1607. In 1620 he had organized the Council for New England, a corporation with a limited membership of forty, which had applied for a grant of land on the coast of North America between 40° N. and 45° N., that is, roughly from the Hudson River to the present border between Maine and New Brunswick.<sup>8</sup> Gorges's plans for plantation under the aegis of his Council for New England soon collapsed in face of vigorous hostility by western fishing interests who carried their opposition into the parliaments of 1621 and 1624,<sup>9</sup> and in the latter year his son Robert, who had gone to the Massachusetts area to lay the foundations for a great colony, returned to England without gaining a permanent foothold. Then from 1625 to 1628 Sir Ferdinando himself was deeply involved in the wars which Buckingham waged against France and Spain. As a result the Council for New England became inactive. In 1629 Gorges retired from his command at Plymouth and soon afterwards he married a wealthy cousin. As he was then over sixty years old, he might well have been expected to have settled down to quiet rustic domesticity.<sup>10</sup> Instead, he turned once more to the task of promoting the colonization of America.

<sup>8</sup>When the charter was issued it had been extended by the King's ministers to include the territory north to 48°. This included the St. Lawrence and the extension was no doubt made in order to give grounds for future claims against the French. Gorges himself never made any attempt to exploit this part of his grant partly because in the following year the King gave that section of it then known as Acadia to Sir William Alexander. Gorges's account of this suggests a wry agreement on his part. He wrote, "Sir William Alexander . . . procured his Majesty (for what could they not do in those times in such cases?) to send to me to assign him a part of our territories. His Majesty's gracious message as to me was a command agreeing with his pleasure to have it so" (Sir Ferdinando Gorges, *Brief Narration of . . . the Advancement of Plantations into the Parts of America*, London, 1658, published in *Collections*, Maine Historical Society, II, 1847, 48).

<sup>9</sup>R. A. Preston, "Fishing and Plantation, New England in the Parliament of 1621" (*American Historical Review*, Oct., 1939).

<sup>10</sup>J. P. Baxter, *Sir Ferdinando Gorges and His Province of Maine* (3 vols., Boston, 1890); Raymond Gorges, *Story of a Family, through Eleven Centuries* (Boston, 1944), 119-39.

Mason, the other leader of the Laconia Company, was a younger man who, like Gorges, had combined a military career with interest in colonial expansion.<sup>11</sup> From 1615 to 1621 he had governed Newfoundland for the company of London and Bristol merchants which had tried to plant a colony on the island. In 1622 he became one of the first men to receive a patent of land from Gorges's Council for New England; and about the same time he also shared another land grant from the Council with Sir Ferdinando himself. However, little came of these grants; perhaps the general failure of the Council for New England discouraged Mason. Then during the wars Mason was treasurer of the army and was busy with military affairs. It was in Mason's house at Portsmouth that Buckingham was assassinated while on his way to the Isle of Ré in 1628. A year later, when the wars were being wound up, Mason turned his attention once more to North America and on November 7, 1629 he obtained from the Council for New England a new grant of land which he planned to call New Hampshire.<sup>12</sup> Ten days later, however, he and Gorges took out yet another land patent from the Council for New England for a piece of territory which they called "Laconia."<sup>13</sup> It was this grant, the foundation of the so-called Laconia Company, which was the first appearance of the design of Gorges and Mason to win the fur trade from the French and Dutch.

By the Laconia patent the Council for New England granted to Gorges, Mason, their associates, and whoever else they admitted to their plans,

all those lands and countries lying adjacent or bordering upon the great Lake or Lakes or Rivers commonly called or known by the name of the River and Lake or Rivers and Lakes of the Iroquois a Nation or Nations of savage people inhabiting up into the landwards betwixt the lines of west and northwest conceiv'd to pass or lead upwards from the Rivers of Sagadahoc and Merrimac in the Country of New England aforesaid. Together also with the Lakes and Rivers of the Iroquois and other nations adjoining the middle part of which lakes is situated near about the latitude of forty-four or forty-five degrees reckoned from the Equinoctial line northwards as also all the lands soils and grounds within ten miles of any part of the said lakes or rivers on the south or east part thereof and from the west end or sides of the said lakes or rivers so far forth to the west as shall extend half way unto the next great lake to the westward and from thence northwards unto the north side of the main river which runneth from the great and vast western lakes and falleth into the river of Canada including all the islands within the perambulation described.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup>The most complete biography of John Mason is to be found in J. W. Dean (ed.), *Captain John Mason, the Founder of New Hampshire . . . together with a Memoir by Charles Wesley Tuttle* (Boston, 1887).

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 183-9.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 189-97.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

This was the area which was given the name "Laconia" because it was to be built up around lakes. The partners were also given "for the better accommodation of their intended traffic" the right to take up one thousand acres of unoccupied land on convenient harbours in New England; and they were guaranteed unhindered access to Laconia for their ships, boats, barks, or other vessels with their cattle and commodities of what nature soever.<sup>15</sup> John Winthrop's *Journal* indicates what this "intended traffic" was to be. He wrote that the bark *Warwick*, which Gorges and Mason sent out in 1630, went "for the discovery of the great lake in New England, so as to have intercepted the trade of beaver."<sup>16</sup> The later history of the Company corroborates the suggestion that the aim of the organization was to build up a fur trade which would strike into the interior of the continent and make contact with the Iroquois. The Company planned to set up a fur-trading post on the great lake, when it was discovered, and to operate a fleet of pinnaces to collect furs from all its shores.<sup>17</sup>

Mason turned to this scheme for exploiting the fur trade of the interior within ten days after obtaining a patent to colonize New Hampshire, and did not return to his earlier plan until the Laconia project had collapsed. This suggests that he had been suddenly persuaded to abandon his first plan and to venture in this alternative project. Furthermore it is probably significant that his conversion to the Laconia enterprise coincided with the arrival of Champlain in London. Kirke reached London with the Frenchman just about the day on which the New Hampshire patent was issued, and during the following ten days circumstances arising out of the capture of Quebec were being investigated by a judge of the Admiralty.<sup>18</sup> London undoubtedly buzzed with gossip about the wealth of furs which Kirke had found on the St. Lawrence. It is safe to assume that the Laconia patent of November 17 was inspired by this tangible evidence of the profit which could be made in the fur trade of the interior of the continent.

Just who conceived the Laconia idea is not clear. It has been suggested that certain merchants who had been interested in the Canada Company which had financed Kirke were disappointed when the expedition returned with the news of a rich fur trade on

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup>John Winthrop, *Journal* (ed. J. K. Hosmer, New York, 1908), I, 29.

<sup>17</sup>F. Gorges, *America Painted to the Life* (London, 1658) in *Collections*, Maine Historical Society, II, 68.

<sup>18</sup>Depositions were taken from the French on November 9 and from the Kirkes on November 17. *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1574-1680* (London, 1860), 102-3. Champlain had arrived at Plymouth on October 20 and at London on about November 6.

the St. Lawrence but with their prospects of exploiting that trade blighted by the terms of the Treaty of Susa. According to this theory these men then founded the Laconia Company.<sup>19</sup> A contemporary list of the Canada Company, however, includes none of the names of the people who were later active in the Laconia Company.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, in the few days between Champlain's arrival and the obtaining of the Laconia patent, there was hardly time to negotiate a partnership between half a dozen or more individuals and then to get a patent drafted and issued.

The link between the Canada Company and the Laconia Company was doubtless Thomas Eyre who in 1630 was acting as accountant and cashier of the Canada Company.<sup>21</sup> He was also playing a prominent part in the Laconia Company. He was an investor in the name of his wife Eliezer and perhaps also on his own account, "for his children" as he wrote in one letter. But more important than this, he was the chief agent who was concerned with the loading of the Laconia Company's ships with trade goods and stores and he carried on a business correspondence with Ambrose Gibbons the "factor" or agent sent to New England by the Company. He was certainly already active in the Company's affairs in the early months of 1630 and he may have been concerned from the beginning. Moreover, he was a neighbour of Mason's on Fenchurch Street in London.<sup>22</sup> It seems likely, then, that Eyre, alone or with someone else, suggested to Mason the idea of a company to strike direct to the fur country and that Mason, who had just finished negotiating with Gorges for his charter for New Hampshire, then came back to Gorges and suggested that he and Gorges should combine to take out a patent for "Laconia" in their own names and on behalf of the unnamed "associates" who had suggested the

<sup>19</sup>J. S. Jenness, *Isles of Shoals* (6th ed., Boston, 1898), 60-1, gives this explanation which has been frequently repeated after him. He lists Thomas and Eliezer Eyre, John Cotton, Henry Gardner, George Griffith, Edwin Guy, and Thomas Wannerton as the associates of Gorges and Mason at the time of the founding of the Company. But these were the associates when the second patent was obtained by the Laconia Company in 1631 and were not necessarily the associates of 1629. Jenness also says that Griffith, Wannerton, Eyre, Mason, and Gorges were interested in the Canada Company. Unfortunately his only reference for this statement is very vague "Numerous affidavits in the Court of Admiralty relating to the Canada Company." Wannerton (or Warverton) was connected in some way with the Canada Company (P.R.O., H.C.A., 13/50, f. 332), but a search in the Admiralty records has so far failed to support Jenness's suggestion that the other three were also concerned in it.

<sup>20</sup>Acts of the Privy Council, Colonial (Hereford, 1908), I, 180. The Canada Company was formed by a union of two groups, Sir William Alexander with some Scots and English supporters, and the Kirke Brothers and their associates (Historical Manuscripts Commission, 12th Report, Appendix I, "Cowper MSS.," 376-7).

<sup>21</sup>P.R.O., C.O. 1/6, 33, 33 II; H.C.A. 13/50, f. 332.

<sup>22</sup>Baxter, *Sir Ferdinando Gorges*, III, 255n., 284, 285; Dean, *Mason*, 284, 316-18, etc.

idea.<sup>23</sup> Once the patent had been obtained Gorges and Mason could negotiate for partners to help to finance the scheme. For instance, George Griffith came in at this time and provided the ship, the bark *Warwick*, which took out the first Laconia expedition in April, 1630 and which was used in the following years to supply the colony.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to Mason, Gorges, and the Eyres, the other "associates" in the Company were George Griffith, Henry Gardner or Gardiner, Thomas Wannerton or Warnerton, John Cotton, and Edwin Guy. All these except Cotton were London merchants. Griffith's wife Mary may have been the "Mistress Griffith" in whose name the Council for New England registered Gorges's *Brief Relation of the Discovery and Plantation of New England, 1620*, at Stationer's Hall in 1622.<sup>25</sup> Henry Gardner is the man whose name is associated with the book *New England's Vindication* printed in 1660 in London. C. E. Banks who edited this book for the Gorges Society, believes that its actual author was Edward Godfrey who was sent out to America by the Laconia Company and later became the governor of Gorges's province of Maine.<sup>26</sup> Thomas Warnerton, a notary public and merchant, must be distinguished from the Laconia Company servant of the same name, an ex-soldier who was killed in 1644 while making an unprovoked attack on a French farm house. The second Warner-ton was probably a son of the first.<sup>27</sup> John Cotton was the famous Puritan minister of St. Botolph's, Boston, Lincolnshire who was expelled from his living and later (in 1633) emigrated to Massachusetts where he became one of the leaders of the Bay colony.<sup>28</sup>

The wording of the Laconia patent leaves unidentified the location of the intended plantation in the interior and of the route by which it was to be reached. When Champlain had first explored the New England coast in 1605 he had recorded his belief

<sup>23</sup>Another possibility is suggested by the fact that one of the "factors" who went with the Kirkes was a certain John Love. This man may have been related to Captain Sir Thomas Love who was closely associated with Gorges in military and naval affairs and was also in the business of the Council for New England (*Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1574-1660*, 103; *Proceedings, American Antiquarian Society*, 1867, 72, 75, 78).

<sup>24</sup>W. B. T[rask], "The Barque Warwick, 1630-36" (*New England Historical and Genealogical Register*, Boston, XXI, 1867, 223-4).

<sup>25</sup>Baxter, *Gorges*, I, 225.

<sup>26</sup>C. E. Banks, "Edward Godfrey" (*Collections, Maine Historical Society*, IX, 295-384). See footnote on p. 329.

<sup>27</sup>Charles Deane, "Indenture of David Thompson and Others" (*Proceedings, Massachusetts Historical Society*, May, 1876, 381n.); Baxter, *Gorges*, III, 258n.; N. Bouton (ed.), *Provincial Papers: Documents and Records Relating to New Hampshire, 1623-1686* (Concord, 1867), I, 70n.

<sup>28</sup>*Dictionary of American Biography*.

that one of the rivers of New England flowed from the country of the Iroquois. He wrote, "Furthermore, in this Bay there is a very broad river which we named the River du Gas. In my opinion it extends toward the Iroquois, a nation at open war with the Montaignais who live on the Great River St. Lawrence."<sup>29</sup> This passage is obviously misplaced in its context and it was apparently added to the chapter as an afterthought. The exact location of the river which Champlain believed to be a passage to the Iroquois is therefore not certain. It has been assumed that he was referring to Boston Bay and to the Charles River which is impressive at its mouth but which, a very few miles up-stream, becomes insignificant.<sup>30</sup> On his 1612 map Champlain attached the name "Du Gas" Passage to a river which is shown as rising far in the interior of the continent in the vicinity of a mythical "Lake of the Iroquois." He drew this river as flowing past the south end of Lake Champlain and into the Atlantic to the north of Cape Cod.<sup>31</sup> Thus Champlain was responsible for an early belief in a direct water passage from the New England coast to the Iroquois fur country.<sup>32</sup>

The "Lake of the Iroquois" mentioned in the patent has usually been assumed to be Lake Champlain but it is not absolutely certain that the Laconia partners were aiming at that lake.<sup>33</sup> Champlain, who had visited Lake Champlain with a war party in 1609, had given it his own name and that name had appeared on two maps which he published in 1613. Both of these maps showed, in addition to Lake Champlain, a "Lake of the Iroquois" situated south and east of Lake Ontario.<sup>34</sup> Champlain's belief in the "Lake

<sup>29</sup>H. P. Biggar (ed.), *The Works of Samuel de Champlain* (6 vols., Champlain Society, Toronto, 1922-36), I, 342.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 342n. The Merrimac, which flows from the New Hampshire lake district, comes closer to being the passage which Champlain imagined. His Indian informants may have been referring to Lake Winnepesaukee.

<sup>31</sup>See the map on page 126 which is adapted by permission from Champlain, *Works*, VI, Portfolio, Plate LXXXI. The river to the Iroquois country is omitted in the map of 1613 (*Works*, II, facing p. 1) which was produced when Champlain had learned of the discovery of Hudson Bay. It is possible that Champlain lost interest in a southern route to the fur country when he learned that Hudson had found the northern one.

<sup>32</sup>John Smith, in his *Description of New England*, also supported this idea. He wrote of "rivers that stretch themselves far up into the country even to the borders of divers great lakes, where they the Indians kill and take most of their beaver and otter" (*Works*, ed. E. Arber, Birmingham, 1884, 204, 707).

<sup>33</sup>It is true that the name "Lake of the Iroquois" was given to Lake Champlain by some Dutch cartographers and was in general use among them thirty years later (Justin Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History of America*, Boston and New York, 1884, IV, 391, 392). About the same time the French began to call Lake Ontario "the Lake of the Iroquois" (*ibid.*, 281).

<sup>34</sup>Champlain, *Works*, VI, Portfolio, Plate LXXXI; II facing p. 1. Champlain had not yet seen Lake Ontario but he knew of its existence from the Indians. He showed it in some detail on the map of 1612 and called it Lac St. Louis on the map which he made in 1613.

of the Iroquois" was the result of Indian reports about the lakes in northern New York state and for some reason the explorer believed that these were one sheet of water; but when he made another excursion with his Indian allies against the Iroquois in 1615 he crossed the end of Lake Ontario into the area where he had supposed the "Lake of the Iroquois" to be and so discovered his mistake. On his map of 1632 the mythical "Lake of the Iroquois" was therefore omitted.<sup>35</sup> Thus Champlain was already aware in 1629, when he came to London, that the lake which he had imagined in the Iroquois country did not exist.

It seems likely that Champlain did not reveal his secrets to his captors and that therefore his arrival in England and the revelation of the astonishing wealth of the St. Lawrence fur trade sent Mason or one of his friends to the explorer's own maps and writings (which had been published in 1613 and 1619) to find a means of obtaining a share of that vast wealth. The Laconia Company can thus be regarded as an attempt to reach Champlain's mythical "Lake of the Iroquois" by his equally mythical Passage du Gas.

It is still possible, on the other hand, that "Laconia" was intended to be Lake Champlain itself and not the mythical "Lake of the Iroquois." It would be natural for the English to avoid using the name of the French explorer for territory which they intended to seize. Champlain's knowledge of Lake Champlain was scanty as is evident by the fact that he drew it completely out of proportion, making it far too wide from east to west. It is obvious that on the hurried Indian raid in 1609 he had been unable to make any accurate observations.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore on all his maps he placed it much too close to the New England coast, about a hundred miles inland instead of a hundred and sixty, and not far beyond the head-waters of the short New England rivers. But this was not realized at the time and his errors persisted in the work of later cartographers who continued to place the lake far too near the coast.<sup>37</sup> His "Lake of the Iroquois," on the other hand, was five hundred miles inland. Sir Ferdinando Gorges's grandson, in a work published nearly thirty years after the Laconia episode, identified the "Lake of the Iroquois" with that lake which Cham-

<sup>35</sup>Champlain, *Works*, III, Plate X.

<sup>36</sup>Champlain, *Works*, VI, Portfolio, Plate LXXXI; II facing p. 1; III, Plate X.

<sup>37</sup>Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, III, 381; IV, 384; Winsor, *Cartier to Frontenac* (Boston and New York, 1894), 160-1.

De Laet's map of New Netherland, published in 1630, is an exception. Lake Champlain is there placed in its correct position in relation to the ocean (Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, III, 381).

plain had visited and he tells us that the Laconia partners believed the lake to be ninety or one hundred miles from the Plantation at Piscataqua overland.<sup>38</sup>

In 1629 the Lake Champlain area was still not possessed by any European power. After Champlain's visit there in 1609 the French were kept away from the lake because the country round-about was dominated by the Iroquois. Although the Dutch had established a trading post near the site of Albany in 1614 and although the Iroquois furs were flowing down to them, they had probably not yet penetrated into the Lake George and Lake Champlain area. This territory, believed to be at the head of the New England rivers, remained comparatively unknown fur country.<sup>39</sup> Thus Mason's Laconia scheme may have been intended as an attempt to open up Lake Champlain to the English. But even if this is so, the information on which the project was based probably came from Champlain's writings and maps.

There is a third possibility. Lake Winnepesaukee in New Hampshire is about thirty miles inland as the crow flies. Indian reports about Winnepesaukee may have been a source of the belief in a water passage to the great lakes of the interior. The Winnepesaukee district can be reached by way of the Merrimac River. Hence it may have been the "Laconia" of the dreams of Mason and Gorges. It seems likely, however, that the two men had all these three lake countries confused in their minds when they made their attempt to seize the fur trade. They presumably thought that there was a reasonable chance of finding a water passage to some lake where they could build up a substantial fur trade even though they were not sure where that lake was to be found.

The associates sent out their first expedition to seek for Laconia in April, 1630 at about the same time as the fleet with John Winthrop and the main body of the Massachusetts Bay Company sailed to New England. Winthrop recorded in his *Journal* his belief that the Laconia Company's vessel, the *Warwick*, on the way from the downs to the Isle of Wight to join the fleet of ships going to New England, had fallen a prey to Dunkirk corsairs.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup>Gorges, *America Painted to the Life*, II, 66-7.

<sup>39</sup>G. O. Coolidge, "The French Occupation of the Champlain Valley from 1609 to 1759" (*Proceedings*, Vermont Historical Society, new series, VI, 1938, 151). Lake Champlain was a route between Iroquois territory and the Huron settlements but was probably not visited by white men after Champlain's raid in 1609 until Jourges, the French Jesuit, was captured by the Iroquois in 1642 (R. G. Thwaites, ed., *Jesuit Relations*, 73 vols., Cleveland, 1896-1901, XXIV, 283; XXVI, 141; XLIX, 173). Young Ferdinando Gorges said that the Dutch were trading with horses on the west side of the lake by the time he wrote (in the sixteen-fifties) (*Collections*, Maine Historical Society, II, 66-7).

<sup>40</sup>Winthrop, *Journal*, I, 29.

In actual fact the *Warwick* had sailed safely to Plymouth whence Ambrose Gibbons, the factor or business manager who was sent in charge of the trading activities of the enterprise, wrote a letter to Eyre in London about his plans.<sup>41</sup> Gibbons's job was to send home profitable cargoes as soon as possible; but the task of seeking out the lakes in the interior was the responsibility of the governor of the plantation, an ex-soldier named Walter Neale.<sup>42</sup> This division of the control of the activities of the colony between Neale, the leader and explorer, and Gibbons, the factor, is indicative of the difficulties which the Company was to encounter later. If the colonists concentrated on exploration then profitable returns might not be immediately forthcoming. If they attempted to satisfy the demand for immediate returns they could not carry on with the real purpose of the expedition. This dichotomy of purpose was to be clear throughout the Company's short history. Thus, for instance, when two men were sent to the colony as reinforcements, it is noticeable that they were described as a "factor to take charge of the trade goods, also a soldier for discovery."<sup>43</sup>

The *Warwick* sailed to the Piscataqua River which empties into the Atlantic through an extensive estuary and which John Smith had noted as a suitable harbour for small barks.<sup>44</sup> Champlain had stated that the entrance to the Passage du Gas was in a "Bay of Islands" which is believed to have been Boston Bay.<sup>45</sup> But his references are vague and might have been interpreted to indicate other inlets. Mason and Gorges almost certainly knew that the Charles River, which runs into Boston Bay, was a very short stream; and in any case the Puritans had forestalled the Laconia partners by obtaining a royal charter for the Massachusetts Bay area and had already settled there. Furthermore, the Merrimac, the longest river in those parts, also had the grave

<sup>41</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 283-5, Eyre to Gibbons, May 31, 1631. Ambrose Gibbons was named to act as attorney for the delivery of Mason's first grant from the Council for New England in 1622. Mason's heirs claimed in 1679 that Gibbons established a fishing station at Cape Anne in 1622 and was expelled by Massachusetts in 1630 (*New Hampshire State Papers*, Manchester, 1889, XVII, 534). It may be assumed that Gibbons was appointed as agent for the Laconia Company by Mason.

<sup>42</sup>Neale had commanded the Artillery Company of London, a unit which already prided itself on being as efficient as any militia unit in the world. He had come into contact with Mason when he applied to the treasurer of the Army for a military pension (P.R.O., C.O. 1/9, 131, Petition of Neale, 1638; Jenness, *Isles of Shoals*, 64). It is likely therefore that Neale was also a Mason appointee. Sir Ferdinando Gorges, although continuously interested, left the direction of the Laconia Company to Mason assisted by Eyre.

<sup>43</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 284, Eyre to Mason, May 31, 1631. The Laconia Company's correspondence is also printed in Boulton (ed.), *Provincial Papers of New Hampshire*, I.

<sup>44</sup>Smith, *Works*, 204, 707.

<sup>45</sup>Champlain, *Works*, I, 342n.

disadvantage of being included within the bounds of the Bay patent. The Piscataqua, which is deep water for about twenty miles inland, is the next substantial inlet to the north of the Merrimac. Some Englishmen, followers of Gorges and perhaps also of Mason, had been settled near the mouth of the Piscataqua for several years and thus the two men had already interest in the area.<sup>46</sup> These settlers must have penetrated far enough up-stream to know that it was not the great river it seemed at its mouth, but their information had not reached England. So the Laconia Company sent its expedition to the Piscataqua to establish the Atlantic base for the interior fur trade.

Neale took up his residence in a house which up till very recently had been occupied by one of Gorges's followers, David Thompson,<sup>47</sup> who had gone to New England in 1623 with a patent from the Council for New England at about the same time as Robert Gorges went to Massachusetts. Thompson's house was situated on the southwest bank of the Piscataqua right at its mouth on what is now called Odiorne's Point opposite "Great Island" (Newcastle Island) which fills the river entrance. This place became the headquarters of the Laconia enterprise and was usually called "Pasquataqua," the name which was also given to the whole area. Gibbons went further up-stream and on up the River Newichewannock (the Salmon Falls) which flows into the Piscataqua estuary. There he built a trading station about twenty-five miles from the sea where falls interrupted the river's course. The place is now within the town of South Berwick. Another trading post was set up at Strawberry Bank on the east side of the Piscataqua, about six miles from the mouth, near the present city of Portsmouth.

Under Neale's leadership the colony began to dig itself in by tilling the land. Neale appears to have decided that the colony must first ensure itself of a supply of food; and indeed the Laconia Company had apparently planned this for it had sent out with the first expedition plenty of tools and equipment for fishing, for planting vineyards, and for lumbering operations. Salt-works were made to produce salt from sea-water for packing fish, and potash was manufactured. The venture was thus much more than a fur-trading enterprise. It was aimed at exploiting all the potential

<sup>46</sup>Mason's heirs claimed in 1679 that Mason had sent settlers to the Piscataqua in 1623 (*New Hampshire State Papers*, XVII, 534).

<sup>47</sup>David Thompson, a Scotsman who lived in Plymouth had acted as an agent for the Council for New England in 1622-3 and emigrated shortly afterwards to the Piscataqua area. Deane, "Indenture of David Thompson and Others," 358-85.

sources of profit in the country and was to be self-supporting as well.

Fur trading was not forgotten. It was reported that as many as a hundred Indians were to be found at one of the posts at one time; at least two vessels, the *Warwick* and the *Pied Cow*, made regular voyages with trade goods for the colony; and other vessels were chartered in addition for single voyages for fishing and trading. Lastly Neale fortified "Great Island" opposite Odiorne's Point in order to guard against attack from the sea.<sup>48</sup> The whole business was well planned and well carried out. If any purely commercial colony could have succeeded in New England this would have done so.

The time spent in building up the coastal base for operations naturally delayed the work of exploration. Neale had informed the Company in August, 1630 that he intended to start out at once to find the way to Laconia. But the associates learned with dismay that he had not gone out in September; and at the same time the merchants were pressing for return profits. Gibbons wrote to say that he was not satisfied with the trade goods which they had taken out with the first expedition in the *Warwick* and he was assured by Eyre that the reason for this was the haste and difficulty with which the expedition had been despatched. Eyre said that if return cargoes could be quickly sent back it would be easy to obtain new supplies of trade goods to send to New England.<sup>49</sup> There is no detailed record of all the returns, but in all probability they were not large.<sup>50</sup> On the other hand the running expenses were high. For instance sixty-six men and twenty-two women had been sent out to the colony and they all had to be paid their wages. Wives left in England were also given separation allowances until they could be shipped out to their husbands.<sup>51</sup> It is not difficult to appreciate that in the first years the returns which the Company received from its trading operations on the New England coastal plain were insufficient to cover its operating costs.

<sup>48</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 198-204, 283-5, 288-90, 305-6, 316-18, Letters of Eyre and Gibbons; "Farnham Papers," I, 143-50; Bouton (ed.), *Provincial Papers of New Hampshire*, I, 47, "George Watson's Deposition, 18 December, 1685."

<sup>49</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 284, Eyre to Gibbons, May 31, 1631.

<sup>50</sup>In one letter Gibbons informed the Laconia Company that he had delivered to a ship's captain named Raymond 76lb., 4 oz., of beaver, 10 otters, 6 musquashes, and one marten. He said also that Captain Neale had 358 lb., 2 oz., of beaver and otter, 17 martens, 1 black fox, 1 other fox, 3 raccoon skins and 14 musquashes, 2 of them with stones. Dean, *Mason*, 306-7.

<sup>51</sup>Neale's contract with Charles Knill, July 1, 1633 (Dean, *Mason*, 307-8); Gibbons's arrangements with Roger Knight (*ibid.*, 283-5); *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1674-1680*, 138, Contract of Sidrack Millar.

In order to help to pay its way the Company turned to fishing. For this purpose it had an admirable base in the Isles of Shoals. In 1631 it obtained from the Council for New England a patent for land on both sides of the Piscataqua estuary and this specifically included the islands off its mouth.<sup>52</sup> This was an expansion of the coastal base which the Laconia Company had been promised in the earlier patent. The associates also negotiated with the owners of fishing vessels to undertake fishing voyages to New England. But some of their fishing ventures proved unsuccessful. One man named Wirrott, with whom they had entered into an agreement, refused to divide the profits on the grounds that the Laconia partners had not put up their full share according to the contract. Another captain named Gibbs also "dealt ill" with the Company. As a result of these disagreements the "associates" became discouraged.<sup>53</sup>

But they were even more discouraged by the failure of Neale to send large quantities of furs and to discover the great lakes in the interior. There is some reason to believe that Neale did make an attempt to find Laconia. As early as November 3, 1631 the petition for the second, or Piscataqua, grant to the Laconia Company claimed that the associates had, through their agents, taken great pains and spent much time in discovering the country at a cost of over £3,000.<sup>54</sup> But of course that claim might have applied to the project as a whole and not particularly to the exploration of the interior. Some years later, in the course of a petition in which he asked for the governorship of New England, Neale said that he had made "greater discovery of the interior than was ever made before or since" and that he had "exactly discovered all the rivers and harbours in the habitable part of that country";<sup>55</sup> but this does not indicate how far he penetrated into the continent. Belknap, the historian of New Hampshire, wrote that Neale went far enough in 1632 to see the "White Hills," that is, the White Mountains of New Hampshire;<sup>56</sup> and this seems quite likely, but tells us very little about Neale's exploration for the mountains are visible out at sea.

<sup>52</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 198-204.

<sup>53</sup>P.R.O., C<sub>2</sub>, Charles I G15/12, 7 June, 1632, Sir Ferdinando Gorges, John Mason, John Cotton, Henry Gardner, George Griffith, Thomas Eyre, and Thomas Wannerton, versus Edward Wirrott of Plymouth, William Simons and others concerning a fishing voyage in the summer of 1631. Dean, *Mason*, 305, Laconia Company to Gibbons, Dec. 5, 1632; pp. 316-18, Gibbons to the Laconia Company, July 13, 1633.

<sup>54</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 198-204, or "Farnham Papers," I, 143-50.

<sup>55</sup>P.R.O., C.O. 1/8, 131.

<sup>56</sup>Quoted by C. W. Tuttle, biography of Mason (Dean *Mason*, 72n).

Ferdinando Gorges, Sir Ferdinando's grandson, wrote many years afterwards that, "The way over land to this great lake from the Plantation of Pascataway hath been attempted by Captain Walter Neale, once Governor, at the charges of my grandfather, Capt. Mason, and some merchants of London, and the discovery wanted one day's journey of finishing, because their victuals were spent, which for want of horses they were enforced to carry with their arms and their clothes upon their backs."<sup>57</sup> This account is substantiated to some extent by the fact that in 1632 Sir Ferdinando Gorges, his cousin Lord Edward Gorges, and Mason were planning to send out horses which they said they knew would be of good service "at the islands."<sup>58</sup> This phrase suggests the Isles of Shoals but it seems unlikely that horses would be necessary there. It is possible that this somewhat mysterious statement actually refers to the work of the Laconia colonists taken as a whole and that the horses were required for the overland journey to the lakes. The idea that horses were necessary for the project recurs two years later in a letter of Gibbons to Mason where he wrote that if he had two horses and three men he would himself be able to find the lakes.<sup>59</sup> It seems likely therefore that Neale was prevented from penetrating far into the interior by difficulties in transportation. The rivers flowing into the Atlantic at Portsmouth are navigable for only a very short distance and water carriage, on which those who had originally planned Laconia had relied, proved impossible. Neale probably tried various river routes and then struggled through the woods for some distance. If he came near a lake, it is probable that it was Lake Winnepesaukee in New Hampshire.<sup>60</sup> W. H. Hubbard, the historian of New England, says that Neale reported "*Non est inventa Provincia.*"<sup>61</sup>

Meanwhile, discouraged by the lack of profits, by the failure of their fishing ventures, and by not hearing from Neale that the way to the lakes had been discovered, the London merchants who had joined with Mason and Gorges in financing the Laconia Company began to fall away. In 1632 the Company wrote to instruct Neale to return to England to confer with them "that by conference with him they may settle things in a better order." He was told

<sup>57</sup>Gorges, *America Painted to the Life*, II, 66-7.

<sup>58</sup>P.R.O., C.O. 1/6, 44, 52, Gorges to Mason, Mar. 18 and Apr. 6, 1632.

<sup>59</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 334-6, Gibbons to Mason, Aug. 6, 1634.

<sup>60</sup>Lake Winnepesaukee is situated only about thirty miles inland. The modern city of "Laconia" is built in that area but has no direct connexion with the Company's efforts. The Lake Winnepesaukee area was opened up around 1770 by settlers from the colony of Massachusetts Bay using the natural entry by way of the Merrimac.

<sup>61</sup>W. H. Hubbard, "History of New England" (*Collections*, Massachusetts Historical Society, 2nd series, V, 216).

to pay off the Company's servants at Piscataqua leaving only those who could "live of themselves." The house at Newichewannock was left in Gibbons's care because he had proved more successful in securing profits. At the same time the Company sent instructions that the fishing operations from New England bases were to be increased, and Gibbons was also directed to help those ship captains who had been sent out with goods for the fur trade. He was instructed to take over their surplus goods for future trading.<sup>62</sup> The Company had in its stores large quantities of trade goods, stockings, coats, papoose coats, kettles, hatchets, shoes, shirts, blankets, and "goads" of cotton.<sup>63</sup> During the next two years these goods were exchanged for beaver and by 1635 the Company's moveable property in its various houses in the Piscataqua area consisted only of cannon and muskets, stores and provisions, fishing tackle, cattle, and articles for "religious use."<sup>64</sup> It is apparent that in those years the Company closed down its fur-trading operations.

By 1634 the merchants had withdrawn altogether and only Mason and Gorges were desirous of venturing further. The difference between the attitude of these gentlemen and the merchants to this whole business of colonial settlement is nowhere more clearly demonstrated than in one of Mason's letters to Gibbons. He wrote, ". . . I am sorry in that so good a business (albeit hitherto it hath been unprofitable) should be subject to fall to the ground; and therefore I have strained myself to do this at present and could have wished the rest would have joined to have sent you some provisions for trade and support of the place; but that failing, I have directed to you, as a token from myself, one hogshead of mault to make you some beer. . . . I have disbursed a great deal of money in the plantation and never received one penny; but if there were once a discovery of the lakes, I should in some reasonable time, be reimbursed again."<sup>65</sup> Gibbons told Mason that he would never again trust the merchants.<sup>66</sup> The resources of Mason and Gorges, without support, were inadequate to carry the Laconia enterprise.

<sup>62</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 305-6, Mason, Gardner, Griffith, Wannerton, and Thomas Eyre, the Company of Laconia, to Ambrose Gibbons, Dec. 5, 1632.

<sup>63</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 300-1, "Trade goods now shipped aboard the ship *John*," Apr. 8, 1632; pp. 308-9, "Trade goods at Newichewannock," July, 1633; pp. 309-16, Inventories, 1 July 1633. A "goad" is an obsolete cloth-measure equal to four and a half feet.

<sup>64</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 332-4, "A Remembrance of goods . . . belonging unto the worshipful company of Adventurers for Laconia," July 20, 1634; pp. 341-4, "Inventory of goods at Pascataqua and Newichewannock," July, 1635.

<sup>65</sup>Dean, *Mason*, Mason to Gibbons, May 5, 1634.

<sup>66</sup>Bouton (ed.), *Provincial Papers of New Hampshire*, I, 91.

At a meeting of the Company on December 6, 1633 the Company's land on the northeast side of the Piscataqua was divided up among the surviving members, and some swine in New England were also shared out. The land on the southwest side, where two of the Company's "houses" stood, remained undivided for the present.<sup>67</sup> On May 5, 1634, instructions were sent by Mason and Gorges to Gibbons to divide up the Company's moveable property. As Mason had bought out the shares of John Cotton and his brother, one-half of all the Company's assets belonged to him and Gorges in the proportion of three to one between them.<sup>68</sup> A year later, in 1635, the division of the land between Mason and Gorges was confirmed when the Piscataqua became in 1635 the boundary between their great provinces of New Hampshire and Maine, provinces that were their shares of the territory of the Council for New England and were, of course, much larger than the Laconia Company's territory on the coast.<sup>69</sup>

Mason continued to work on his own for his own plantation. The post at Newichewannock had fallen to him. He sent out the material for a saw-mill in 1634 and made enquiries about iron ore which had been discovered by Gibbons near his house. With fanatical enthusiasm he continued to hope for the discovery of the lakes. Gibbons commended his decision to persevere with the plantation and also encouraged his hope for the discovery of a route to Laconia.<sup>70</sup> However Mason died in 1635, shortly after the division of the territorial rights of the Council for New England had brought to him the Province of New Hampshire and after he had succeeded in obtaining a royal commission from the King as vice-admiral of New England.<sup>71</sup>

It has been seen that Sir Ferdinando Gorges had never been deeply concerned with the details of the Laconia Company's business and that he had left the direction of its affairs to Mason. Furthermore, after the creation of the Laud Commission for Plantations in 1634, Gorges had resumed his interest in New England as a whole and had engineered the division of the territory of the Council for New England in 1635. Mason's death left Gorges a welter of problems. While he was struggling to obtain an appointment as royal governor for the whole of New England

<sup>67</sup>J. S. Jenness, "Transcripts" (*New Hampshire State Papers*, XVII, 487-8).

<sup>68</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 329-30.

<sup>69</sup>"Records of the Council for New England" (*Proceedings*, American Antiquarian Society, 1867, 116, 117).

<sup>70</sup>Dean, *Mason*, 322-32, Mason's contract with three men to set up a saw-mill, Mar. 13, 1633/4; pp. 334-6, Gibbons to Mason, Aug. 6, 1634; Winthrop, *Journal*, I, 129.

<sup>71</sup>*Proceedings*, American Antiquarian Society, 1867, 117-18.

and a royal patent for his Province of Maine, the bankruptcy of the Laconia Company involved him in endless legal troubles. Eyre sued him to compel him to accept responsibility for action which Eyre had undertaken on the instructions of the Company.<sup>72</sup> Sir Ferdinando was also compelled to pay off the servants of the Company despite his claim that he had not been a party to particular agreements,<sup>73</sup> and as late as 1644 one of the Laconia associates, John Cotton, who had emigrated to Massachusetts and had become a powerful Puritan preacher there, was still suing Gorges for money in connexion with one of the fishing voyages sent out by Cotton and some of the other Laconia adventurers in a vessel belonging to Mathew Craddock.<sup>74</sup> Undoubtedly the financial collapse of the Laconia Company was an important cause of Gorges's ultimate failure to establish effective control in New England, and its demise thus left Massachusetts Bay as the predominant power in that area.

As for the plan to intercept the fur trade by penetrating to the lakes in the Iroquois country, it had made little progress after Neale returned to England and after the death of Mason removed its chief supporter. Thomas Morton, the old rogue of Merry-mount who had been driven out of Massachusetts by the Puritans, said that Henry Jocelyn, who succeeded Neale as governor of Gorges's interests in New England, was expected to make another attempt to find the great inland lake. Morton himself believed that the lake was three hundred miles' distance from the Atlantic.<sup>75</sup> The further continuance of the search for a route to the lakes may have led to other exploration of up-country New England of which no record now remains. It is known that in 1642 an Irishman called Darby Field made the first recorded ascent of the White Mountains. He reported that he saw to the north a great water which he judged to be a hundred miles across but beyond which he could see no land, that he saw the ocean to the southeast at Saco, apparently only twenty miles away, and that in the east he saw what he thought was the "Gulf of Canada." He also saw "some great waters in parts to the westward, which he judged to be the great lake which the Canada river comes out of."<sup>76</sup>

<sup>72</sup>Jenness, "Transcripts" (*New Hampshire State Papers*, XVII, 493-5).

<sup>73</sup>*Acts Privy Council, Colonial*, I, 232, 250-1, 251-3, 255, 266-7, 286.

<sup>74</sup>Cotton vs. Gorges, Court of Requests, Bills and Answers, 19 Car. I, in Appendix IV of Jenness, *Isles of Shoals*, 185. Mathew Craddock was the first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Company. Cotton had earlier sued Gorges and Gardner, perhaps on the same issue. Jenness, "Transcripts" (*New Hampshire State Papers*, XVII, 493-5).

<sup>75</sup>Thomas Morton, *New English Canaan* (London, 1883), 237, 238.

<sup>76</sup>Winthrop, *Journal*, II, 62, 85-6.

Two years later a group of Massachusetts merchants, believing in the existence of a great lake within the northwest bounds of the colony's patent, obtained monopolistic rights on trade to the lakes and financed an expedition to seek a route thither by way of the River Delaware. Their ship was prevented by the Dutch and Swedes from ascending the river and then was not allowed to return home until the men of Massachusetts had paid to the governor of the Swedish fort 40s., the cost of a warning shot which he had fired at them!<sup>77</sup> And so the last effort to find Laconia ended in comedy. In actuality, however, the English obtained Laconia from the Dutch in 1664 when they captured New Amsterdam and took over the Iroquois alliance and thenceforward they had a hold on the fur trade which they never again relinquished.

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<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, 164, 181, 190-1.

## THE INDIANS IN THE WAR OF 1812

THE use of primitive peoples to fight the battles of civilized nations has, from time to time, been condemned by moralists. And yet, despite such condemnation, the practice has been frequent in our history. Certainly today few nations would cavil at the employment of Senegalese by France or Ghurkas by Great Britain —except, perhaps, such nations as do not possess colonies providing coloured man power. In the past, in North America, all nations have been prepared to employ the native Indian peoples as military auxiliaries. Each country, be it France, England or the United States, while admitting the difficulties of keeping their aboriginal allies within the recognized bounds of civilized warfare, has been prepared, not only to use, but to employ every device to solicit the assistance of the Indians. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the French relied to a great extent upon the Indians for the defence of Canada. The British sedulously cultivated the friendship of the League of the Iroquois, and in particular that of the Mohawk nation. During the American Revolution the United States succeeded in detaching many Oneida from the League through the efforts of the Reverend Samuel Kirkland. Thus in 1812 when President Madison declared war upon Great Britain and Henry Clay boasted that the Kentucky militia alone could take Canada, it is not surprising to find both contestants seeking the aid of such Indian warriors as were prepared to take up the tomahawk on their behalf.

As far as the Indians were concerned, Great Britain enjoyed certain marked advantages. The British Indian Department had behind it a long tradition of successful dealing with the Indians ever since the day when William Johnson had been appointed superintendent of the Six Nations in 1755. The Department had extended its activities to Canada after the Seven Years' War, and after the American Revolution removed its main office to Montreal. In 1774 Colonel Guy Johnson was appointed to succeed Sir William, and in 1782 Sir John Johnson, Sir William's son, was appointed superintendent-general of Indian affairs. The expanding needs of the service necessitated a division of responsibility and at the end of the eighteenth century the Department was divided, with the superintendent-general remaining at Montreal and a new office, that of the deputy superintendent-general, being opened at Fort George.

At the outset there had been a close association between the officers of the Indian Department and those of the military establishment. Indeed the *raison d'être* of the Department was to facilitate the employment of the Indians as military auxiliaries rather than their education or civilization. Control of Indian affairs thus rested ultimately in the hands of the commander-in-chief and disbursements were made out of the military chest. However, in 1796 in Upper Canada, and in 1800 in Lower Canada, the control of Indian affairs was transferred from the military to the civil authorities. It was not until May 13, 1816, that the management of Indian affairs was once more placed under the direction of the commander of the forces in British North America.

One of the most significant features of the Indian Department in its early days was the strong personal hold which the officers of the Department acquired over the Indians. For many years, the men who ran the Department were men who had been schooled in the tradition of Sir William Johnson; when they passed on, their sons succeeded to their appointments and to their influence. Many of the officers of the Department were related to one another, and in some instances, to the very Indians whose affairs they administered. Names like Johnson, McKee, Claus, Elliott, Caldwell, Chew and others were names familiar to more than one generation of Indians; and they were still names to conjure with in 1812. This fact gave the Indian Department a strong sense of independence, one which brought it into conflict with the military authorities after the war broke out.

To swing the Indians to the British side was not a difficult task. The western tribes, in particular, had never ceased to hate the Americans. They had refused to lay down their arms when the white men had stopped fighting in 1783, preferring to carry on an unequal struggle to preserve the Ohio as the boundary of the Indian territory until they were finally defeated at the hands of "Mad Anthony" Wayne and compelled to accept the peace of Greenville in 1795. Although the United States claimed territorial sovereignty over their lands, the western Indians continued to look to Great Britain for assistance and advice. And these Great Britain was prepared to give. To have refused would have been to impose unnecessary hardship and undue distress upon the Indians who were completely dependent for their very subsistence upon periodical handouts of ammunition. There is no evidence to show that the British ever used their influence with the western Indians deliberately to stir them up against the United States—and much to the contrary—but there is truth in the charge that

the Indians were encouraged by Great Britain never to let the ancient covenant chain of friendship grow brown with rust. Political and military factors made it essential for the British to retain the confidence of the Indians. Against the western Indians the colony of Upper Canada had no defence whatever; against the Americans, unfriendly and threatening, Canada's greatest assurance of protection seemed to lie in the support of the red men. The fur trade too, still one of the principal economic activities of Canada, required the friendship of the western Indians. That is why the Indians continued to receive presents in large numbers from the British government through the agency of the British Indian Department. Undoubtedly these presents, the official expressions of sympathy, the retention of the western posts until 1796, the presence of British agents at Indian councils, must have worked strongly upon the minds of the Indians to convince them that Great Britain was still their ally and that in a final test of strength with the United States, Great Britain would defend them; even when no official encouragement was actually given them so to believe.

The British might hope for much from the western tribes; from the Six Nations they could expect less. The League of the Iroquois for the greater part, and the Mohawk in particular, had thrown in their lot with the British between 1776 and 1783. They had been assured that their interests would never be forgotten by their Great Father the King when peace should be made and felt confident that the boundaries fixed at Stanwix in 1768 would be confirmed by victory in arms. When the treaty was finally signed in 1783 it included no mention of the claims of the Indians. There was bitter disillusion among the tribes. They had never accepted the view that they were subjects of the Crown: they were Allies. The King had no right to cede to the United States lands which were not his to cede.<sup>1</sup> Sir John Johnson, unwilling though he was for obvious reasons to undertake the task, was finally compelled to go to Niagara to face the Indians assembled in Council. Even liberal portions of rum and Johnson's evasions of the truth could not calm the fears of the Six Nations that they had been cheated by the British;<sup>2</sup> nor did Haldimand's grant of lands to John

<sup>1</sup>Public Archives of Canada, B 103, 177, Maclean to Haldimand, May 18, 1783.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 280, Maclean to Haldimand, July 19, 1783. See also B 119, 195 ff. and P. A. C., Claus Papers, III, 246 ff. for the proceedings of the Indian council. Johnson told the Indians that the peace treaty had not included the lands set aside for the Indians at Stanwix and gave them assurances of support should the United States attempt to deprive them of their lands, which he must have known he had no authority to give. It was not surprising that Haldimand should later urge the retention of the western posts; to risk further disillusion would be to risk an Indian war.

Deserontyon's Mohawk at the Bay of Quinte, the traditional home of Dekanawida the founder of the League, and to Joseph Brant's followers at the Grand River, allay the distrust which had been aroused in the Indian minds by the British neglect of their interests at Versailles.

We do not find among the Six Nations, between 1783 and 1812, the same display of enthusiastic loyalty which had marked their former devotion to the cause of Great Britain and the person of Sir William Johnson. And their attitude was not improved by the disputes which subsequently arose over the extent and nature of the Grand River grant.<sup>3</sup> Even Joseph Brant, whose fidelity and attachment to the Crown had elicited the commendation of Haldimand in 1781, was looked upon a few years later with distinct disfavour by the secretary of state in charge of the colonies.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless the Six Nations were prepared to fight when war came to their doors and when they became convinced that the British were determined to prosecute the war with real vigour. They had little enough for which to thank the British; from the Americans they could expect even less.

From the Caughnawaga Indians, the "praying Indians" of the Ancien Régime, the British might hope for, but had little reason to expect, much assistance in the event of war. There had been a strong infiltration of New England blood into the Indians at the Sault St-Louis, as Peter Kalm observed in 1749,<sup>5</sup> and their attitude during the American Revolutionary War had not been one to inspire great confidence in their loyalty to Great Britain. In 1778 the Indian superintendent accused them of having "listened to the singing of evil birds" and declared that the hatchet which he had given them had "been rusted by some Dirt which the Rebels wanted to throw in your Eyes."<sup>6</sup> Iroquois from Caughnawaga formed part of a delegation to the French headquarters at New-

<sup>3</sup>The two questions at issue were the boundaries of the Grand River reserve and the right of the Indians to a transmissible title. This last was withheld by Simcoe for the protection of the Indians, much to their annoyance. The Six Nations finally gave Joseph Brant power of attorney to surrender, sell, or transfer their lands for the purpose of forming a fund which would provide them with an annuity when the wild game had vanished. Brant conveyed large tracts of lands by sale and by 999 year lease, in many instances for nominal consideration.

<sup>4</sup>B 222, 68, Haldimand to Claus, Apr. 19, 1781; P.A.C., G 53-2, 579, Portland to Hunter, Oct. 4, 1799. See also P.A.C., C 252, 270.

<sup>5</sup>Prisoners taken during the Ancien Régime had frequently been adopted by and later married into the Indian tribes. Silas Rice captured at Marlboro, Mass., in 1703; Eunice Williams, one of the captives of Deerfield in 1704; Jacob Hill and John Stacey, two boys taken near Albany in 1755, are outstanding instances of this. See E. J. Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga* (Montreal, 1922), 421.

<sup>6</sup>B 119, 8-10, Proceedings of a Council held at Montreal, Aug. 14, 1778.

port in 1780.<sup>7</sup> "Colonel" Louis Cook, the half-breed Abenaki from Caughnawaga, who had acted as go-between for the Oneida and Caughnawaga<sup>8</sup> during the American Revolutionary War, was alive in 1812; he was too old to fight, but his name still carried weight among the Indians of Lower Canada and when linked with that of the Reverend Eleazar Williams of Caughnawaga, the pseudo-Bourbon heir<sup>9</sup> who endeavoured to seduce the Caughnawaga and St-Regis Indians from their allegiance to the Catholic Church and to the King of England, caused considerable alarm in official British circles. Certainly the indifference of the Seven Nations of Lower Canada to the fate of British rule in North America was such that it brought down upon the heads of the Indians the wrath of Sir George Prevost who told them they "were like old women, and that if they would not fight willingly where and when they were ordered to, they should be considered unworthy of receiving provisions and presents from their Great Father's Government. . . ."<sup>10</sup>

### I. THE WESTERN THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, 1812-13

The war which broke out in 1812 was preceded by years of uncertainty. In 1807 the threat of hostilities was sufficiently real to cause considerable alarm in Canada, and Sir James Craig, the governor-general, entered into a lengthy correspondence with Lieutenant-Governor Gore of Upper Canada with respect to the disposition and possible employment of the western Indians. Craig considered it essential that the Indians be included in any defence plans for Canada and hoped to be able to take advantage of their antagonism towards the Americans. At Gore's instructions William Claus was sent to Amherstburg to ascertain the intentions of the Indians. He found the Shawnees prepared to take the field against the Americans but reported that the other nations were reserved and noncommittal. He estimated that "the number of

<sup>7</sup>Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga*, 321.

<sup>8</sup>F. B. Hough, *A History of St-Lawrence and Franklin Counties New York, from Their Earliest Period to the Present Time* (Albany, 1853), 182. Colonel Louis was commissioned into the American army and went to Plattsburg where he was regarded as "a firm and undeviating friend of the United States" (*ibid.*, 195). His father was a Negro and his mother an Abenaki from St. Francis according to Hough, although other sources suggest he was of mixed French, Negro, and Oneida blood.

<sup>9</sup>Eleazar Williams, a descendent of one of the Deerfield captives, claimed to be the son of Louis XVI and that he had been smuggled out of the hands of the revolutionists in Paris and brought to North America where he was secretly raised by the Caughnawaga Indians. Although he was an arrant imposter he was adept at exploiting the credulity of newspaper men and others. For a full account see J. H. Hanson, *The Lost Prince: Facts Tending to Prove the Identity of Louis the Seventeenth and the Rev. Eleazar Williams, Missionary among the Indians in North America* (New York, 1854).

<sup>10</sup>Quoted in Devine, *Historic Caughnawaga*, 321.

fighting men" in the Miami and Michigan country "do not exceed fifteen hundred" who, in view of the defenceless state of Amherstburg, might prove "very backward" in coming forward.<sup>11</sup> Craig was very distressed at this apparent lack of enthusiasm and in a letter to Gore requested the lieutenant-governor to impress upon the Indian Department the "peculiar importance" which he attached "to the success of our endeavours to conciliate and secure the Indians to our interests."<sup>12</sup> Reporting to Viscount Castlereagh on July 15, 1808, Craig deplored that so little interest had been taken in the Indians; a neglect which he attributed to the mistaken idea that "it has been thought little probable that we should ever have occasion for their assistance": a "commendable principle of economy" in the matter of Indian presents had, he felt, "in this instance been attended with . . . ill consequence."<sup>13</sup>

That the Indians must constitute an important component of the defence forces of Canada was always appreciated by Major General Brock. He was aware of the temper of the Shawnees and knew of Tecumseh's efforts to form a western Indian confederacy, and although he took care to direct the officers of the Indian Department at Amherstburg to exert their whole influence to dissuade the Indians from attacking the Americans in 1811,<sup>14</sup> he took equal care to secure that should war break out between Great Britain and the United States, the Indians would be found on the British side. He realized that the best way to engage their active support would be a quick, decisive action against Detroit and Michilimackinac; only in this way would it be possible to convince those Indians who felt that they had been deserted by the British when Major Campbell refused to help them against Wayne in 1794 and when the red coats marched out of the western posts in 1796 "that we are earnestly engaged in the War."<sup>15</sup>

It was in accordance with this policy that Brock wrote in February, 1812, four months before the actual declaration of war, to Robert Dickson, a British fur trader then in Wisconsin, asking him "to ascertain the degree of cooperation that you and your friends might be able to furnish, in case of . . . an Emergency

<sup>11</sup>P.A.C., Q 107, 233, Extract of a letter from Claus to Gore, Apr. 20, 1808. The Craig-Gore correspondence is to be found in Q 107.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, 232, Extract of a letter from Craig to Gore, May 11, 1808.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 202, Craig to Castlereagh, July 15, 1808.

<sup>14</sup>E. Cruikshank, "The Employment of Indians in the War of 1812" (*Annual Report*, American Historical Association, 1895, 323).

<sup>15</sup>C 673, 171, Brock to Prevost, Dec. 2, 1811. See also *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, ed. W. Wood (3 vols., Champlain Society, Toronto, 1920), I, 271 ff. and *Documentary History of the Campaign on the Niagara Frontier*, ed. E. Cruikshank (9 vols., Welland, 1896), III, 21.

taking place."<sup>16</sup> Dickson received this communication in June and hastened to assure Brock of the services of 250 to 300 Indians, 79 of whom he sent at once to Amherstburg while hurrying himself with the remainder directly to St. Joseph's.<sup>17</sup>

Meanwhile General Hull at Detroit was engaged in similar efforts to gain Indian support, or at least to ensure Indian neutrality. He had been instructed to "adopt such measures with the chiefs of the several tribes of Indians as may . . . appear to be the best calculated to secure the peace of the country."<sup>18</sup> He therefore despatched Huron agents to the Grand River with a promise that the Six Nations would be undisturbed in the occupation of their lands<sup>19</sup> and invited all the Indians in the vicinity of Detroit, including those under Tecumseh and Roundhead who had already joined the British at Amherstburg, to attend an Indian council at the Wyandot village at Brownstown.<sup>20</sup> Both chiefs, however, remained firm in their refusal to have anything to do with the Americans and Colonel Matthew Elliott wrote to Claus that Tecumseh "has shewn himself to be a determined character and a great friend to our Government."<sup>21</sup> This was good news to Brock's ears, for he had always been apprehensive lest the scale of American preparations at Detroit should so impress the Indians with the strength and determination of the United States that they would be reluctant to support a side which might appear to have little chance of victory.

The first success of the war went to the British, not to the Americans. The small British force at St. Joseph's, taking advantage of a prior knowledge of the official declaration of war, immediately seized Michilimackinac, a fort long known to the Indian trade.<sup>22</sup> The effect of this victory was all that Brock had hoped for: to quote General Hull ". . . after the surrender of Michilimackinac, almost every tribe and nation of Indians, excepting a part of the Miamis and Delawares, north from beyond Lake Superior, west from beyond the Mississippi, south from the

<sup>16</sup> *Select British Documents*, I, 423, Brock to Dickson, Feb. 27, 1812. See also C 256, 209.

<sup>17</sup> *Select British Documents*, 424, Dickson to Brock, June 18, 1812; C 256, 211.

<sup>18</sup> Cruikshank, "Employment of Indians in the War of 1812," 328.

<sup>19</sup> Hull's letter to the Six Nations is printed in *Select British Documents*, I, 359 and in *Documentary History*, III, 132.

<sup>20</sup> Cruikshank, "Employment of Indians in the War of 1812," 329.

<sup>21</sup> *Select British Documents*, I, 358, Elliott to Claus, July 15, 1812.

<sup>22</sup> For the events of the war see C. P. Lucas, *The Canadian War of 1812* (Oxford, 1906). A recent American account of the war is F. F. Beirne, *The War of 1812* (New York, 1949). Oddly enough Beirne seems unaware of the existence of Sir Charles Lucas's book.

Ohio and Wabash, and east from every part of Upper Canada and from all the intermediate country, joined in open hostility, under the British standard against the Army I commanded. . . . The surrender of Michilimackinac opened the northern hive of Indians, and they were swarming down in every direction."<sup>23</sup> One must make allowances for the fact that Hull, when he penned this report, was seeking to find excuses for his own supine conduct at Detroit in August; but there is no doubt that the initial British success at Michilimackinac made an impact upon the Indians far out of proportion to its broader military significance.

On the Detroit front Hull made the first move by crossing the river and penetrating into Upper Canada. He issued a belligerent manifesto threatening reprisals against those taken in arms with the Indians but made no hostile move against the British position at Amherstburg. Then came the news of the British success at Michilimackinac quickly followed by rumours that the British forces on his flank included 5,000 Indians!<sup>24</sup> The report was false, but Hull was gullible enough to believe it and finding his line of communications cut by Tecumseh, he succumbed to the war of nerves and surrendered his entire command to General Brock on August 16 without striking a blow. The American frontier was thus thrust a long way back towards the Ohio, the line the Indians sought to establish as their boundary. Brock reaped great credit for his spectacular victory, but without the aid of Tecumseh and the Indians it could never have been so easily achieved, a fact which Brock willingly admitted. From the day the two men met face to face at Amherstburg each respected the other, and Brock wrote of his ally "a more sagacious or a more gallant Warrior does not I believe exist."<sup>25</sup>

During the autumn and winter Robert Dickson continued to hand out presents and to send Indians to Amherstburg. Behind him was the full support of the fur barons of Montreal. James McGill wrote to Sir George Prevost on Dickson's behalf pointing out, "The Indians are the only Allies who can aught avail in the defence of the Canadas. They have the same interest as us,

<sup>23</sup>*The Historical Register of the United States from the Declaration of War in 1812 to January 1st 1814* (2 vols., Washington, 1814), II, 41-2, Hull to Eustis, Aug. 26, 1812.

<sup>24</sup>Owing to the capture of Hull's orders and despatches at Brownstown as a result of an Indian ambush, the British were fully informed of Hull's weakness and his fear of the Indians. It was thus possible to play upon his fears by planting a letter purporting to be from Procter to the commanding officer at Michilimackinac asking that no more Indians be sent to Amherstburg as there were already more than 5,000 there! (Beirne, *The War of 1812*, 103).

<sup>25</sup>*Select British Documents*, I, 508, Brock to Liverpool, Aug. 29, 1812.

and alike are objects of American subjugation, if not extermination."<sup>26</sup> He urged that Dickson's requests for further supplies be given favourable consideration. Sir George was more than favourably disposed towards Dickson. Not only was he prepared to compensate him for the sums which had been spent upon Indian presents<sup>27</sup> but commissioned him as a special agent for the Indians west of Lake Huron with a staff of five officers and fifteen interpreters and authority to "make such requisitions as may be necessary upon H.M. Indian storekeepers and other proper officers for such goods and provisions as from time to time shall be considered needful"; all this "in the expectation that upwards of 1,000 picked warriors will be collected."<sup>28</sup>

The Indians, however useful their services may have been at Michilimackinac, Brownstown, and Detroit, were at best unsatisfactory soldiers. They were devoid of discipline. They lacked tenacity and were easily discouraged by failure. They were restless, dissatisfied during periods of enforced inactivity, and yet inclined to fight for only brief periods at a time. Tactically they offered great advantages in ambuscades and forest warfare, but when it came to besieging a fort protected by walls and cannon, they were invariably useless.<sup>29</sup>

This weakness on the part of the Indians as a fighting force became painfully apparent during the campaign of 1813. In January Colonel Procter administered a check to General Winchester at Au Raisin River where the issue was decided by the Indians outflanking the Americans on either side and gaining their rear; at Fort Meigs, however, the Indians drifted away after several days' siege leaving Procter, according to his own report, with "less than twenty Chiefs and Warriors." Well might Procter add that "under present Circumstances, at least, our Indian Force is not a disposable one, or permanent, tho' occasionally a most powerful Aid."<sup>30</sup> Throughout the spring and summer western Indians flocked to Amherstburg adding both to Procter's strength and to his embarrassment. They consumed vast quantities of food and Procter's supplies were never abundant. It was, therefore, as

<sup>26</sup>C 257, 31, McGill to Prevost, Dec. 19, 1812.

<sup>27</sup>A board of commissioners including General de Rottenburg, McGill and his associates, John Richardson and Wm. McGillivray, and officers of the Indian Department, awarded Dickson the sum of £1,875 to cover the cost of the goods which he distributed among the Indians during the summer and autumn of 1812 (P.A.C., C 257, 11). A detailed statement of Dickson's claims may be found in *Select British Documents*, I, 426-7.

<sup>28</sup>C 257, 4, Instructions for Robert Dickson, Jan. 14, 1813.

<sup>29</sup>G. F. G. Stanley, "British Operations in the American North-West 1812-1815" (*Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, XXII, no. 87, Autumn, 1943, 95-6).

<sup>30</sup>*Select British Documents*, II, 35-6, Procter to Prevost, May 14, 1813; C 678, 261.

much with the object of finding employment for his Indians as in the hope of administering a defeat to the Americans that he led his force against Fort Stephenson late in July. But a cannon, a stockade, and a determined Irishman stopped the Indian assault and the British force returned to Amherstburg with both Procter and the Indians indulging in mutual recriminations.

During the autumn it became clear that the reverses suffered at Fort Meigs and Fort Stephenson had not been without their effect upon Indian morale. Procter was aware of what was happening and begged that reinforcements of regulars be sent him in order "that our Dependance on the Indian Force may not appear to so great a Degree as it has hitherto done," also "to prevent Defection among the Indian Tribes, which ought strenuously to be guarded against, from the Propensity of Indians to follow each other, on the most unaccountable Impulse at Times."<sup>31</sup>

If the Indians needed a stimulant for their morale, so too did Procter. He was not a man of great courage nor did he ever enjoy the respect of his redskin allies. He seems to have been very much alarmed at the extent of the American preparations for a counter attack and was inclined to pull out of his exposed position. He feared, however, that such a course might lead to trouble with the Indians and endeavoured to cloak his intentions from his allies. Finally, after Barclay's defeat at Put-in-Bay and the loss of Lake Erie to the Americans, he felt that he had no choice but withdrawal, even though Tecumseh, anxious to fight it out where he stood, likened the British commander to a whipped dog crawling away with its tail between its legs. And there was some aptness to the metaphor. For when Procter was finally shamed into making a stand at Moraviantown on October 5, 1813, it was Tecumseh and the Indians who did the fighting, not Procter's red coats. Tecumseh gave his life; Procter saved his by flight.

The effect upon the Indians of the defeat at Moraviantown was as decisive as that of the victories at Detroit and Michilimackinac. With military defeat and the death of the soul and inspiration of the Indian resistance, organized Indian opposition in the Michigan and Lake Erie region came to an end. Small bands of Indians might harass the American army on its withdrawal from Moraviantown, but no large forces of Indians were again mustered on the Detroit front. Only in the upper reaches of Lake Huron and in Wisconsin, where Robert Dickson continued to hand out large numbers of presents and larger numbers of promises while arrang-

<sup>31</sup> *Select British Documents*, II, 262, Procter to Baynes, Aug. 19, 1813; C 679, 456.

ing with Sir George Prevost for still larger supplies of both, did the British influence over the Indians remain unimpaired.

## II. THE NIAGARA FRONTIER, 1812-13

The response of the western Indians to the British appeals for assistance was by no means equalled in alacrity or ardour by that of the Six Nations. The Iroquois tribes had, after the American Revolutionary War, accepted land reserves not only in Canada but in the United States as well and they had little stomach, at this time, to engage in fratricidal war. Hoping to take advantage of this disinclination on the part of the Six Nations to join in the hostilities, the United States prevailed upon the old Seneca chief, Cornplanter, to send a deputation of American Iroquois to Canada to talk in terms of Indian neutrality with their kindred at Grand River. There is no doubt that the Canadian Six Nations were disposed to toy with the idea of neutrality, but to the American deputation they returned the answer: "It is the President of the United States makes war upon us. We know not your disputes. . . . The British say the Americans want to take our lands. We do not want to fight, nor do we intend to disturb you; but if you come to take our land, we are determined to defend ourselves."<sup>32</sup>

Brock was just as anxious to bring the Six Nations into the war as the Americans were to keep them out. On July 3, 1812, he wrote: "About 100 Indians from the Grand River have attended to my summons, the remainder promise to come also, but I have too much reason to conclude that the Americans have been too successful in their endeavours to sow dissension and disaffection among them."<sup>33</sup> Three weeks later he learned to his disgust that only fifty Grand River Indians were willing to go to Detroit; the remainder had determined to follow a cautious policy of wait and see.<sup>34</sup> This was a great source of apprehension to the commanding general, for as long as the Indians remained undecided as to their course of action, the civilian population living in the Niagara peninsula would be reluctant to leave their homes and join the militia at Amherstburg or Fort George.<sup>35</sup> Brock therefore hastened

<sup>32</sup>B. J. Lossing, *The Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812* (New York, 1869), 400n.

<sup>33</sup>*Select British Documents*, I, 348, Brock to Prevost, July 3, 1812; C 676, 115.

<sup>34</sup>*Select British Documents*, 378, Brock to Prevost, July 26, 1812. Brock attributed this change of sentiment to the agents whom Hull had sent to Grand River with his letter to the Six Nations. See above note 19.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.* Brock wrote "I meditated, the moment I could collect a sufficient number of Militia, a diversion to the westward, in the hope of compelling General Hull to retreat across the river, but this unexpected intelligence has ruined the whole of my plans. The Militia, which I destined for this service, will now be alarmed, and unwilling to leave

to answer Hull's letter to the Indians by drawing attention to Hull's inconsistency in making threats in his Proclamation while making promises in his letter, and by sending Joseph Willcocks to Grand River to counter the American propaganda.<sup>36</sup>

However cool the Six Nations Indians may have been at the beginning of hostilities, they warmed to enthusiasm after the British victories at Michilimackinac and Detroit. On September 7 Brock reported to Prevost that he had now three hundred Indians assembled at Fort George with "two hundred more . . . expected tomorrow." "They appear ashamed of themselves," he wrote, "and promise to whipe away the disgrace into which they have fallen by their late conduct."<sup>37</sup> Even so he was not inclined to place too much reliance on their loyalty. He felt that so long as he was able to maintain his position at Niagara and keep open the line of communications with Montreal the Indians would remain firm in their attachment to the Crown, but "the moment they are convinced that we either want the means to prosecute the War with spirit, or are negotiating a separate peace, they will begin to study in what manner they can most effectually deceive us."<sup>38</sup>

When put to the test the Six Nations Indians fought well. At Queenston Heights they played an important role under the command of John Brant, a son of the immortal Joseph, Captain Jacobs and Captain Norton, and suffered the loss of two Cayuga chiefs, one Onondaga and two Oneida warriors and several wounded.<sup>39</sup> Following the traditional Council of Condolence at Fort George on November 6, the bulk of the Indians, under the command of Major Givins of the Indian Department and Captains Norton and Kerr, proceeded up the Niagara River towards Fort Erie where they assisted in repelling the second attempt made by the Americans to cross the river. Subsequently they returned to Fort George whence Lieutenant Thomas Ridout wrote to his cousin on January 5, they "are encamped on the skirts of the woods

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their families to the mercy of 400 Indians, whose conduct affords such wide room for suspicion—and really to expect that this fickle race would remain in the midst of war in a state of neutrality is truly absurd."

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 517, Willcocks to Macdonell, Sept. 1, 1812; C 688B, 30. This appears to be the same Willcocks who later went over to the Americans and led a force of renegades calling themselves the "Canadian Volunteers" who ravaged the Canadian frontier during 1813 and 1814. Willcocks was later killed in a skirmish at Fort Erie, September 4, 1814. An odd selection, to say the least, for the purpose of inducing the Indians to fight on behalf of Great Britain.

<sup>37</sup>*Select British Documents*, 587, Brock to Prevost, Sept. 7, 1812; C 677, 64.

<sup>38</sup>*Select British Documents*, 597, Brock to Prevost, Sept. 28, 1812; C 677, 94.

<sup>39</sup>Claus Papers, X, 87, Report of William Claus, Dec. 4, 1813. This report is also printed in the publications of the *Niagara Historical Society*, no. 9, 1902, 23-40.

back of the town" keeping the troops "alive with their war dances" and making "the dark cedar woods echo with savage yells."<sup>40</sup>

Indian morale suffered something of a slump after the British reverses at Fort York and Fort George, nevertheless a number of Indians remained with the British troops and accompanied them on the retreat towards Burlington. They were therefore on hand to participate in the pursuit of the Americans after the night attack at Stoney Creek. On this occasion they appear to have acquired considerable booty: on June 11 Harvey wrote from Forty Mile Creek that "the greatest part" of the enemy baggage and equipment "are in the hands of the *Indians* or scattered throughout the Country."<sup>41</sup>

Following the set back at Stoney Creek the Americans withdrew to Fort George closely followed by the troops and the Indians. The latter had, incidentally, received a strong reinforcement from Lower Canada. On May 26 Sir John Johnson had informed Claus that he had succeeded in raising a substantial force in Lower Canada and would send about 300 Indians to Sir George Prevost "either to attack or defend."<sup>42</sup> These Indians were led by Captain Dominique Ducharme. At Forty Mile they were joined by John Brant and William Kerr with about 100 Mohawk. On June 20 the combined force of Indians encamped at Twenty Mile Creek, near a spot known as Beaver Dam. Learning from scouts that the Americans were preparing a reconnaissance in force, Ducharme notified Major de Haren and then, placing himself in the centre, Kerr on the left, and J. B. de Lorimier and Isaac Leclair on the right, he set the stage for an ambush. After two hours' fighting the Americans under Colonel Boerstler surrendered. The actual capitulation was received by Lieutenant Fitzgibbon and completed by de Haren both of whom, however, arrived on the scene with regular reinforcements after the day had been won; it is clear from all contemporary accounts that Beaver Dam was an Indian victory. Indeed, there seems to be more than one grain of truth to Norton's jibe that "The Cognauaga Indians fought the battle, the Mohawks got the plunder, and Fitzgibbon got the credit."<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup>M. Edgar, *Ten Years of Upper Canada in Peace and War 1805-1815, Being the Ridout Letters with Annotations* (London, 1891), 167.

<sup>41</sup>*Select British Documents*, II, 153, Harvey to Baynes, June 11, 1813; C 679, 76.

<sup>42</sup>*Documentary History*, V, 245, Johnson to Claus, May 26, 1813. According to a letter written by Ducharme on June 5, 1826, he commanded 340 Indians comprising 160 from Caughnawaga, 120 from Lake of Two Mountains, and 60 from St. Regis (see *Documentary History*, VI, 126).

<sup>43</sup>*Select British Documents*, III-2, 585, Journal of Events by Captain W. H. Merritt. For various reports on the battle of Beaver Dam see *ibid.*, II, 169, General Order sent to Sir John Johnson, July 6, 1813; *Documentary History*, VI, 110, Claus to Bissopp,

In the fighting the Indians suffered five principal chiefs and warriors killed and 20 wounded.<sup>44</sup>

Beaver Dam was an important victory for the British. The old fear of the Indians took possession of the American troops at Fort George and following Colonel Boerstler's disaster they did not venture to send a patrol more than a mile from the fort.<sup>45</sup> Perhaps there was justification for such caution, for, despite the return home of the Lower Canada contingent,<sup>46</sup> the Indian forces in the Niagara peninsula had received a new reinforcement with the arrival, on July 5, of a number of Ottawa Indians under Captain Matthew Elliott and their chief, Blackbird. It was the new arrivals from the west, along with some of Norton's Mohawk, who fought a sharp engagement with the Americans on July 8 at Ball's Farm in an effort to recover a quantity of medicines and surgical instruments which had been buried when the British had abandoned Fort George earlier in the year.<sup>47</sup> Unlike the engagement at Beaver Dam the proceedings at Ball's were marred by scalping, notwithstanding all that could be done by the officers of the Indian Department to prevent it.<sup>48</sup>

The net around Fort George tightened as the weeks passed. Each day the Indians were employed harassing and teasing the enemy outposts. On July 27 the American General Peter B. Porter wrote disgustedly: "The truth is . . . that we have had an army at Fort George for two months past, which at any moment of this period might by a vigorous and well-directed exertion of three or four days have prostrated the whole of the enemy's force in this division of the country, and yet this army lies panic-struck, shut up and whipped in by a few hundred miserable savages, leaving the whole of this frontier, except the mile in extent which

June 24, 1813; *ibid.*, 112, Bissopp to Vincent, June 24, 1813; *ibid.*, 116, *Montreal Gazette*, July 6, 1813; *ibid.*, 126, Ducharme letter, June 5, 1826. In 1818 Fitzgibbon wrote to Captain Kerr of the Indian Department: "With respect to the affair with Captain Boerstler, not a shot was fired on our side by any but the Indians. They beat the American detachment into a state of terror, and the only share I claim is taking advantage of a favorable moment to offer them protection from the tomahawk and scalping knife. The Indian Department did all the rest" (*Documentary History*, VI, 120-1). According to Ducharme the only reason that he did not demand the surrender and receive the capitulation was because he did not speak English.

<sup>44</sup>*Documentary History*, VI, 110, Claus to Bissopp, June 24, 1813.

<sup>45</sup>*Ibid.*, 163, Fulton to Prevost, June 30, 1813.

<sup>46</sup>Following the victory at Beaver Dam the Lower Canada Indians became restless. They were dissatisfied with the rewards which they had received and the long standing jealousy between the Iroquois of Caughnawaga and the Iroquois of Grand River flared up. Many of them returned home and the others followed a few weeks later owing to the necessity of looking after their crops.

<sup>47</sup>*Documentary History*, VI, 207, de Rottenburg to Prevost, July 9, 1813.

<sup>48</sup>*Ibid.*, 216, Claus to Johnson, July 11, 1813.

they occupy, exposed to the inroads and depredations of the enemy."<sup>49</sup> No more eloquent tribute could have been paid to the services of the Indians to the British cause in the Niagara peninsula in 1813 than this.

Meanwhile, the Americans were using every effort to scrape up a few native warriors for themselves. The failure of Cornplanter's mission to the Grand River in 1812 had not, perhaps, been wholly unexpected; but the chilly reply of the Seneca to the American request that they take up the hatchet<sup>50</sup> and the letter sent by a number of Oneida, Onondaga, Stockbridge, and Tuscarora Indians to the president of the United States on September 28 expressing their desire to remain neutral and their regret that they should ever have been asked to take up arms in a white man's war,<sup>51</sup> must have been a great disappointment.

Early in 1813 a determined drive was made to enlist Indian support. The United States Indian Department might point out that the president had never authorized the employment of the Indians, but the army needed them and General Dearborn, the commander-in-chief at Niagara, made it clear that he wanted 150 "young warriors of the Six Nations" to meet him at Fort George.<sup>52</sup> The Indians replied by holding council at Buffalo and on July 25 Red Jacket told the American Indian agent, Erastus Granger, that "the part we take in this war is not voluntary on our part; you have persuaded us into it. . . . Your voice was for us to sit still, when the war began, but you have beat us—you have got us into the war."<sup>53</sup> The reluctance on the part of Red Jacket and some of the other Indians to take up the tomahawk was probably promoted less by their distaste for war than the fact that by this time, they had been fully informed of the American reverses at Stoney Creek and Beaver Dam. Under the circumstances neutrality was perhaps the safest course. This, at least, was Granger's explanation of the Indian attitude.<sup>54</sup> Farmer's Brother and Henry O'Bail of the Seneca were, however, less inclined to argue than was Red Jacket, and the American military authorities succeeded in enlisting a number of Indian warriors who took part in the defence of Black Rock and Buffalo in July, 1813. A few Seneca and other

<sup>49</sup>*Ibid.*, 283, Porter to Tompkins, July 27, 1813.

<sup>50</sup>W. Ketchum, *An Authentic and Comprehensive History of Buffalo with Some Account of Its Early Inhabitants, Both Savage and Civilized* (2 vols., Buffalo, 1865), II, 423, Appendix 8, Minutes of a Meeting at Buffalo, Sept. 8, 1812.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, 424, Address to the President of the United States, Sept. 28, 1812.

<sup>52</sup>*Ibid.*, 428, Granger to the Chiefs at Alleghany, June 22, 1813.

<sup>53</sup>*Ibid.*, 430-1, Minutes of Council at Buffalo, by Erastus Granger, July 25, 1813.

<sup>54</sup>*Ibid.*, 431, Granger to the secretary for war, Aug. 9, 1813.

Six Nations Indians joined the American forces at Fort George but, with the exception of one slight skirmish, their services did not merit much comment.

### III. THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER

The principal theatres of operations were those already discussed. Nevertheless several engagements took place along the St. Lawrence River which might be noted briefly. At St. Regis the Indians occupied a rather unique position living, as they did, upon both sides of the frontier. Neutrality under such circumstances was difficult enough, but it became impossible when the troops of both sides engaged in operations in the immediate vicinity. Thus the Indians became divided in their loyalty, and while some, owing to the influence of "Colonel" Louis, favoured the Americans, others joined the British and participated in the fighting at Sackett's Harbour, Ogdensburg, and Beaver Dam.

Of more significance was the operation which ended in the defeat of the Americans at Chateauguay. During 1813 plans were laid for a combined movement of two American forces upon Montreal. In September, 1813 the right wing of this combined movement got under way with Hampton's advance towards Odelltown. According to Hampton his force encountered no real resistance but he was constantly annoyed by a "few despicable Indians" who continued "to lurk about the distant bushes and frequently crawled up and fired upon our sentries during the day and the succeeding night" despite the fact that "they were frequently drove off."<sup>55</sup> Finding it difficult to secure water and fodder for his horses, Hampton shifted his line of advance from Odelltown westward towards the Chateauguay River with "Cognawaga opposite Lachine, about forty miles from Chateauguay and ten from Montreal" as his objective. The change of route did not rid him of the nuisance of the Indians. They still continued to hover about his flanks and pot away at his sentries, harassing the enemy in the manner best suited to their style of warfare. When Hampton and de Salaberry finally met on October 26 Captain Lamothe's 22 Indians "behaved well"; the 150 with de Léry only shouted, but their war whoops apparently counted for something when the Americans began to lose their nerve.

<sup>55</sup>*Documentary History*, VII, 159, Hampton to secretary for war, Sept. 22, 1813.

## IV. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

The decisive year was 1814. With the entrance of the Allies into Paris and the fall of the French Empire it was obvious that if the Americans were to achieve victory in Canada they would have to do so before the arrival of the reinforcements from Wellington's armies which events in Europe would now set free.

The American advance began with the crossing of the Niagara and the surrender of Fort Erie. Moving northwards along the Niagara River the American troops encountered General Riall near the Chippewa River. With Riall were 300 Indians, including 100 western Indians and 200 Six Nations under Norton. These Indians very nearly succeeded in capturing Winfield Scott, one of the American brigadiers, while he was taking his morning coffee in a Canadian farm house, but Scott and his aides proved to be fleet of foot and succeeded in effecting an escape.<sup>56</sup> In the battle which ensued the Indians penetrated too far into the woods on the British right to afford Riall the assistance he required of them and when the retreat began they melted into the surrounding country in a fashion which drew forth his indignation: "The Indians . . . have behaved most shamefully; literally speaking, not one remaining, of the hundreds that were with him, prior to the retreat."<sup>57</sup>

This marks the virtual end of the Indian participation in the war in the Niagara area. Only a small number of them took part in the battle of Lundy's Lane and these, together with the light troops, were sent to follow the Americans and harass them during their withdrawal. There were also a few Indians at the siege of Fort Erie but they played no significant role.<sup>58</sup>

Nor did the American Indians play much part in 1814. General Porter had enlisted the aid of Red Jacket and Erastus Granger to raise a force of Indians for his command and 600 Indians appear on the United States payroll.<sup>59</sup> It is hardly likely, however, that

<sup>56</sup>C. W. Elliott, *Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man* (New York, 1937), 158.

<sup>57</sup>*Select British Documents*, III-1, 128, Drummond to Prevost, July 13, 1814; C 684, 90.

<sup>58</sup>Following the battle of Chippewa, two American Indians bringing with them a Cayuga Chief taken prisoner at Chippewa attended a council of the Six Nations at Burlington where they endeavoured to persuade the Canadian Indians to withdraw from the war promising the American Indians would do likewise. "Whatever those fellows have said," wrote Riall, "has caused much dissatisfaction among the Indians, and the western people have reason to suspect the Six Nations of treachery" (*Documentary History*, I, 70, Riall to Drummond, July 17, 1814). In any event very few Cayuga or Onondaga came forward with the other Indians.

<sup>59</sup>L. L. Babcock, *The War of 1812 on the Niagara Frontier* (Buffalo, 1927) 147.

anything like this number actually crossed the Niagara River or participated in the battle at Chippewa. When, after the battle, the Indians appeared before Porter and demanded payment for their scalps, Porter indignantly refused and his Indians promptly returned home. There were no American Indians present at Lundy's Lane.

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The problem of handling the Indians during the war was not simply a matter of preventing them from indulging in the barbaric practices usually associated with Indian warfare, it was also a matter of preserving good relations between the army and the Indian Department. And these, unfortunately, were never very satisfactory during 1812-14. Even prior to the outbreak of hostilities Captain Norton, an Indianized Scotsman<sup>60</sup> who sought to step into the shoes of Joseph Brant as the principal leader of the Six Nations, had come into conflict with the officers of the Indian Department, and in particular with William Claus, the deputy superintendent-general. Brock was not unaware of this personal antagonism and the effect which it had upon the tribes on the Grand River. As early as May, 1812 he had noted that while the Six Nations seemed "well disposed" they were, unfortunately, divided "on points which some white people find an interest in keeping alive."<sup>61</sup>

The issue raised by the quarrel between Norton and Claus was a fundamental one. Norton had proved himself to be a good fighting man, and for that reason he received the support of officers like Prevost, de Rottenburg, Harvey, and others, who felt that the first consideration should be that of winning the war. The political implications of Norton's activities were of no concern to them. On the other hand the Indian Department and the civil authorities had to look to the future. They were obliged to consider what problems might arise were Norton to achieve his object of becoming the leader of the Six Nations; better by far that the Indians should remain peaceful and submissive than stirred up to make embarrassing demands. For that reason Claus not only attempted to play down Norton's ability as a leader of the fighting Indians,

<sup>60</sup>Norton was a Scotsman by birth who came to Canada as a private in the 65th Regiment. He was discharged in 1788 and after a brief stay in Kingston went to the villages of the Six Nations where he learned the Mohawk tongue. After a period as a trader he made the acquaintance of Joseph Brant and at Brant's instigation was appointed interpreter to the Mohawk. He resigned this appointment in 1800 and assumed the habits and manners of an Indian (Q 312-1, 126-8, Gore to Castlereagh, Sept. 4, 1809; see also *Claus Papers*, VIII, Chew to Selby, Sept. 1, 1800).

<sup>61</sup>*Select British Documents*, I, 306, Brock to Liverpool, May 25, 1812.

but also endeavoured to undermine Norton's authority with the tribes at Grand River and obstinately opposed all proposals that he be given a free hand in the distribution of presents to the Indians.

It was thus a matter of concern to Claus that Prevost, who was always suspicious of the Indian Department as a jealous clique, agreed in 1813 to give Norton a discretionary power to distribute presents and rewards to Six Nations warriors who fought in the British interest. And events soon proved that Claus had some justification for his alarm. It was not long before Norton, not content with controlling the Six Nations Indians, endeavoured to extend his influence over the western Indians as well by bribing them with liquor and supplies. When Colonel Caldwell, the superintendent of the western Nations, addressed his Indians on June 14, one of their chiefs replied: "As to the Snipe [Captain Norton] having got some of our young men to join him, I only say, He speaks loud, and has Strong Milk and Big Breasts, which yield plentifully. You know Father, your Children are fond of Milk, and he gives when they go to him, and promises them Provisions as they want and Goods at discretion. If you will do so Father they will not go to him, but we cannot keep our young men in our hands."<sup>62</sup>

#### V. THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY

Despite the events on the Thames River in 1813 which had led to the virtual extinction of Indian resistance on the Detroit front, the British still hoped to revive the fighting spirit of the western Indians. Tecumseh's sister was heaped with presents of condolence, his son was given a commission in the British Army and his brother, the Prophet, was given a pension and installed as principal chief of the Western Indians. But these investments yielded no dividends, for the Indians were not prepared to take up arms in any large numbers until the British themselves were in a position to send regular troops to reoccupy the abandoned territory. General Drummond was confident that the Indians around Detroit were still loyal to Great Britain and that, could he but spare the men, he could, without difficulty, recover everything that had been lost. But there were no troops available for this task, and the Indians would not fight alone.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, III-2, 726-7, Extract of a Speech delivered to the Western Warriors, June 14, 1814, and the answer of Neyash; C 257, 303.

Beyond Lake Michigan the British position was still reasonably secure. Michilimackinac was well defended; an Indian store depot had been established at Green Bay and Dickson's agents, Rolette and Brisbois, with the assistance of the loyal Winnebago, maintained British influence throughout the upper reaches of the Mississippi River between Michilimackinac and Praire du Chien. Against these two positions the Americans directed their western operations during 1814 without success. The little post at Praire du Chien was taken but quickly recovered and the attempt against Michilimackinac ended in failure. A later effort by Zachary Taylor to dislodge the British from the Mississippi met with failure at the hands of the Winnebago, Sioux, and Sauk Indians. The British thus retained their hold on Praire du Chien and even began to plan offensive operations for the Wisconsin Indians against St. Louis for the spring of 1815.<sup>63</sup>

## VI. THE TREATY OF GHENT

One of the great blunders committed by the British delegates to Versailles in 1783 had been failure to secure some guarantees for the Indian allies of the Crown, in the final treaty of peace. The problem of obtaining Indian assistance during the War of 1812 had kept this lesson before the minds of the British authorities and when their representatives left London for Ghent in 1814 they were bound by instructions to make some effort to arrive at an understanding with the United States over the Indian boundary line. It was to the credit of the British that they would not consent to any arrangement which excluded the Indians, and righteously asserted of Great Britain that "it is utterly inconsistent with her practice and her principles ever to abandon in her negotiations for peace those who have co-operated with her in war"<sup>64</sup>—an assertion which would have stuck in any Indian throat at that date.

The original British proposal called for the establishment of a clearly-defined Indian territory in which the Indians might live their own independent existence, the boundaries to follow those fixed at Greenville in 1795. This was, at least in principle, what the Indians had been fighting for. But the defeat at Moraviantown and the loss of that territory beyond Lake Erie which the capture of Detroit by Brock and Tecumseh had given them, made

<sup>63</sup>See Public Archives of Canada, *Report, 1887*, cv-vii, for correspondence relating to the recovery of Praire du Chien. For later military events at Praire du Chien see Bulger-McDouall correspondence in the Bulger Papers in the Public Archives of Canada.

<sup>64</sup>Quoted in Lucas, *Canadian War of 1812*, 251.

it difficult for the British to press their point in the face of the adamant refusal of the American delegates to agree to the setting up of an Indian buffer state. The final compromise was one by which the United States agreed to restore to the Indian nations who had been at war "all the Possessions, Rights, and Privileges"<sup>65</sup> which they had enjoyed or been entitled to enjoy before the commencement of hostilities. It was not what the Indians wanted nor what the British would like to have gained for them; but, while conceding the United States claim to territorial sovereignty over the area which the western Indians had striven to maintain for themselves ever since the days of Pontiac, the Treaty of Ghent did place the United States under a moral obligation to restore the Indians to the *status quo ante bellum*. If the Indians did not gain anything from supporting the British in 1812-14, at least they did not lose anything.

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<sup>65</sup>The terms of the Treaty of Ghent will be found in *Treaties and Agreements affecting Canada in Force between His Majesty and the United States of America 1814-1925* (Ottawa, 1927), 1-6.

## UNIVERSITY FEDERATION AT TORONTO: A CANADIAN EXPERIMENT\*

I HAVE heard it stated in a body no less august than the University of Toronto Senate, and by a learned senator who professed law, that no statute can be understood or expounded by a layman not learned in the law. I propose this evening to endeavour to disprove the soundness of this statement. Indeed, over against the claim of the learned senator, I am venturing to set another claim that any layman versed in logic and language should be able to understand and explain any statute that is worth the effort—provided only that he knows the history behind it. This evening, I am going to put my counter theory to the test in respect of an elaborate and unique piece of legislation—as a layman to laymen.

My plan is to take the University Federation Act of 1887, or to give the full title, "An Act respecting the Federation of the University of Toronto and University College with other Universities and Colleges," and to analyse the principles it embodied. Then with this before us, I propose to examine the progress of events which produced this compromise after sixty years of warring ideas. And thirdly, with the same act as a focal point, I wish to note some of its defects, and subsequent changes effected to remedy them. I cannot explain why I have chosen this method, taking an intermediate position and looking before and after, unless it be an instinctive feeling that it is juster to the remarkable achievement of 1887 to make it our point of vantage.

First, then, the Act of 1887. It is a long act of eighty-seven sections, several of them sub-divided, but clearly phrased and free from archaism and redundancy. Its provisions may, I think, be summarized so as to fall under four principles. First, it introduced the federal principle. The idea which had created the Dominion of Canada twenty years before was applied to higher education in Ontario. The several denominational universities of the province, enrolling some 60 per cent of the students in Arts, were invited to co-operate with the state university to make a truly provincial university, each federated college surrendering a portion of its autonomy in so doing. That is to say, each held in abeyance its

\*This article was read as a paper to the Graduate Historical Club of the University of Toronto on January 11, 1950.

power to grant degrees other than those in theology, in which field the state had no interest; each turned over to the state instruction in certain subjects, mainly the sciences, and retained instruction in certain other subjects, mainly the humanities; each surrendered to the University the control over discipline in the university area, retaining control over the life and discipline of the students on its own campus; and the control over examinations was also given to the University Senate, each of the denominational universities retaining such influence as is secured by the presence of its representatives on the Senate, and in the departmental committees, and by the conduct of examinations in certain religious knowledge options. Such was the federal pact in respect of the conferring of degrees, instruction in the Arts curriculum, discipline, and examination. A Canadian invention it was, a compromise affecting church and state interests in education never achieved elsewhere. It was not entirely logical, especially in a division of subjects, which reflected the influence of certain individuals, notably Sir Daniel Wilson, professor of history and English literature as well as president of University College, and George Paxton Young, professor of philosophy, and again in the peculiar status of University College. And a disturbing feature was that it did not prove attractive enough to dislodge Queen's from Kingston, Trinity from its original site on Queen Street West, or McMaster from nearby Bloor Street, while St. Michael's was still content with the status of a theological school, like Knox and Wycliffe. In fact, Victoria University, then anchored "on the old Ontario strand" at Cobourg, alone had the vision, or courage, or temerity to come in. Who ever heard, men asked, of a federation of *two* states, and these with disparate relations to the central body? So there was deep mistrust among certain of the friends of Victoria, and especially its alumni.

Secondly, the Act embodied the principle that religion has a place in education—not a controlling, a paramount place, but still one that must be recognized and defined in any truly national system of higher education. The aim of the state was to enlist the moral and financial support of the several churches in the cause of higher education; the churches in return might avail themselves of the superior advantages afforded by the state for instruction in the newer and rapidly expanding fields of the physical and social sciences. Of the University and University College, it was written that there should be no religious tests for professors or students. Any religious instruction which a student of University College

might secure was optional; optional also the acceptance of any provision for his soul that his college might suggest within its walls or in city churches. Lest the epithet of "godless" should continue to be levelled at its instruction, however, a section of the Act provided for such concern on the part of the authorities of the state college. What the federating universities might do in the matter was for them to decide. Victoria from the outset had been free from all religious tests for admission and from compulsory religious exercises or studies. Fusion of the interests of church and state, then, was a vital principle of the Act of 1887, although more than a decade had to elapse before the Church of England and the Roman Catholics were ready to accept it for themselves.

Thirdly, the Act embodied the principle of state supervision in return for state support. The socialist idea which in the eighteen-forties had been applied to primary education, and in the sixties to secondary education, was now in the eighties extended to education at the university level. The government accepted financial responsibility for the state university, at length engaging public funds beyond the limit of the income from the endowment of Crown Lands set aside in 1797. But in so doing it required large concessions in the matter of control. The lieutenant-governor was named as visitor, and as such stood above the chancellor and president in ceremonial dignity. The lieutenant-governor-in-council, that is to say, the government, appointed the president and the professors and provided for their retirement. The minister of education was a member of the Senate, as well as nine others appointed by the government. Every statute of the Senate must be reported to the government within ten days of its passing, and was valid only when approved by the government. Within the University itself, under the suzerainty of the government, the Senate was the principal governing body, controlling the degrees and the courses of study leading thereto, and adjudicating on petitions of students. More than that, the Senate under the Act of 1887 continued to manage many matters of business, so that we read in its minutes of the passing of a motion by Professor Alfred Baker rejecting an offer to purchase a portion of the University's land at \$525,000. There was no Board of Governors, just a Trustee Board whose powers were limited to the control of investments and of property, but evidently not all matters of property. There were also two Councils, a University Council and a University College Council with duties restricted to oversight of student societies and discipline. The Act said nothing of

the internal organization of the federating universities; evidently that was considered their own concern. The chancellor, elected every three years by Convocation, that is, the graduates, as president of the Senate and of Convocation for the conferring of degrees, enjoyed a position of both dignity and power; likewise the vice-chancellor, elected every three years by the Senate and usually presiding at its meetings. The president occupied a somewhat anomalous position. Sir Daniel Wilson had insisted on the titles of president of the University and president of University College being held by the same person, and it was so enacted. But the dual position was to confer little real authority on the president, and was far from satisfactory to the federating universities, or indeed to University College.

Fourthly, the Act embodied the principle of state responsibility for professional training. Education was included as one of the subjects of study in the university list, although it was many years before a faculty of education was set up. But Medicine and Law, after an exile of twenty-five years, returned to Queen's Park. From that time Medicine has had a large place in university planning and finance. With Law it was different—the Law Society and Osgoode Hall had to be reckoned with. On the other hand, Upper Canada College, which since 1829 as an apanage of the University had extracted considerable nourishment from an indulgent Alma Mater, was cut off with its shilling—in the form of a \$100,000 endowment. With excellent collegiate institutes across the province, the legislature could no longer defend indulgence of a favoured few in Toronto.

Such was the Act in principle and in some detail. Rarely has an important piece of legislation been carried with such unanimity. The second reading was moved on April 13, 1887 by the minister of education, Hon. G. W. Ross. The leader of the Opposition, William Meredith, gave it his warm and cordial support. The only voice raised against it at this stage was that of Corelli C. Field, the member of the constituency in which Cobourg was situated, who feebly remarked that he was fulfilling a promise to his constituents. Later, in committee of the whole, some slight objection was raised as to the section on Medicine, but it was allowed to stand without change. But the main purpose of the Federation Act had to wait five years for fulfilment. It was October, 1890, before an injunction obtained by certain of Mr. Field's constituents could be dissolved, and the Act declared to be in force; and it was October, 1892, before the main building of Victoria University, at

the northeast corner of Queen's Park, was opened for instruction. Within the next two decades Trinity and St. Michael's had come in.

But, as I suggested at the outset, a clear understanding of such a statute as this is impossible without a knowledge of preceding history and legislation. If Ross had smooth sailing for his measure, it was because the winds of heaven had exhausted their force. In other words, during a half century or more, and under our democratic system, the whole question had been so fully discussed in legislative and church assemblies that a common conscience had been reached. It is possible to note only the main stages here; a complete documentary summary would take volumes.

The story begins with 1797 and the Duke of Portland's despatch. This provided for the setting aside of large tracts of land in the Upper Province for district grammar schools and the further extension of education "in due course of time by the establishment of other seminaries of a larger and more comprehensive nature for the promotion of religious and moral learning and the study of the Arts and Sciences." Soon the phrase "other seminaries of a larger and more comprehensive nature" had been altered to "one university in Toronto." For this metamorphosis I suppose we can give the credit jointly to the magic wand of John Strachan and a cunningly acquisitive manner that Toronto developed while it was still muddy York.

Thirty years later, Strachan, then archdeacon of York, returned from England with a royal charter for this one Upper Canadian university to be named King's College. It is to be noted that its constitution was by royal charter; no legislature in Canada would have sanctioned such a fabric. The visitor was to be the bishop of Quebec; the president, the archdeacon of York; all professors and members of its governing body were to subscribe to the thirty-nine articles; degrees in divinity were restricted to candidates in holy orders of the Church of England. All this for a population of which probably less than a quarter were in active communion with the Church of England.

The people of the province and their legislature would have none of it, and the charter never came into operation. The best that could be done was to set up in 1829 a preparatory seminary under similar control—Upper Canada College. King's College, however, continued to exist on paper for the use and abuse of the income from the valuable Crown Lands. It required ten years of struggle to convince the Legislative Council, dominated as it was by the Compact, that the Royal Charter would not serve. In 1837

that body at length accepted from the Assembly modifications which, in permitting rather than stipulating ecclesiastical control, in fact continued Strachan's direction of the paper university. The effect of all this was to delay the opening of King's College until 1843, by which time both Queen's and Victoria were in operation as degree-conferring colleges, and Regiopolis, a Roman Catholic college at Kingston, had been incorporated.

But King's College under Strachan's presidency, as it remained from 1842 to 1848, could not satisfy the people of Upper Canada. However, it was 1853 before even a tolerable *modus vivendi* was reached. In the interval no less than six attempts were made at legislation; one by Baldwin in 1843, two by Draper in 1845 and 1846, one by Macdonald in 1847—these four abortive—then Baldwin's second bill in 1849, to be supplanted by Hincks's bill of 1853, which was to serve with slight adjustments until federation in 1887.

It would be tedious to spread before you the provisions of all these Acts. In principle they ranged from the stark secularism of Baldwin's two bills to the open recognition of the place of the several churches in higher education by Macdonald. His cheerful proposal was to make everyone happy, including the people of Kingston, by dividing the annual income from the endowment of some £10,000 among the colleges—£3,000 to King's College, £1,500 to Victoria, and £1,500 each to Queen's and Regiopolis (both located in his own constituency), with the balance divided among grammar and agricultural schools. Macdonald's failure doubtless paved the way psychologically for Baldwin's second bill in 1849. Here the reaction to Macdonald's kindness to the churches was nothing if not thorough. The name, King's College, made way, significantly enough, not for The University of Upper Canada, but for The University of Toronto. Higher education was to be centralized and secularized. The university endowment was reserved exclusively for the use of the University and Upper Canada College. Any subvention to the denominational colleges must be entirely outside the Act. All that was said of them in the Act was that if any of them wished to surrender their powers to confer degrees other than in divinity, they might claim a seat on the Senate, the governing body of the University, and thus become equal in influence to one University professor, since all professors were members of the Senate. But it was against ecclesiasticism in general that the bill showed its teeth. The chancellor was to be elected by "a majority of voices in open convocation" (voices—one of the numerous archaisms, taking one back all the way to

Sparta, in a statute phrased to discourage the layman); but no "minister, ecclesiastic or teacher under or according to any form or profession of religious faith or worship whatsoever" might be chosen as chancellor. Secondly, of the six members appointed by the government to the Senate, none could be a minister, ecclesiastic, etc., as in the above formula. And thirdly, the teaching of divinity was barred from the University. However, its old professor was allowed a cushion in metaphysics and ethics; Baldwin might be doctrinaire, but he was not inhuman.

If Baldwin's purpose was constructive and aimed to set up a provincial university which would command general support, it signally failed of effect. It shocked the bishop of Toronto and the larger section of the Anglicans, and brought Trinity to birth in 1851 as a rival and hostile university granting degrees in Arts, Divinity, and Medicine. Queen's and Regiopolis alike scorned it. It caused only a temporary flurry at Victoria, then without a principal and at the darkest stage of its history. Only a fraction of the population was prepared to support the Act. Even the author, who retired to private life in 1851, refused the chancellorship when it was offered him the following year.

The final attempt at this stage to build a truly provincial university was made by Hincks in 1853. Hincks was an able man, more adroit and much less rigid than Baldwin. He took the pains to find out what others thought, as his correspondence with Ryerson indicates. And he produced an Act which, as I have said, survived for twenty-five years. Had a mind intensely interested in the economic development of Canada permitted him to concentrate on the University and complete what he began, a solution of the problem might have been reached a generation earlier than it was. The preamble to the Act reveals the half-finished nature of the work. Its three "whereases" tell of the failure of previous legislation, the need of providing facilities for the prosecution of studies in various parts of the province, and the admirable features of the University of London. Its fifty-fourth section provides that any moneys left over when the needs of the University and Upper Canada College had been met should constitute a fund to be divided among denominational colleges. That is all that is said of sustenance for the outlying colleges. We know that he intended to introduce supplementary legislation to facilitate their applying for affiliation, but his interests turned elsewhere. As to support, as Mr. Stewart Wallace drily remarks, "it is perhaps not surprising that there was never a surplus to divide."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>W. S. Wallace, *A History of the University of Toronto* (Toronto, 1927).

The Hincks Act may thus be summarized. It repealed the Baldwin Act of 1849; transferred the property and endowment of the University to the government; abolished the faculties of Law and Medicine; gave University College a separate existence as the State Arts College; made the Senate, in which the colleges of the province were to be represented through their heads, the custodian of academic standards with full power over degrees; and provided that any surplus of the income fund remaining unexpended at the end of any year should be "from time to time, appropriated by Parliament for Academical Education in Upper Canada." Thus, under the Act of 1853, the University of Toronto became largely, if not exclusively, an examining body. Law and Medicine were left for professional schools to teach; and teaching in Arts was delegated to University College and any of the denominational colleges which might care to affiliate; Divinity was taboo, and the practical sciences were still in embryo.

Two historical events leading up to the Federation Act of 1887 remain still to be noted. A bitter controversy between the University of Toronto and the denominational colleges broke in the early sixties. Both extravagance and standards in University College were assailed with some cogency in the course of a parliamentary inquiry. The usual commission was granted to investigate, the usual change of government took place, and no legislation emerged. The only effect was an added bitterness, and perhaps some little cleansing through ventilation. The other event was the complete cutting off in 1868, under the first premier of Ontario, J. S. Macdonald, of the small annual grants to the outlying colleges, resulting in some temporary financial embarrassment but eventually in a strengthening both of their self-reliance and their sense of injury.

Having arrived again at our point of vantage, 1887, may we look back over the path of ascent. Four principles were noted as embodied in the Act; the federal idea, the rights of the church, state supervision and support, and state responsibility for professional training. The sixty years since Strachan's royal charter of 1827 had served to demonstrate that while public opinion would not tolerate control of higher education by one church (1827) or by several churches (Macdonald, 1847), neither was it satisfied with the exclusion of the churches (Baldwin, 1849 and, in effect, Hincks, 1853). Some compromise, then, must be discovered which would bring to the support of the provincial university those who believed that religion had an essential place in education and which would not cause them to suffer for their belief by being compelled

to support their own colleges and at the same time to pay equally with others through taxation for the maintenance of the provincial university. Indeed, it was the application of the University of Toronto for a government grant, in addition to the income from the Crown Lands, that brought the matter to a head. The development of the sciences, with their expensive equipment, had created large demands, to meet which new sources of revenue were required. The colleges objected, and particularly Grant of Queen's. "Why," they asked, "should our constituents pay taxes to crush ourselves in ruinous competition"? "But the expansion must take place," was the answer, "else Canada will export its best brains. Why not join us in this great enterprise, on a fair basis of give and take. You give us the support of your church and your endowment and teaching staff for a part of the curriculum, and you shall receive in return together with the retention of your religious associations the best that learning and science can offer in the rest of the curriculum, and the prestige of a great centre of learning—all this without money and without price." That was the essence of the federation proposal.

But the Act of 1887 was not perfect, and it is not surprising that Victoria hesitated for three years before accepting its terms, and then over the dead bodies, so to speak, of a considerable section of its graduates. I refer to the injunction they secured and the appeal to the courts. But the faith of Nathanael Burwash, president and chancellor of Victoria, was justified in the end, and that it was, must be attributed largely to his patience and good sense. James Loudon, who became president of the University of Toronto in 1892, was not the man deftly to control the new machinery. The result was recurring disturbance, which resulted in the appointment of a Royal Commission in 1905 and the framing of a new Act in 1906 based squarely on the statesmanlike report of the Commission. This, with a few minor changes, is the constitution of the University in force today. Time has revealed very few weaknesses in its structure, and these are the result less of the Act itself than of the human agencies—individuals and governments—called upon to administer it.

What were some of the defects in the original federation act of 1887? First, the extent and directness of government control over the University and University College as evidenced in the appointment and retirement or dismissal of professors and other servants, in the fact that the minister of education and a solid group of government appointees sat in the Senate, the principal governing

body of the University, and in the fact that all statutes, that is, acts of the Senate, must have the sanction of the government before having effect. In such circumstances the University could hardly be kept free from party politics and the evils of patronage. However, the Act of 1906, if it did not completely exorcise government control, at all events made it less direct. The supreme authority in all but purely academic matters was now placed in the hands of a Board of Governors appointed by the government for a term of six years, one-third of the members retiring every two years but being eligible for reappointment. The Board of Governors replaced the old Board of Trustees, but with much wider financial powers; and in the matter of the appointment of president, professors, and officers, the Board assumed the place vacated by the government.

A second defect of the Act of 1887 lay in the weakness of the position of the president. He was surrounded by men who owed their appointment to the government and over whom he had little authority. Even in the Senate, the governing body of the University, he was placed in third position, inferior to the chancellor and the vice-chancellor. The Act of 1906, on the other hand, made the president the directing executive officer of the University. The office of vice-chancellor, which under such incumbents as John Langton and William Mulock, had exercised large powers, disappeared. The chancellor remained, and the prestige he enjoyed as chairman of Convocation was further enhanced by including him as a member of the Board of Governors. But the president was now the effective head of the University. The Board of Governors appointed him, but having done so they entrusted the management of the University largely to him, and could appoint and dismiss professors and officers only on his recommendation. He became chairman of the Senate, chairman of the Caput, a disciplinary body, and chairman also of the Council of the Faculty of Arts, this latter office signifying the central place which Arts was intended and has continued to occupy amongst the faculties.

A third defect of the Act of 1887 was the burdening of the Senate with the management of matters of business. Under the Act of 1906, the Senate was permitted to concentrate its attention on courses of study and the maintaining of standards through control of examinations—entrance, in course, and final. Recognizing that the Senate was the body on which the federated colleges had representation, the commissioners both in their report and in the Act which they drafted sought to protect the rights of the

colleges as confirmed in the Act of 1887. The division of subjects between College and University was preserved intact. Common sense, however, suggested a slight modification in the matter of any change from one category to the other. The old Act predicated the unanimous consent of the Senate for any such transfer, the new Act the consent of the federated universities. No one senator, Professor X, for instance, of the Department of Psychology could now avail to block any such change. But either Trinity College, say, or the Board of Governors could. Such change must be by the Board's direction. The Senate, then, retained its dignity and prerogatives. Its influence was lessened relatively, however, with the extension of the powers of the Board and the president. And human nature being what it is, there was always a danger of further encroachments by those holding the purse strings.

The fourth fault was the failure of the Act of 1887 to set University College definitely on its own feet. The authorities of Victoria College had desired this, but, in view of the antagonistic attitude of the old president and his friends, had not insisted. Trinity, however, made it a condition of its entry in 1903, and St. Michael's which was to enter in 1913 doubtless observed and welcomed the change. A partial separation had been effected by 1901, but the Act of 1906 confirmed the arrangement and sought to assure to University College not only its own principal and registrar, but a separate college life.

Despite these defects the Act of 1887 was an admirable piece of legislation. In principle and in general its provisions are in force today. The changes which have taken place since 1906, in the development of graduate studies, in the expansion of professional and semi-professional courses, and in the extension of government interest and support to other universities, two of which are denominational in character, may be regarded as within the realm of current university politics rather than that of history.

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## JAMES STEPHEN ON CANADIAN BANKING LAWS, 1821-46

THE Canadian constitutional conflicts from 1815 to 1837 have overshadowed discussions within that period of economic problems which touched important aspects of colonial self-government. Among these the regulations relating to banking held a prominent place. In 1815, shortly after the end of hostilities between Britain and the United States, the imperial government decided to call in the army bills which during the war years had provided an important medium of exchange in British North America.<sup>1</sup> To avert a financial crisis following this action and to provide facilities for expanding the trade and developing the resources of the Canadas, merchants of Montreal in 1817 established a private bank which later sought a provincial charter as the Bank of Montreal. The first charter act failed to get the approval of the British government. In 1821 the attempt was renewed. The legislature of Lower Canada then passed bills for the incorporation of three banks, the Bank of Canada, the Quebec Bank, and the Bank of Montreal.<sup>2</sup>

On March 17 the governor-general, Lord Dalhousie, reserved these measures for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure. The speaker of the legislative council, Jonathan Sewell,<sup>3</sup> and the solicitor-general, Charles Marshall, reported unfavourably on the bills. They held that it was beyond the competence of the legislature of Lower Canada to pass laws for the incorporation of banks and that therefore such legislation would be invalid even though confirmed by the king.

The colonial secretary, Lord Bathurst, submitted the banking bills to James Stephen, Jr., for an opinion.<sup>4</sup> Since the autumn of

<sup>1</sup>For a review of the difficulties caused by the scarcity of currency in British North America after 1813 see M. Q. Innis, *An Economic History of Canada* (Toronto, 1935), 119, 120, 129. A Lower Canada act of March, 1814 providing for the issuance of army bills to the extent of £1,500,000 which might be used as legal tender for certain specific purposes was considered by James Stephen to be contrary to 4 Geo. 3, c. 34. This act made null and void all colonial legislation establishing paper money or bills of credit as legal tender. C.O., 323:40, ff. 20, 21, Report, Aug. 30, 1814.

<sup>2</sup>For a brief survey of the early history of Canadian banking see Adam Shortt in *Canada and Its Provinces* (Toronto, 1913-17), IV, 606-36.

<sup>3</sup>Jonathan Sewell (1766-1839), chief justice, 1808-38, speaker of legislative council, Lower Canada, 1809-39. Charles Marshall was in 1817 appointed solicitor-general of Lower Canada.

<sup>4</sup>Lord Bathurst (1762-1834), secretary of state for war and the colonies, 1812-27; James Stephen, afterwards Sir James (1789-1859) was, until his father's death in 1832, known as James Stephen, Jr. In 1825 he was appointed legal adviser for the Board of

1813, Stephen had served as legal counsellor in the Colonial Office. He examined all colonial legislation, and analysed important measures in detailed reports to the secretary of state. While he was supposed to confine himself to the purely legal and constitutional aspects of each piece of colonial legislation, the boundary was uncertain between these aspects and questions relating to general colonial policy. Because of his industry, wide learning, and outstanding ability, James Stephen, Jr., had by 1821 become a dominant influence in the Colonial Office. His report of June 26, 1821, on the Lower Canadian banking bills is therefore of much significance not only in the history of colonial banking, but, because of the views expressed by Stephen concerning the constitutional position of the Canadas, in the evolution of self-government in the British colonies as well.

Stephen wrote:

It appears by the protest of the Speaker of the Council that that officer entertains a clear opinion that the four bills establishing mercantile corporations<sup>5</sup> will be absolutely null and void, even though confirmed by His Majesty, as being repugnant to the provisions of certain acts of the parliament of Great Britain which are in force within the province. And it further appears, [from] Mr. Marshall's report of the 19th March 1821, that he in general concurs in this opinion, although he regards the question as more open to doubt. As I am unable to agree in the view which these Gentlemen have taken of this point of law, it is necessary that I should lay before your Lordship the grounds of my dissent.

The reasoning by which the Law officers of Lower Canada impugn the validity of these bills even if confirmed by His Majesty is as follows,

An Act of the British Parliament passed in the year 1719 (6th Geo. 1<sup>st</sup> c. 18) has prohibited all such public undertakings as those which it is the object of the present bills to establish, if such undertakings are carried on "without legal authority either by act of parliament or by any charter from the Crown."—In the year 1741, a further act of the British parliament (14<sup>th</sup> Geo. 2<sup>d</sup> c. 37) declared that the

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Trade; in 1834 he was made assistant undersecretary and in 1836 permanent undersecretary in the Colonial Office. In 1846 he resigned as legal counsellor for the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade, and in the following year he retired from the permanent undersecretaryship. For biographical sketches of him by his children see Sir Leslie Stephen, *The Life of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen* (London, 1895), 31-65; *The Dictionary of National Biography*, sketch written by Sir Leslie Stephen, and biographical notice by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in the fourth edition of his father's *Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography* (London, 1860), xi-xvii. In 1906 the daughter, Caroline Amelie Stephen, printed for private circulation *The Right Honourable Sir James Stephen*, a book consisting largely of letters selected from his private correspondence. For the work of James Stephen as colonial undersecretary see Henry L. Hall, *The Colonial Office, A History* (London, 1937), *passim*, and Paul Knaplund, "Mr. Oversecretory Stephen" (*Journal of Modern History*, I, Mar., 1929, 40-66).

<sup>5</sup>The four bills were: "No. 385. An Act for the incorporation of certain persons therein named under the name of the Bank of Canada," "No. 386. An Act for the incorporation . . . of the Quebec Bank," "No. 387. An Act to incorporate . . . the Quebec Fire Assurance Company," "No. 389. An Act for incorporating . . . the Bank of Montreal."

former act did & should extend to His Majesty's dominions in America. The Quebec Act, passed in the year 1774 (14<sup>th</sup> Geo. 3<sup>d</sup> c. 83) extended to the province of Quebec all acts of parliament theretofore made concerning the colonies. Consequently the prohibitory act of George 1<sup>st</sup> is in force in Lower Canada. The British Legislature therefore has prohibited the formation in that province, except by act of parliament or charter from the Crown, of such corporations as are now sought to be established, not by either of those means, but merely by acts of the provincial legislature. But a colonial act is neither an act of parliament nor a charter from the Crown—the present bills therefore are directly repugnant to the law of the United Kingdom;—and the statute of 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> William 3<sup>d</sup> c. 22 sect: 9 declares that all laws which shall be pretended to be in force in any of the plantations which are in any wise repugnant to any law to be made in this kingdom relating to the plantations are "illegal, null, and void to all intents and purposes whatever." These bills, therefore, even if confirmed, would be illegal, null, & void.

I am not clear that any sufficient answer could have been opposed to this reasoning, if it had related to ordinances made by the legislative council of Quebec within the first seventeen years after the date of the Quebec act of 1774. I am much mistaken, however, if the Canada act, which, at the expiration of that period, was passed in the year 1791 (31<sup>st</sup> Geo. 3<sup>d</sup> c. 31) does not entirely remove the difficulties which Mr. Sewell's protest and the report of Mr. Marshall have suggested.—I have the less difficulty in relying on this answer to their objections, because I observe that neither of those Gentlemen have referred to this act in the opinions written by them on the subject.

The act 31<sup>st</sup> Geo. 3<sup>d</sup> c. 31. s. 2, after the establishing the present legislatures of Upper & Lower Canada, declares that in each of those provinces, His Majesty shall have power, with the advice and consent of the legislative Council & Assembly of such province respectively "to make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government thereof, such laws not being repugnant to *this act*". It further provides that all such laws "shall be and the same are hereby declared to be by virtue of and under the authority of this act valid and binding to all intents and purposes whatsoever within the province in which the same shall have been so passed."—The 33<sup>rd</sup> section of the same act declares that all laws then in force within the province of Quebec should remain in force except in so far as the same were repealed by that act, or should hereafter by virtue of that act be repealed by His Majesty with the advice & consent of the provincial legislature.—Language thus comprehensive might have been considered to give the acts of the Governor, Council, & Assembly, an authority within the province itself as high and perfect as that of a British act of parliament, and thus might have been considered as placing the whole system of navigation and customs, so far as concerned the province, under the control of the provincial Legislature. To obviate this construction, the 46<sup>th</sup> section enacts that nothing in the act contained should be construed to affect the execution of the laws of navigation or external commerce, or to give to the legislative Council and Assembly authority to repeal any such law. No other provision is to be found in this act abridging the generality of the powers which by the 2<sup>nd</sup> section are conferred on the provincial Legislature. Nor do I think that it was in fact the meaning of the British parliament to withhold from the Governor, Council, & Assembly the power of making any law *relating to matters of internal regulation*, whether repugnant to acts of the British parliament or not. How far His Majesty, as a branch of the Colonial legislature, should be advised to sanction laws repugnant to acts of Parliament is a different question, but, his sanction being given, I see no reason to doubt

that such laws would "by virtue of and under the authority of" the statute 31<sup>st</sup> Geo. 3<sup>d</sup> c.31,s.2, be "valid and binding to all intents and purposes whatever within the province in which the same should have been passed." In short, I apprehend that the statute 7<sup>th</sup> & 8<sup>th</sup> William 3<sup>d</sup> c.22, sec.9, is virtually repealed, so far as relates to the provinces of Upper & Lower Canada, by statute 31<sup>st</sup> Geo. 3<sup>d</sup> c.31, with the exception only of laws relating to navigation and external commerce. I conceive that the British parliament in the year 1791, conferred on the provincial legislatures the power of repealing within the province the prohibitory act of the year 1719; and I think that in the bills now transmitted that legislature must be considered only as exercising the power thus confided to them. Whatever may be the policy or impolicy of the measure, I am unable, therefore, to discover any sufficient ground for denying its legality.

In the report of Mr. Marshall, it is proposed to avoid all questions as to the legality of the companies to be erected, by granting a royal charter to such of them as His Majesty's Government may be pleased to sanction. Whether my opinion as to the necessity of such a charter is right or not, your Lordship would probably consider it expedient that this grant should not be withheld, if it would have the effect of quieting all controversy respecting these corporations. A charter of incorporation, however, would not entirely supersede the necessity of the present bills; because there are several regulations apparently essential to the welfare of the proposed corporate bodies, to which the prerogative of the Crown would not extend.

The same report also contains an objection to the number of the intended banks. Mr. Marshall considers that two of these institutions would be sufficient for the wants of the province. This being, however, a mere question of policy, of course I do not presume to offer any suggestion upon it.

With regard to the details of the proposed bills, I have to submit to your Lordship the following remarks.

The bills N<sup>o</sup> 385, 386, and 389, appear to me to include all those provisions which are referred to in your Lordships dispatch to the Duke of Richmond<sup>6</sup> [26 May, 1819], except that the act no. 386 does not prohibit the Directors from acting as private Bankers. Upon these bills I have, however, to observe,—First, that in the case of the joint ownership of stock, it is enacted that "it shall be lawful that one person be empowered by letter of attorney from the other owners to represent the stock, & to vote accordingly":—But no provision is made for the very probable case of a contest between the joint owners themselves for the right of voting. 2<sup>ndly</sup>, The bills are deficient in penal sanctions for enforcing obedience to those regulations which have been made in compliance with your Lordship's instructions. Nothing short of a legislative act could destroy the corporate character of these banks, however widely they might depart from many of the chief obligations imposed on them.—It is not unusual in similar acts in England to give the King in Council a power of dissolving a corporation on proof of flagrant misconduct.—3<sup>rdly</sup>—The penal clauses with respect to the forgeries of the paper of these banks are as follows . . . persons engraving or mending plates or instruments designed for forging such securities, or having in their possession such plates or instruments, with the intent to use or permit the use of them for the purpose of forgery, are to suffer death as felons without benefit of clergy.—It seems very singular that the

<sup>6</sup>Charles Lennox, fourth Duke of Richmond (1764-1819), governor-general of Canada, 1818-19. For dispatch, Bathurst to Richmond, see Public Archives of Canada, *Report*, 1930, 68.

preparation for this crime should be punished with death, and the crime itself, when perpetuated with so much milder penalties—[imprisonment and hard labor or the pillory, for the first offence, and for the second one to be deemed guilty of felony]. It appears to me also worthy of much consideration whether the penalty of death in either case is not needlessly severe.

With regard to the Bill No 386, I have to observe further that it does not declare the shares of the different proprietors personal property,—an omission which might cause[?] embarrassing questions on the death of any proprietor;—and that it does not contain any direction as to the manner in which legal process is to be served on the corporation,—a point of great practical importance. Mr. Marshall has also observed on this act, that it has erected a Court for the trial of its delinquent officers, with higher power than appear to him to be necessary. I may add that the constitution of the court itself appears to me more calculated to promote contention than to prevent it.

On the best judgment, however, which I can form on the whole subject, it is my opinion that if His Majesty's Government should deem the erection of these banks or any of them *expedient*, these bills are not open to any such objections *in point of law* as ought further to postpone their operation.—If it should be His Majesty's pleasure to confirm these bills with any alterations or additions, the Governor might be instructed to grant the Royal assent as soon as such emendatory bills as His Majesty's Government may deem necessary should have passed the Council & Assembly.<sup>7</sup>

After some delay, doubtless caused by the dilatory habits of the Treasury when handling colonial business, the banking bills were approved by the Privy Council and the royal assent proclaimed by the governor-general of Canada.<sup>8</sup>

During the next twenty-two years the English banking system was overhauled by acts of Parliament. The last of this series, the Bank Charter Act of 1844, established strict regulations for the English banking system, particularly concerning the issuance of paper money.<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile laxity in regard to currency, credit,

<sup>7</sup>C.O., 323:41, ff. 155-162. Stephen was more critical of No. 387, the bill for incorporating the Quebec Fire Assurance Company, than he was of the banking laws. He objected to No. 387 because it did not fix the amount of capital stock, prescribe payment of the whole stock subscribed except to meet an emergency, prohibit payment of dividends from capital and assignment of shares to other owners before they were paid up, which might lead to transfer from solvent to insolvent holders, make provisions for shares as personal property, or contain adequate penal sanctions. Moreover, Stephen stated that this bill was drafted in loose, careless, obscure, and ungrammatical language. The law officers of Lower Canada had declared that this bill was very important, but Stephen did not see how benefits could be derived from it. *Ibid.*, f. 163.

<sup>8</sup>The bill for incorporating the Bank of Montreal was approved by order-in-council of May 18, 1822. The same authority sanctioned incorporation of the Bank of Canada and the Bank of Quebec, Sept. 16, 1822. Lord Bathurst transmitted the orders-in-council on May 29 and Sept. 20, 1822, to Lord Dalhousie, the governor-general of Canada. Public Archives of Canada, *Report*, 1930, 86, 88. The royal assent was proclaimed respectively on July 22 and Nov. 30, 1822. *Provincial Statutes of Lower Canada*, 1822.

<sup>9</sup>For the story of British banking legislation, 1820-50, see J. H. Clapham, *An Economic History of Modern Britain* (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1930), I, chaps. VII, XIII; Sir John Clapham, *The Bank of England, a History* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1945), II, 131-221.

and banking methods had resulted in financial crises in South American countries and the United States with heavy losses to British investors. To prevent similar occurrences in British colonies, the Treasury and the Colonial Office had co-operated in preparing rules for the guidance of colonial legislatures in preparing banking bills. Governors were instructed to reserve such measures till sanction had been secured from the Privy Council. In practice this meant Treasury control of colonial banking laws.<sup>10</sup>

As far as these imperial banking regulations applied to the Canadas, James Stephen doubted their wisdom. He held that the Canadian legislatures had the legal and constitutional right to pass banking laws. He doubted the practicability of attempting to teach these bodies sound banking principles by threats of disallowing banking legislation. Knowing by long experience how the Treasury persistently delayed decisions on colonial laws, he feared that a system which gave the lords of the Treasury the veto power over Canadian banking laws would prove injurious to the colonies and stimulate discontent with British rule in North America.

But the willingness of James Stephen to let the colonists regulate their own affairs and grow wise by experience did not mean that he wanted the imperial authorities to abstain from giving admonitions and advice; quite the contrary. Defects in banking laws should be called to the attention of the colonial legislators, especially those which might prove injurious to private and public interests. For instance he was dissatisfied with the Upper Canada act of 1822 which reduced by one-half the amount of paid up capital required before the Bank of Upper Canada at York could open for business, and when in the following year the same institution was permitted similarly to halve its capital stock he called attention to the fact that the bank's creditors had not been consulted.<sup>11</sup> In 1829 he suggested that the confirmation might be deferred on the act for establishing a trust to wind up the affairs of the insolvent Bank of Upper Canada at Kingston. Among the provisions of the act which needed clarification were the ones which

<sup>10</sup>For a brief survey of the general problems relating to colonial banking legislation see A. S. J. Baster, *The Imperial Banks* (London, 1929), 20-48. British influence on colonial banking and currency is summarized in C. M. MacInnes, *An Introduction to the Economic History of the British Empire* (London, 1935), 212-35; *Canada and Its Provinces*, IV, 614-15.

<sup>11</sup>For reports on the acts concerning this bank, see C.O., 323:42, f. 367; 42, f. 371; 43, f. 357. The capital stock of the Bank of Upper Canada at York was in 1821 set at £200,000, reduced in 1823 to £100,000; the paid up capital originally fixed at £20,000 was reduced in 1822 to £10,000. R. M. Breckenridge, "The Canadian Banking System" (*Publications of the American Economic Association*, 1895, X, 56).

applied the statute of limitation concerning debt in operation for the creditors but not for the debtors of the bank.<sup>12</sup>

On several occasions James Stephen expressed grave doubts concerning the wisdom of issuing imperial prescriptions relating to colonial banking. One of the fullest reports on this subject was sent to Lord Glenelg, the secretary of state for the colonies, on August 4, 1837. This report dealt with fourteen reserved bills from Upper Canada—all of them related to banking, trust, and insurance companies. The lieutenant-governor and the late attorney-general of the province had supplied full and accurate information concerning them. Under the existing regulations all would have to be sent to the Board of Trade and the Treasury for examination. Stephen observed:

It is impossible however to dismiss the subject without adverting to the possible effect of an unfavourable decision upon these various projects.

By requiring that all Bills of this nature should be reserved, Her Majesty's Govt. have assumed to themselves a responsibility which they cannot now decline, but which might otherwise have been decorously avoided. Upon the decision of the Queen in Council must depend the question whether these Laws shall ever take effect, or shall be entirely rejected. There is no longer the apology for acquiescing in a doubtful measure which may be shown[?] its having actually begun to work. It is probable that the Lieutenant Governor and the Legislative Council would have assented with less facility to some of these projects, if the instruction of August 1836 had not rescued them from a large share of the attendant responsibility.<sup>13</sup>

To allow these Acts as a whole, would evidently be to give Her Majesty's countenance to the vast extension of a Banking system which at the present moment has produced, or is attended by a suspension of cash payments in the Province. To sanction some and reject the rest of these schemes would be to make an invidious distinction, which, as far as I can perceive, it would be impossible to justify. To disallow these Laws altogether would probably be to provoke an hostility which it would be impossible to encounter with success or safety.

In this embarrassment my own judgment is that the only practicable escape will be to instruct the Lieutenant Governor to acquaint the Council and Assembly, that adverting to the events which have occurred since the enactment of these Laws, Her Majesty's Government doubt whether the Local Legislature will on further consideration retain the opinions which induced them to authorize so great an extension of the system of Chartered Banks. I would propose to communicate to those Bodies any Commercial or Financial objections which the Board of Trade or the Treasury may entertain to these projects, and I would instruct the Lieut. Governor to declare that if the Local Legislature should on a review of the subject adhere to their opinions in favour of these projects, Her Majesty's sanction would

<sup>12</sup>Report, Nov. 2, 1829, on Upper Canada Act No. 614. C.O., 323:46, ff. 146-147. For the history of this bank see Breckenridge, "The Canadian Banking System," 58-61.

<sup>13</sup>For defence of instructions of August, 1836, see Glenelg to Arthur, Dec. 28, 1837 in Public Archives of Canada, *Report*, 1936, 545-6. New rules had been issued by the Treasury on April 26, 1837; *ibid.*, 546-7.

not be refused. In that case to save delay of a further reference to this Kingdom, the Lieutenant Governor might perhaps be authorized to assent to any Bills to be re-enacted in the terms of these suspended Bills.

I venture to recommend this course in the full and confident persuasion that it is worse than idle to enter into a contest with either of the Canadian Legislatures upon any question which is exclusively of local concern. In any such controversy their success may be postponed for a little while, but is ultimately certain. The little which may be gained by the delay, will be a very poor compensation for the evils inseparable from the contest. The principle of leaving to the Canadas the regulation of their own Local Interests must, I conceive be fully followed out into all its consequences, as the only basis on which the connection between the two Countries can now be maintained.

If it should be said that British as well as Canadian Interests are involved as they may affect the payments made by the commissioners on account of the Troops, it will I conceive be answered on behalf of the Province, that this may be a good reason for calling on them for an indemnity, or for reducing the Military Establishment, but can be no sufficient reason for arresting the progress of undertakings in which the Local Legislature regard the welfare of their constituents to be deeply and permanently involved.

If it should be maintained that the Legislature misunderstood those interests, this may be a good reason for calling the imputed error to their notice. But should they persist in maintaining the accuracy of their own judgment, then I confess myself at a loss to perceive what is the ground on which their views should be overruled, in order to give effect to those of Her Majesty's confidential advisers. It will be the triumph perhaps of superior wisdom but will certainly pass in Canada for the triumph of superior authority, and to that authority such a victory may be eminently dangerous.<sup>14</sup>

The first parliament of united Canada passed several banking bills. The governor-general, Lord Sydenham, had special competence in this field since, as president of the Board of Trade, he had examined all colonial banking bills.<sup>15</sup> In reporting on January 10, 1842, to Lord Stanley on the batch of Canadian banking laws Stephen said:

<sup>14</sup>C.O., 323:52, ff. 24-27. On Nov. 27, 1837, Glenelg explained in a dispatch to the lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada, Sir Francis Bond Head, why decisions had not been taken on the fourteen banking bills. It was pointed out that the conditions on the North American continent were too disturbed to consent to the raising of the capital of chartered banks in Upper Canada from £500,000 to £4,500,000 currency and to give power to issue notes to the extent of £13,000,000. Special objections were made to bill No. 1063 which would make the provincial government a large stockholder in the Bank of Upper Canada. Public Archives of Canada, *Report*, 1936, 540-1.

On Dec. 20, 1836, Stephen reported to Glenelg on four banking acts from New Brunswick. He advised that when these were sent to the Treasury, the colonial secretary should explain "that in the present aspects of affairs in British North America, it would require the most clear and cogent motives to justify the disallowance of any Act which has come into operation in the Province of New Brunswick, and which is generally regarded there as essential, or as highly conducive to the welfare of the Inhabitants." C.O., 323:52, f. 69.

<sup>15</sup>Charles Edward Poulett Thomson, Lord Sydenham (1799-1841), president of the Board of Trade, June-Nov., 1834, 1835-9; governor-general of Canada, 1839-41.

They have been reserved, because, the Lords of the Treasury some time ago, insisted on the promulgation of a general rule, which required the suspension of all Colonial Acts of this class until Her Majesty's pleasure should be known. They appear to have been considered with the utmost attention by Lord Sydenham; and Sir Richard Jackson<sup>16</sup> strongly urges that they should be confirmed, and that this measure should be taken with the least possible delay.

The proceeding in Laws of this kind is to make a reference of them to the Treasury, and to recommend them to the special notice of the Board of Trade. In such references, many months are usually consumed, for it is the habit, I suppose the unavoidable habit, of each of those Boards to move at a very slow pace, especially on matters of this kind, which do not immediately and perceptibly involve any domestic interest. When at length these conclusions are formed and stated, they usually proceed upon grounds which seem to me to be altogether of secondary importance in reference to such questions as the present. The Treasury not seldom points out the possible bad effects on the local Currency of some of such Enactments, and the Board of Trade insist on the tendency of others to give an unnatural stimulant to Trade, or to oppose artificial restraints on it. Such criticisms have of course their value and importance. But in my mind there is scarcely any amount of bad Legislation about provincial Banks, of which the mischief is to be compared with that of offending the Legislature and the whole population (especially the Commercial population) of Canada, first by a long delay on matters of the deepest interest to them, and then by disquisitions on their projected Laws, which, however just in themselves, are received as the rebukes of a superior and distant authority. Of course I do not mean to say that pernicious Banking Acts ought to be passed. My meaning is only, that in the case of Canada, the Governor ought (as it seems to me) to be relieved from this restriction, and that the Province ought not to be placed under this invidious kind of tutelage, on a subject of such great local interest, and in which the British Treasury have an interest comparatively so slight and so remote. Convinced as I am that the Canadian Parliament will resent, and that they are powerful enough to shake off such restraints on their Local Executive Government, and believing, as I do, that the restraint is of little practical worth, I cannot but think that it would be better to withdraw it before the dispute arises. Indeed my own firm belief is, that this kind of prohibition counteracts its own object. For example, immediately after it reached Upper Canada a series of extravagant Banking projects came home, in the form of Re-served Bills. The Lieutenant Governor avowed his own conviction of their absurdity. But having been told to reserve such measures for the signification of the Royal Pleasure, he of course would not encounter the odium of rejecting them. The projectors of the Bills in the Assembly, and the House in general, were guided by the same kind of policy. Knowing that such measures would not be accepted in England they left to the Government here the unpopularity of arresting them, securing to themselves such popular favour as was to be won by patronizing or by passing them. In fact the Regulations promulgated by Lord Glenelg at the instance of the Treasury relieves all the local authorities, Legislative and Administrative, from the due sense of responsibility about Banking Enactments, and transfers that responsibility entirely to the Government at home, or rather to the Head of this Office, leaving them or him to incur reproaches to which neither they nor he ought

<sup>16</sup>Sir Richard Jackson (1777-1845), administrator of the government of Canada, Sept., 1841 to Jan., 1842.

to be exposed, and exhibiting to the people of Canada their Colonial relation to this Country in its most distasteful aspect.

If as I suppose, it is necessary to refer these Laws to the Treasury, and to the Board of Trade, I would submit to your Lordship the expediency of your taking the most effective measures to secure their instant attention to them. Any such references should I think be accompanied by extracts from Sir Richard Jackson's Despatch on the subject, and perhaps by an expression of your Lordship's opinion (if such should be your opinion) that this is an occasion on which it would not be fitting to oppose to the confirmation of these Laws any obstacle, unless it can be clearly shewn, that they would be directly and seriously injurious to the Revenue, or to the Trade of Great Britain—objections derived from any injuries which they may be supposed to threaten to the Revenue or to the Trade of Canada falling more properly within the cognizance of the Provincial, than of the British Authorities.<sup>17</sup>

Stanley concurred in the views expressed by Stephen and urged the Treasury and the Board of Trade to expedite the decisions on the bills "more especially as considerable delay has already taken place in consequence of Ld. Sydenham's death."<sup>18</sup> These departments were willing to allow the Canadians some latitude in the interpretation of the rules laid down for banking laws, but refused to change their method of handling or their power to review them. Stephen objected to both. Reporting on September 29, 1846, to Benjamin Hawes, the parliamentary undersecretary in the Colonial Office,<sup>19</sup> Stephen wrote "that I cannot but think that those Boards wd. relieve themselves of much unprofitable trouble by declining to interfere about these matters any further."<sup>20</sup>

But with this the colonial secretary, Lord Grey, did not concur. Writing in the margin of this minute he said: "The regulat[ion] of banks & the currency is a subject of all others on wh[ich] a popular Ass[em]bly & especially in countries where there is not much knowledge of political economy is apt to make the most injurious mistakes & as the subject is one of imperial concern the imperial gov[ernmen]t may both usefully & reasonably claim to exercise a control in such matters.—The delay arising from the accustomed references is certainly a great evil & ought to be avoided—the T[reasu]ry & B[oard] of Trade are the proper departments for considering such questions."<sup>21</sup>

But Lord Elgin adopted the point of view of James Stephen. Writing to Lord Grey, May 17, 1851, Elgin said: "I fear we shall have a great deal of difficulty in conducting the Government of

<sup>17</sup>C.O., 323:57, ff. 40-43.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, 52, Minute by Stanley.

<sup>19</sup>Sir Benjamin Hawes (1797-1862), undersecretary of state for war and the colonies, 1846-52.

<sup>20</sup>C.O., 323:61, f. 336.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*

this Colony if the opinion of the Canadian Statesmen and Legislators on Currency and Banking questions are to be wholly disregarded."<sup>22</sup> By then the imperial authorities were ready to follow the advice of James Stephen, one of the wisest British imperial statesmen of the nineteenth century.

PAUL KNAPLUND

The University of Wisconsin.

<sup>22</sup>*The Elgin-Grey Papers 1846-1852*, edited by Sir Arthur Doughty (Ottawa, 1937), II, 823.

## REVIEWS OF BOOKS

*Canada*. Edited by GEORGE W. BROWN. (United Nations series, ROBERT J. KERNER, general editor.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1950. Pp. xviii, 621. (\$6.50)

It is generally assumed—in particular among those who have to do with education—that a better knowledge of other countries may make for understanding and world peace. This is the underlying assumption in the series of volumes issued under the general editorship of Robert J. Kerner, Salter Professor of History at the University of California, who is himself an authority on the countries of Slavic Europe and has edited the volumes on Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in this series. The book on Canada is scholarly and well balanced. The editor has seen to it that practically all phases of Canadian life are dealt with, and by those who are recognized in their particular fields. The only question that this reviewer has is whether the book contains so much that it may be read by the scholar rather than by the general reader, and so to some extent defeat the purpose for which the series was planned. For its 621 pages take some reading, and the present reviewer cannot claim to have read them with the requisite degree of reflection. But the title page in itself gives some indication of the care that has been taken to see to it that the various chapters have been committed to competent hands. It reads: "Canada. Chapters by Edgar McInnis, James Wreford Watson, Gustave Lanctot, A. L. Burt, D. G. Creighton, C. P. Stacey, H. A. Innis, W. T. Easterbrook, A. W. Currie, Vernon C. Fowke, Benjamin H. Higgins, Arthur Lermer, R. MacGregor Dawson, Hugh McD. Clokie, K. Grant Crawford, Frank H. Underhill, Alexander Brady, Samuel Delbert Clark, Elizabeth S. L. Govan, Walter Herbert, Watson Kirkconnell, Arthur R. M. Lower, George P. de T. Glazebrook, John Bartlet Brebner, Frank A. Knox, F. H. Soward. Edited by George W. Brown, Professor of History in the University of Toronto."

It would seem gratuitous even to suggest that this list might have been added to, for it is long, and the book is large. But for the sake of balance it might have been advisable, had it been possible, to have had a business man and a labour executive on the list as well. The academic flavour, which is good—very good—is also very pronounced.

It was inevitable, from the nature of the subject and the background of the contributors, that the historical aspect should have been dealt with very fully, and from several angles. Not only the historian *per se*, but the economist, the sociologist, the student of culture and of religion, and the political scientist have, each from their own viewpoint, discussed the growth of Canada from the days of the French régime onwards. There is of necessity some repetition. But it is not a repetition that surfeits, for there is not infrequently a refreshing difference of emphasis. This anyone who knows the contributors would expect. Meighen's stand in 1921 and Sir Robert Borden's part in bringing Canada to full maturity come not infrequently into the picture, but always in their own right. A good background requires more than one colour—perhaps even, more than one artist. It is remarkable after all how seldom the artists who have drawn this picture have come into conflict.

The most significant part of the book, from the standpoint of the purpose of the series, is the outlook into the future. Many of the contributors assumed, for

the nonce, the role of prophet. There is a tantalizing uncertainty about Canada that intrigues. The ultimate solution of the United States-United Kingdom-Canada triangle, the way in which the federal-provincial tension will be eased, the extent to which our two cultures may merge, the part that Canada may play in a Pacific alliance, the ultimate conquest of the North, our contribution to the things of the spirit when our pioneering activities absorb less of our waking hours—all this and more is dealt with, directly or incidentally, in these pages. And, on the whole, in a mood of confidence. So much depends, as is pointed out more than once, on the spirit of fairness and justice that must prevail in a country so unevenly blessed by providence in its various parts, if ultimately Canada will count in World Councils as she may and must. It seems not unreasonable, in the light of the past, to feel some assurance that statesmanlike policies will prevail.

With the general purpose of the series in mind, one could have wished for some consideration of the way in which common problems of northern development may bring social and physical scientists in Canada and the U.S.S.R. together in the days that lie ahead. For there is no doubt that for both countries this will be among the great challenges of the next quarter century. And where there are common problems—as in plant breeding in the last quarter century—there are opportunities and there is need for consultation and co-operation. The scholar-scientist may sometimes do more than the politician and the statesman. For he can work in an atmosphere which is not surcharged with emotion.

This is a volume that requires not only reading, but much rereading. It is the most authoritative study of Canada that we have had in the last decade. The printer and the publisher have seen to it that the mechanics of reading is a pleasure. To this reviewer it has been a real pleasure. The editor deserves a word of praise.

R. C. WALLACE

Queen's University.

*Wartime Economic Co-operation: A Study of Relations between Canada and the United States.* By R. WARREN JAMES. Toronto: Ryerson Press, for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1949. Pp. xiii, 415. (\$5.00)

THIS book is about the Hyde Park agreement and how it worked out. By that declaration, made in April, 1941, the United States and Canada announced their intention that ". . . in mobilising the resources of this continent [for war production] each country should provide the other with the defence articles which it is best able to produce, and, above all, produce quickly, and that production programs should be co-ordinated to this end." Two things were aimed at: the full use of the production facilities of both countries and their more effective use by integrating them into a continental structure of production.

That the productive resources of both countries were fully used is the great achievement of these years. The United States supported our war production programme by treating Canadian manufacturers, in their priorities and materials allocation systems, just as United States firms were treated. The American government bought defence articles in Canada whenever we could produce them more quickly or when idle capacity would otherwise have appeared in Canada. The Canadian government, sensitive to the implications of taking Lend-Lease aid, thus obtained from our own war production the American dollars required to buy the vast amount of American raw materials and parts needed to make munitions for Britain.

Of "integration," however, there was little or none. From the beginning the United States had not permitted the making in their country of any but standard American-type war machines. North America's output of British types had therefore to come from Canada. Only in common type goods or unspecialized materials and parts would it have been possible to concentrate production in either country. Moreover, what each country might supply quickly was already determined by natural resources and the use which had been made of them before the war. So true was this, as for instance in the American closing of the gold mines, that it was found that not much productive power was released for the war effort as compensation for the individual hardship and loss which followed. It proved, to cite another case, better to let Canadian newsprint mills continue to make standard newsprint than to attempt to reduce the grade or to divert pulp to mills making other sorts of paper. Incidentally, because Canada was a main supplier and the American press the chief consumer of newsprint, this forest products problem produced a large share of such recrimination between the two countries as took place. It is discussed in one of the most interesting chapters in this book.

The failure to do much "integrating" was relatively unimportant. The major and critical achievement of co-operation between Canada and the United States was the agreement to grant Canadian firms "domestic" status in the American allocation system. Without that status our production would have been crippled from the want of materials even though we had the American dollars to buy them. It was achieved neither quickly nor once for all but had to be argued for again and again at each stage in the evolution of the American priority and allocation system. That it was eventually firmly established Mr. James attributes largely to the fact that war production was organized in both countries by men recruited from business and that quick development of direct and personal relationships between controllers in each country was thus possible. As there were not enough diplomats available to look after these negotiations they were of necessity left to the operating officials. The great advantage of this system was that decisions did get made and were quickly carried out by men who understood and approved the decisions. The disadvantage was that much significant policy-making thus escaped from the hands of the government; that the informal agreements in which decisions were embodied had to be explained and justified over and over again as officials and agencies handling matters changed; and that this co-operation was so "undiplomatic" in procedure that Canadians were likely to be treated—though not for long—as if they were residents of an American state.

The idea of parity of treatment spread from war production to civilian production and supply problems. Equality of treatment of Canadians and Americans in such matters as foods and consumer goods was difficult to achieve because of the very different supply situations and rationing systems in the two countries. The American press was occasionally critical of the relative ease of obtaining meat and footwear in Canada and the American government itself was fearful that Canadian reconversion might proceed faster, on the basis of imported materials, than that of the United States once the war in Europe was over. It is Mr. James's view that the record would have been a much less happy one had it been necessary to impose any very considerable degree of civilian austerity in North America.

All these and many related matters are treated concisely in his book. A great mass of material has been skilfully ordered and set out clearly. The fact that the book has had to be limited to bilateral relationships between Canada and the

United States to the exclusion of the general course of events to which these were related is perhaps inevitable but does not make the narrative any easier to follow. The exclusion of almost all references to persons and controversies is harder to understand. Had the names of persons and the episodes with which they were associated been more freely mentioned the bewildering succession of boards, agencies, and committees would have been easier to tie into one's recollections of these events and the narrative thereby much enlivened.

Nevertheless Mr. James has written an excellent introduction to a most important episode in the long history of our relationships with the United States. It is moreover very topical. If, as the American chief of staff is reported to have said recently, the Hague military agreement between the Atlantic treaty powers means that henceforth no one of these countries will have a complete military establishment of its own, that none of them will be able to wage war without the others, a sizeable job of military and economic "co-operation," to say nothing of "integration," lies ahead. The Canadian-American experience ought to be of importance at least to the Canadians who will have to deal with these questions.

F. A. KNOX

Queen's University.

*Louis XVI, le Congrès américain et le Canada, 1774-1789.* By MARCEL TRUDEL. Québec: Publications de l'Université Laval; Éditions du Quartier Latin. 1949. Pp. xlvi, 259.

PROFESSOR TRUDEL remarks, by way of introducing his problem, that studies have been made of the policy of France toward Canada during the period of the American Revolution, and that the same has been done for the policy of the Congress. He proposes, in the book under review, to examine simultaneously French and American policy toward Canada during these critical years. His method is that of the "scientific historian" (p. x), and he sternly rejects what he terms "hypothetical history," remarking: "Il est déjà assez difficile d'écrire l'histoire qui a été sans tenter d'écrire l'histoire qui aurait pu être" (p. 82).

The terminal dates of the study indicate a certain unity. The year 1774 marks for the Thirteen Colonies the meeting of the First Continental Congress, for France, the accession of Louis XVI, for Canada, the Quebec Act; and 1789 marks for the United States the inauguration of government under the Constitution, for Canada, official projects for a new constitution, for France, the end of the absolute monarchy. In a triangular study of this kind, there is an intellectual satisfaction in finding an imposed chronological unity, and Professor Trudel skilfully demonstrates his point, though he does not push it too far.

The integration of the theme is accomplished in an Introduction and seven chapters. The Introduction, brief and general, sets the problem for the period 1763-74. The main study opens with the Quebec Act which, because of its association with the Intolerable Acts, and the seeming design of Great Britain to recreate the situation before 1760, makes Canada an object of policy both for the Congress and for France. A detailed analysis of the efforts of the Congress both by conciliation and by force, to bring Canada into the union against Great Britain, follows. The main contribution in this section rests upon the elaborate analysis of the communications sent from the Thirteen Colonies in revolt to the projected, though enigmatic, fourteenth colony.

With the conclusion of the Franco-American alliance the triangular theme enters upon its main course. The treatment of the developing and antagonistic

policies of France and the Congress toward Canada from 1778 on seems, to this reviewer, to be the best part of the book. The main lines of French policy are clearly demonstrated: to renounce for herself any ambitions to recreate a French Empire in North America; to prevent the Congress from acquiring Canada, as such an acquisition would produce a too independent United States; and to guarantee Canada to Great Britain, trusting that, in the ensuing frictions and hostilities between British North America and the new United States, American commerce would be drawn to France. When the Congress sought to use its new found ally to help in the conquest of Canada, it met obstruction and resistance. This thesis is supported by detailed study, which is particularly strong on the French side, where a great deal of use is made of the Vergennes-Gérard correspondence edited in 1939 by J. J. Meng. The general theme is carried through the account of the negotiation of the settlement of 1783. France had, during the Seven Years' War, fought to keep the colonists of Britain out of the Ohio country and to hold her own Empire in the New World. During the negotiations in 1783, France fought to keep independent Americans out of this territory and to support the British Empire in the New World. Professor Trudel puts it this way: "La France, si l'on peut s'exprimer ainsi, prenait la défense du Canada, mais ne prenait guère la défense de ses alliés, les Américains" (p. 215). The last chapter of the book deals largely with the question of the western posts, and the continuing friction between the United States and Great Britain. In the Conclusion, the author, with admirable succinctness, summarizes his major themes, and presents a strong vindication of the policy of Vergennes.

It is an arguable point, in a book of this kind, to what extent a writer should indicate in his footnotes the present status of scholarship on a given topic. There is no rule. It is somewhat surprising, however, to detect the following lacunae: on the Franco-American alliance, no reference to E. S. Corwin's study; on the problem of the commercial empire of the St. Lawrence and the English minority, no reference to D. G. Creighton's work; on the negotiations of 1783, citations of Bemis's general diplomatic history, but no reference to the admirably detailed *Diplomacy of the American Revolution* (1935); on the problem of Burgoyne's campaign, no reference to T. S. Anderson's work; on the naval aspect of the war, no reference to A. T. Mahan; on the first year of the American Revolution, no reference to Allen French's major work. It is true that the references are largely made up of citations to what might be regarded as primary sources, but they contain numerous secondary works as well. It would seem the part of wisdom to include among the references the fundamental and recent monographic studies. It is suggested that in some cases this has not been done.

On some points of interpretation, the author takes a rather questionable stand. An instance of this is his treatment of Carleton's actions in June of 1776. Professor A. L. Burt has studied in detail this highly interesting and important point. He has come to the conclusion that Carleton failed to press his attack energetically because he was acting more as a statesman than as a soldier, and that he did not wish, as the step of independence had not yet been taken, to force the Congress into irrevocable action. A close study of the documents gives strong support to this interpretation. Professor Trudel dismisses this as an effort "... inutilement d'écrire une histoire qui n'est qu'une histoire hypothétique" (p. 82). Later (p. 86) he remarks: "Cette hypothèse, très flatteuse pour l'honneur britannique, n'est qu'une hypothèse sans beaucoup de fondement." Professor Burt was not writing so much of the "ifs" of history, as he was trying to perceive motivation in Carleton,

and account for his conduct. To deny this function to a historian is to negative much of the writing of history. Professor Trudel does well to protest against the conception of history "comme une œuvre d'art" and "une représentation dramatique," but great history must evaluate.

This, in spite of some criticisms offered, is a good book. The main thesis is sound, the organization clear, and much material has been brought together in a new orientation. Historians will look forward to Professor Trudel's projected work on the invasion of 1775, the Canadian reaction to the American Revolution, and the French collaboration in it.

G. S. BROWN

The University of Michigan.

*John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy.* By SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1949. Pp. xix, 588, xv. (\$7.50)

In this "diplomatic biography," as he terms it, Professor Bemis has made a valuable contribution to the history of the foreign policy of the United States. The period covered—from the beginnings of the republic to the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine—is of fundamental importance, and Professor Bemis comes to it with a wealth of scholarship at his disposal. During these years the principles of American foreign policy which were to extend through the nineteenth century, and in large part even to our own day, were clearly established, and the diplomatic basis was laid for the expansion of the United States as a transcontinental power through to the Pacific. In all this, requiring as it did an intimate knowledge of the European scene and involving elaborate negotiations at many points with Great Britain, Russia, Spain, and France, John Quincy Adams played a leading role and at times even exerted a determining influence. "More than any other man of his time he was privileged," writes Professor Bemis, "to gather together, formulate, and practice the fundamentals of American foreign policy—self-determination, independence, noncolonization, nonintervention, nonentanglement in European politics, Freedom of the Seas, freedom of commerce—and to set them deep in the soil of the Western Hemisphere."

Professor Bemis finds Adams's robust Americanism a congenial theme, and views his success as the first exponent of Manifest Destiny—though the phrase was not yet invented—with evident satisfaction. "He has often been called America's greatest diplomatist. Let those who dispute the title produce a greater." Certainly Adams's tenacity, cool judgment, and sure grasp of the elements in every diplomatic situation gave him a remarkable record of achievement. In spite of his admiration, Professor Bemis is not, however, disposed to give Adams more than his due, and in the matter of the authorship of the Monroe Doctrine he holds the scales with fairness. "Adams more than any other single person helped to formulate the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. But President James Monroe was responsible for the message itself. . . . The 'most significant of all American state papers' appropriately bears the name Monroe Doctrine."

Canadian readers may be surprised to find how much of the volume touches at one point or another on Canadian history. As a senator from Massachusetts, Adams was more responsible than anyone else for the rejection of the Convention of 1803 between Great Britain and the United States which would have run the boundary west of Lake of the Woods on a line 152 miles south of the 49th parallel.

The territory in question, Professor Bemis suggests, might well be called "the Adams strip." Following the War of 1812 Adams became a principal figure in the conduct of American diplomacy, first as one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Ghent, then as minister to Great Britain, 1815-17, and finally as secretary of state in Monroe's administration. During these crucial years every aspect of Anglo-American relations came under review and decisions of far-reaching and permanent importance were made, some of which directly affected Canadian interests, then and later, notably those concerned with disarmament on the Great Lakes, the fisheries of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the boundary settlements, east and west. In the cases of the Maine-New Brunswick boundary, and of the Oregon and Pacific Coast settlements the story is carried through to the treaty agreements of the eighteen-forties. For the intricate diplomacy lying behind all these decisions, Professor Bemis has supplied an account of great interest and value, fully documented and written on a sufficiently ample scale to invite careful study.

GEORGE W. BROWN

The University of Toronto.

*The Saskatchewan.* By MARJORIE WILKINS CAMPBELL. Illustrated by ILLINGWORTH H. KERR. (Rivers of America, edited by HERVEY ALLEN and CARL CARMER; as planned and started by CONSTANCE LINDSAY SKINNER; associate editor, JEAN CRAWFORD; art editor, FAITH BALL.) New York, Toronto: Rinehart and Co. [Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co.]. 1950. Pp. 400. (\$4.50)

IT cannot be easy for the New York editors of a series of books on American rivers to know where to turn to find authors competent to describe the rivers of Canada. The most natural place in which to look for an authority on the Saskatchewan would surely be Edmonton (whence an attractive short book on the river has lately come). Instead the editors of this series looked no farther afield than Toronto and were, perhaps, lucky to find in Mrs. Campbell an authoress, who, if somewhat out of touch with the Saskatchewan country, was nevertheless born there, and brought to her task a boundless enthusiasm and readiness to make, and gracefully to acknowledge, any number of enquiries.

The result may perhaps be described as a fundamentally decent book rather lavishly sprinkled with schoolboy howlers. It is bizarre, for example, to find ascribed to Hudson's Bay Company men of the eighteenth century the reticences and mannerisms that Hollywood imposes on all its ludicrous Englishmen as unfailingly as it puts feathers on its Indians. Perhaps some may think it niggling to complain of finding a parody of modern English public schoolboy behaviour attributed to men (largely Orcadian) who reached the West before Dr. Arnold of Rugby was born, yet one cannot help feeling that the history of a country where an English company counted for so much might be better written by a writer with more understanding of the British Isles. The whole book is decidedly episodic. The authoress jumps from one topic that attracts her to another, with a resulting lack of continuity, and the chronology of her historical sections is often almost impossible to follow. Her omissions are curious. For example, the founding of Cumberland House interests the writer and Hearne's work there is well and reasonably described; there is no specific mention of Andrew Graham on whose initiative Hearne was despatched inland. The authoress is capable of referring to the unnamed Joseph Colen, the factor at York who stopped David Thompson's surveys, as a "colonial governor" (p. 111); and is it Lord Bathurst, secretary of state,

primarily, for war and, secondarily, for all Britain's colonies from penal settlements in Australia to the rum-producing West Indies, who is disguised as "the Canadian colonial secretary" on page 144? (Or is it Sir John Sherbrooke, the governor-general of Canada?) A number of our other old friends are strangely disguised by Mrs. Campbell's spelling—Corrie or Curry (to give A. S. Morton's alternatives) becomes Corey; Umfreville's already rather strange name is made stranger by the substitution of "ph" for "f". Though the authoress has wisely turned to Mrs. M. A. MacLeod for assistance, the nephew and husband of Letitia Hargrave both appear as Hargraves. Again, the reader who is led by Mrs. Campbell's reference to "huge Norsemen transports" (p. 85) to expect to see aircraft rivalling B29s will be sadly disillusioned by the single-engined reality.

Our criticisms will make it clear that this book contains any number of errors that will jar the professional historian to whose hands it comes, and it is proper for the *CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW* to take note of its faults. Yet to judge it strictly by professional standards would be unfair. It is intended not for the professional, but for the general reader. It is desirable that what the general reader is told should be accurate, but other qualities are also required. A book must interest him; it must give him the bigger and more important facts, and not get him lost in detail. By and large, it was this reviewer's feeling that the general Northern American reader owes a real debt of gratitude to Mrs. Campbell for a lively and readable book, and that a large portion of Canada has been on the whole by no means ill-interpreted to the great southern public which is in general singularly ignorant of things Canadian.

RICHARD GLOVER

The University of Manitoba.

*Native Arts of the Pacific Northwest: From the Rasmussen Collection of the Portland Art Museum.* Introductory text by ROBERT TYLER DAVIS. Photography by WILLIAM REAGH; layout and typography by ALVIN LUSTIG. (Stanford Art series.) Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. 1949. Pp. [xiv], 165, 4 colour plates, 194 illustrations. (\$7.50)

It is seldom that an important book is as attractive as *Native Arts of the Pacific Northwest*. The charm of the volume almost lulls the reader into forgetting that its scholarly accuracy is as significant as its artistic beauty. Mr. Davis points out (p. 4) that the merit of native American Indian art was not recognized until the work of d'Harnoncourt in the nineteen-twenties; he might have added that it was the genius of d'Harnoncourt to display Indian sculpture and craftsmanship in the setting of the salon, rather than with the exotic appeal of the trading-post. This is the view animating this volume. Photography, reproduction, printing, arrangement—all are utilized to show, as works of art, the skill of the Indians of British Columbia, and the Eskimo of Alaska. The result is a volume as pleasing in appearance as are the objects which it illustrates.

Art cannot exist in a vacuum, nor can artistic products be fully appreciated without an understanding of their meaning in the lives of their creators. Here the scientist must collaborate with the art connoisseur. Though the core of this book is its illustrations, it would be no more than a beautiful portfolio were it not for the scholarly and well-balanced text explaining the social and religious life of the people. Mr. Davis shows, perhaps too briefly, the meaning of the sculptures and paintings to the Indians themselves. In addition there is an explanation of each

illustration, virtually a catalogue, the details of which have been checked by Dr. Erna Gunther, the distinguished anthropologist of Seattle.

The specimens chosen for illustration were among the 5,000 articles collected over many years by Axel Rasmussen, of Skagway, Alaska, and the catalogue descriptions are based on his careful records. Rasmussen must have had a keen appreciation of what the Indians themselves considered to be good craftsmanship, and, in making his collection, he sought only representative pieces, hoping that it would be lodged ultimately in a permanent museum. After his death the collection was temporarily scattered, until finally obtained, under rather dramatic circumstances, by the Portland Art Museum. The fact that this volume includes only specimens from this one collection explains the association of two diverse arts, the stylized "totemic" art in wood (or rarely stone) of the tribes of the British Columbia coast; and the more realistic carvings in ivory (or rarely wood) of the Eskimo. All the specimens illustrated are of good quality, but few are remarkable; indeed one of the merits of the book is that it shows fine art, but not unique masterpieces. Indeed, it is perhaps consoling to remember that comparable pieces are on display in museums in Victoria, Ottawa, Toronto, and Montreal—to name only Canadian centres. Not only has the Portland Art Museum made possible the preservation of these works of art, but in conjunction with the Stanford University Press, has published them. Though similar specimens exist elsewhere, they have never been illustrated to better advantage; in fact the only illustrations which are comparable appeared in an article by Wolfgang Paalen in the Mexican journal, *Dyn*, Volumes IV-V (see C.H.R., Mar., 1945, p. 98). The richness and beauty of this same northwest coast art has recently been acclaimed in another medium, the movies, through a superb film, "The Loon's Necklace," produced by Crawley Films Limited, Ottawa.

*Native Arts of the Pacific Northwest* is planned as a first volume of a "Stanford Art series." It sets an extremely high standard. Also it is a pleasing illustration of international scholarly exchange. Most of the objects depicted are the works of unknown Canadian artists; they have gone from British Columbia to Alaska to Oregon; Robert Tyler Davis, the author of the book, was formerly director of the Portland Art Museum and is now director of the Montreal Museum of Fine Art.

T. F. McILWRAITH

The University of Toronto.

#### SHORTER NOTICES

*The Debate on the American Revolution, 1761-1783.* Edited by MAX BELOFF. (The British Political Tradition, edited by ALAN BULLOCK and F. W. DEAKIN, Book I.) London: Nicholas Kaye. 1949. Pp. xii, 304. (12s. 6d.)

THIS is the first to appear of a new series of source-books of political thought intended to present in convenient form the many-sided discussions and varied points of view which, taken together, represent the "British Political Tradition."

Mr. Beloff's book covers roughly the same ground as its well-known predecessor, Morison's *Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution*, and it is with that book, now becoming difficult to obtain in Canada, that *The Debate on the American Revolution* will be compared. There is one very significant difference. Mr. Morison was concerned with the Revolution as a whole and thus introduced extracts which illustrate topics on which Mr. Beloff does not touch, for instance the

western problems which were one cause of the outbreak, and the early development of the ideas which led eventually to the American form of democratic government. On the other hand, one must hasten to add that Mr. Beloff accepts the ideas of Americans down to 1783 as "British" if they throw light on the fundamental issues in the political crisis which beset the British Empire in these years and if they can be fitted into the pattern which the general editors have called the "British Political Tradition."

Mr. Beloff leaves to a later editor in the series the task of taking up the next stage in the development of British theories of Empire in which he says that the Constitutional Act of 1791 (which in an unfortunate lapse he calls the Quebec Act) marks the beginning of a new age. Mr. Beloff has very successfully divided his editorial comment into two compartments. The outline of the development of the theories which he is illustrating is given in a competent introduction in which reference is made to the documents in the order of their appearance. Secondly, each document is preceded by a brief outline of the circumstances which gave rise to the issue which provoked it. The publishers are to be congratulated on the use of a type unusually large for books of this kind.

R. A. PRESTON

The Royal Military College of Canada.

*Les Cahiers des Dix, numéro 14.* Montréal: Les Dix. 1949. Pp. 304.

DURING the past fourteen years the members of *Les Dix* have made a distinguished contribution to the study of the history of French Canada, and to the cultivation of historical interest amongst their compatriots. It is to be hoped that their efforts will go on with the same commendable vigour that they have so far shown.

*Numéro Quatorze* of the *Cahiers des Dix* contains a number of particularly interesting and valuable articles. By delving into the letters of "Les Correspondants canadiens de Rameau de Saint-Père," Jean Bruchési has given us an admirably clear picture of the hopes and fears of many French Canadians of the last century regarding the question of French immigration and colonization in relation to the future development of French Canada. Raymond Douville, in an excellent article, "L'Epopée des petits traiteurs," throws a penetrating beam on some of the important but little-known facets of the liquor trade in New France. L'Étude du droit et le barreau" by Maréchal Nantel is a very worthwhile summary of the changes in legal training in French Canada from colonial days till now. Léo-Paul Desrosiers touches upon some of the political effects of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic régime upon French Canadians as seen in the official pronouncements of the bishops. In his study, "En Relisant les mandements," he quite appropriately calls students of history to a much more careful consideration of this period and of such influences. In "Milice et troupes de la marine en Nouvelle-France, 1669-1760," Gérard Malchelosse presents a meticulous enumeration of the militia forces active in New France in this period. Abbé Albert Tessier offers an interesting new chapter in the local history of his beloved "région trifluvienne." This article, "Les Anglais prennent les Forges au sérieux," concerns the Forges St. Maurice in the years, 1760-1837. Victor Morin continues his charming and amusing description of the "Clubs et sociétés notoires d'autrefois" whilst Mgr Olivier Maurault calls our attention to one of Montreal's most valuable historical collections, "Le Musée de Notre-Dame à Montréal." Pierre-Georges Roy presents a

study of "Le premier Baron de Portneuf," and Aristide Beaugrand-Champagne offers a timely summary of the knowledge about "La Découverte de Terre-Neuve."

RICHARD M. SAUNDERS

The University of Toronto.

*The Honourable Company: A History of the Hudson's Bay Company.* By DOUGLAS MACKAY. Revised to 1949 by ALICE MACKAY. Maps by R. H. H. MACAULAY. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. 1949. Pp. xiv, 397. (\$6.00)

THIS is the best and most readable history of the Hudson's Bay Company, originally published in 1936, and now revised by its author's widow. One is glad to see it reissued and confident that many new readers will enjoy it. Some disappointment, however, awaits the professional historian who uses it. In her foreword Mrs. MacKay refers gratefully to the publications of the Hudson's Bay Record Society, to A. S. Morton's *History of the Canadian West*, and Miss Nute's *Caesars of the Wilderness*, and on the same page she claims to have brought the appendices up to date; yet none of these works that she specially mentioned is listed in the bibliographical appendix, nor does the title of any work published since 1936 occur there.

Mrs. MacKay was very understandably conservative in altering her husband's work, yet there are points at which one could wish for more drastic treatment, as, for example, in the statement that "the York boat was first developed about 1826." Philip Turnor speaks of boats in use on the Albany in 1779, Alexander Henry describes Hudson's Bay Company boats of the true York boat form reaching the Assiniboine from Albany in 1803, and H. A. Innis has shown that boats were adopted on the Saskatchewan in 1795. Arthur Morton's observations on the boat's superior cargo capacity to the North canoe, and hence its greater economy, give this point a real importance for the years of strife between the Companies.

But the reviewer should not confine himself to belittling criticisms which may reveal more of his own foibles than a book's weaknesses. It remains, therefore, to congratulate Mrs. MacKay on a rather rare success—the reissue by a commercial firm of a sound historical book for the general public. Her new edition retains the readability that was her husband's first concern, and its value is enhanced by her own contributions to the final chapter.

RICHARD GLOVER

The University of Manitoba.

*Readings in British Government.* Edited by ELISABETH WALLACE. Toronto: University of Toronto Press—Saunders. 1948. Pp. xxvi, 443. (\$5.25)

THE scope and usefulness of this volume may best be seen by noting the purpose and limitations the editor has kept in mind in preparing it. Her purpose has been to make readily available materials which are out of print or otherwise difficult to come by, but which are necessary source materials for the study of the government of Great Britain. The limitations she has placed upon the scope of her selection are two in number. First, it is the present—present structure and operation—which is the principal concern. Secondly, certain matters of present interest have been excluded—the constitution and its conventions, the Privy Council, and developments since Labour took office in 1945. With this purpose and within these limits Miss Wallace has brought together in one volume a very interesting and varied

anthology of first-rate studies of contemporary British government. In addition to selections from the work of the leading lights in the field such as Pollard, Jennings, Keith, etc., there are essays by such lesser notables as William Clarke, J. K. Pollock, Sir Bryan Fell, E. C. S. Wade, etc. The selections are conveniently arranged under eight departments or aspects of the government system: the party system, the House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Crown, the Cabinet, the prime minister, the Civil Service, and local government. The treatment of each of these, as is inevitable in an anthology such as this, is rather scrappy and incomplete. Some very important matters, naturally, are absent altogether. One finds, however, upon turning to the select bibliography (pp. 439-43), a convenient list of references to readily available works in which these matters are fully treated. The text and the bibliography are therefore complementary and closely related. One matter which does not appear adequately in either text or bibliography is finance. J. R. Hicks's *The Problem of Budgetary Reform* and Hills and Fellows's *The Finance of Government* might well have been included in the latter.

In her introduction (pp. xi-xxiii) the editor discusses briefly "some of the major ideas underlying the discussions of political institutions contained in this volume." The general view there presented is little short of Blackstonian. Miss Wallace heartily approves of the constitution as it stands—"... when all is said and done, (it is) still the best form of government which has as yet been devised"—and its critics seem all to be heavily discounted. *Readings in British Government* will be found of much use to all students of the subject and a valuable addition to private and other small libraries.

H. W. McCREADY

McMaster University.

*The Canadian Y.M.C.A. in World War II.* By ALAN M. HURST. National War Services Committee, National Council of Young Men's Christian Associations of Canada. 1950. n.d. Pp. 398.

THIS large well-printed book will be somewhat disappointing even to those few Canadians who would be particularly interested in its subject matter. It is not a history of Canadian Y.M.C.A. war services in the last war, since it is almost completely lacking in interpretative and explanatory comment, nor is it an evaluation of the programme of those auxiliary services carried out by the Y.M.C.A. It is a chronicle for half its length with the second half consisting of selected documents, entirely flattering letters, and lists of names of committee members, supervisors, and staff. In fact the value of the book lies largely in its documentation and collection of data.

The author was commissioned by the National War Services Committee of the National Council of the Y.M.C.A. to undertake this book. Obviously he has succeeded in organizing a tremendous mass of material by means of a vast number of sub-headings and with cross-classifications of the three armed services, the various theatres of war, and the different phases of auxiliary service activities. The reader searches in vain, however, for some appraisal of programme, or indications of real success and failure in the auxiliary services. One reads that "Conditions in the Bahamas were very different from those prevailing in Iceland" and that sports can be classified as "Games Played with Ball and Bat," "Games Played with Inflated Balls," "Games Played with Sticks," and "Miscellaneous." The attempt to avoid blatant laudation makes it necessary to gloss over spectacular accomplishments and failures. Surely there were both in profusion.

This is a factual record of one of several attempts to meet the needs of servicemen in the pre-atomic era. It may be doubted that the techniques employed will be possible or useful in the time available should there be future wars. The extent of the operation, the amounts of money involved, the rather large profits made (all returned to the Treasury for welfare purposes), the method of selecting staff, the previous occupations of such persons, the very real difficulties they found, are of interest, both to the layman and those ex-servicemen who, like the reviewer, often wondered about these matters.

ALBERT ROSE

The University of Toronto.

*The Irish in Nova Scotia: Annals of the Charitable Irish Society of Halifax (1786-1836).* By HERBERT LESLIE STEWART. Kentville, N.S.: Kentville Publishing Co. n.d. Pp. 199.

STUDENTS of local and social history are much in debt to Dr. Stewart for *The Irish in Nova Scotia*. The most arresting sections of the volume trace the history of the Charitable Irish Society of Halifax from its beginning in 1786 to 1836. The Charitable Irish Society was the second philanthropic organization of the city, following by about twenty years the North British Society. Dr. Stewart has had access to the records of the Society, and these, reinforced by accounts from newspapers, have made it possible for him to give a very complete and lively account of the first fifty years. In 1795 the membership of the Irish Society was broadened to embrace persons of all extractions. As a result it came to include such notable figures as Joseph Howe, who in the late eighteen-thirties was president for three successive years, 1836, 1837, and 1838. The Society, by this stage of its development, was a potentially powerful political force, a consideration which no doubt carried weight with Howe. The charter members of the Irish Society were drawn from the well-placed Irish Protestants who formed such an important segment of early Halifax society. Their benevolence was extended to Irishmen of all persuasions, and the Society today recognizes no distinction of creed. Thus the Halifax Irish have been more united than similar groups elsewhere, where St. Patrick's and Irish Protestant Benevolent societies tell their sad tale of difference. Interspersed among these highly informing chapters on local history, Dr. Stewart has included a running commentary on the history of Ireland. Some of the parallels he draws may be questioned, but they serve to suggest the interaction of events on both sides of the Atlantic. *The Irish in Nova Scotia* provides an interesting account of certain phases of provincial history, and it should suggest the wealth of material available in the records of charitable and national societies elsewhere.

J. I. COOPER

McGill University.

*The Saint John River.* By ESTHER CLARK WRIGHT. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. 1949. Pp. v, 254. (\$4.50)

THIS volume deals mainly with the settlement of the valleys of the St. John River and its tributaries in New Brunswick. While the content of the book is largely historical the approach is geographical as the reader is taken up river from the famous reversing falls at its mouth to the point, several hundred miles to the northwest, where it leaves the international boundary to disappear in the wilderness.

of northern Maine. The tale is told in popular and anecdotal fashion, but it is based on wide reading and research, as may be seen from the notes and the useful bibliography. A number of sketch maps greatly assist the reader in following events along the river's tortuous course, while some modern photographs and reproductions of a few early prints further enhance the volume.

Mrs. Wright, who is a Ph.D. (Economic history) from Harvard, wears her learning lightly. She makes no attempt to give a complete or balanced historical account, but does an excellent job in recreating the atmosphere of the early settlements and bringing the settlers themselves back to life. To do this she quotes frequently from contemporary sources, among them a letter addressed in 1809, by the bishop of Halifax to the newly-founded parish of Kingston, N.B., which it is impossible to resist quoting in part:

But it gives me no small concern [wrote his lordship] to learn that the pews in the Church of Kingston were all held in common, and where men—perhaps of the worst characters—might come and set themselves down by the most religious and respectable characters in the parish. This must ultimately tend to produce disorder and confusion in the church, and check the spirit of true devotion and piety. . . .

What could occasion such an innovation—such a departure from the usage of the Church of England I am unable to conceive. . . . Very earnestly wishing for the prosperity of the Church and Congregation at Kingston, I earnestly recommend to your consideration, Gentlemen, the removal of this strange arrangement.

J. B. CONACHER

The University of Toronto.

*The Men of the Mounted.* By NORA KELLY. Toronto, Vancouver: J. M. Dent and Sons (Canada). 1949. Pp. 398. (\$5.75)

HERE is another "popular" book on the history of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The author, Mrs. Kelly, has brought to her task the sympathy and interest of a wife who married into the Force and the journalistic facility of a woman who has previously written for Canadian newspapers. Upon this, her first book-length work, rests the blessing of Commissioner S. T. Wood, who read the manuscript "and so made sure that the information contained therein was correctly presented from the point of view of the Mounted Police."

The summary on the blurb gives us a warning: this book is intended for that simple soul "the general reader." The emphasis is therefore upon the romantic, upon the glamorous. The more serious aspects of the history of the Force in which the Canadian historian is likely to be interested are omitted or glossed over. These lack the derring-do of rounding up rebellious braves and exploring the unknown wilderness of Canada's northland. Mrs. Kelly has not written a definitive history of the R.C.M.P.—that remains to be done—she simply retells the story that has already been told by Haydon, Longstreth, Douthwaite, Steele, and Fetherstonhaugh to whom she freely admits her indebtedness; for Mrs. Kelly's researches have not extended far beyond the *R.C.M.P. Quarterly* and the annual reports of the R.C.M.P. and its predecessors the North West Mounted Police and the Royal North West Mounted Police in addition to the authors listed above. Consequently the topics covered include the familiar story of the founding of the Force in 1873, the assistance given the Indians of the plains, the building of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the North West Rebellion, the Yukon gold-rush, the tragic death of Fitzgerald, the reorganization of 1921, the exploits of the Force in the Arctic, the mystery of

Albert Johnson, the beginning of the R.C.M.P. dog service, the war work of the Force, 1939-45, and the navigation of the Northwest Passage by the *St. Roch*; all liberally sprinkled with stories of instances in which the Mounted Police always got their man. How the members of the Force must detest that unfortunate tag! One of the more interesting chapters is that on the "Youth and the Police" movement started in the autumn of 1945 with a view to improving public relations and reducing juvenile delinquency.

The book is interesting and often amusing, although this reviewer is irritated by the constant repetition of single sentence paragraphs. There are several good maps and a number of illustrations most of which are of recent vintage. There are appendices showing the strength of the Force and the location of divisions, the names of officer personnel as of July, 1949, and a chronological index in addition to the usual alphabetical index. One may freely recommend this book to those who have not read the earlier accounts and to those who wish to be brought up to date on the story of the R.C.M.P. The serious student of Canadian history will not, however, find in it much above the level of good journalism.

GEORGE F. G. STANLEY

The Royal Military College of Canada.

*Cinderella Island*. By ROB ROY MACLEOD. Buffalo: The author. 1950. Pp. 52. THIS fanciful name alludes to Grand Island, the largest of the islands in the Niagara River. It is indeed about 17,000 acres in area and is about the size of Manhattan. As a frontispiece is a portrait (never before published) of Pendleton Clark, in the teens of the last century, self-appointed governor of the island then populated by squatters. His period lay in the interim between the Treaty of Ghent and the determination of the national boundary eight years later. The line drawn in 1822 put the "Canadian Falls" and Navy Island in Canada but Grand Island in the United States.

In the years between, when Grand Island was a no-man's land, Clark had his own police, judicial system and courts. On December 9, 1819, a company of militiamen, headed by the sheriff of Erie County, set out for the island to evacuate it. In five days this was accomplished by the burning of 70 homes and the removal of 155 men, women, and children to the mainland, thus ending the Republic of Grand Island. The sheriff had one very delicate matter to adjust. A Canadian woman had deserted her husband in Canada and was living in sin on the island with an American who had deserted his wife in the United States. The sheriff allowed them to continue on the island for a time until the news of the scandal had died down and then they were to leave quietly for wherever they wished to live.

LOUIS BLAKE DUFF

Welland.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO CANADA

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS  
BY ANN STEWART RABJOHNS

(Notice in this bibliography does not preclude a later and more extended review. The following abbreviations are used: B.R.H.—*Bulletin des recherches historiques*; C.H.R.—*CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*; C.J.E.P.S.—*Canadian journal of economics and political science*.)

### I. THE RELATIONS OF CANADA WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH

BARTON, Sir WILLIAM. *Communism and the imperial frontiers of the Commonwealth* (English review magazine, IV (5), May, 1950, 300-5). The British Commonwealth's great international frontiers, along the northern boundaries of Pakistan and India, can be held against Communism only if India and Pakistan compose their quarrel over Kashmir and devote their energies to improving the standard of living in their respective countries.

BUTLER, R. A. *The Bigwin Conference* (International affairs, XXVI (1), Jan., 1950, 11-21). An English delegate to the Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Bigwin Inn, Ontario, from September 8-18, 1949, gives some conclusions which he drew from the discussions.

CARTER, GWENDOLEN M. *The Asian Dominions in the Commonwealth* (Pacific affairs, XXII (4), Dec., 1949, 367-75). When India, Pakistan, and Ceylon became members of the Commonwealth, it expanded from six countries with a combined population of less than 90 million, nearly all of European stock, to eight countries (Ireland having withdrawn) with a combined population of 500 million, 400 million of non-European stock.

COMSTOCK, ALZADA. *Commonwealth and Empire* (Current history, XVI (91), Mar., 1949, 162-8). An analysis of the British system.

INNIS, H. A. *Empire and communications*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1950. Pp. 230. \$3.25. To be reviewed later.

MANSERGH, NICOLAS. *The Commonwealth in Asia* (Pacific affairs, XXIII (1), Mar., 1950, 3-20).

MILLER, HAROLD. *New Zealand*. New York, Melbourne, Sydney, Cape Town: Hutchinson's University Library. 1950. Pp. 155. 7s. 6d.

SOWARD, F. H. *The adaptable Commonwealth*. With a foreword by NIK CAVELL. (Behind the Headlines series, X (1).) Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 1950. Pp. 54. 15c. This pamphlet is an attempt to present in brief compass the most important elements of the discussions that took place at the fourth unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference in September, 1949.

### II. CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AMERY, L. S. *The English-thinking world* (English-speaking world, XXXII (1), Jan.-Feb., 1950, 332-40). The author believes that what is known as the English-speaking world is also an English-thinking world.

BRODIE, BERNARD. *Strategic implications of the North Atlantic pact* (Yale review, XXXIX (2), Dec., 1949, 193-208).

Canada, Department of External Affairs. *Report, 1949*. Ottawa: King's Printer. 1950. Pp. 126.

FORSEY, EUGENE and HEBB, ANDREW. *North American union: A discussion* (Canadian forum, XXIX (348), Jan., 1950, 224-5).

## III. HISTORY OF CANADA

## (1) General History

ALTMANN, E. *Kanada: Geographie, Geschichte, Wirtschaft.* Königstein/Taunus: Akademischer Verlag Ausländischer Wissenschaftler. [1949.] Pp. 239.

CHARLAND, THOMAS. *A qui devons-nous la réédition des Relations des Jésuits?* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (2), sept., 1949, 210-26). The publication in question is the work in three volumes published in Quebec in 1858 under the auspices of the government "chez Augustin Côté, éditeur-imprimeur." It was presented as the work of a large number of people.

DOUVILLE, RAYMOND. *Notes pour servir à la rédaction d'une histoire de seigneurie* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (3), déc., 1949, 325-32). "Sous ce titre, je voudrais tout simplement énumérer quelques impressions et opinions personnelles, recueillies au cours d'incursions effectuées dans le passé de deux ou trois seigneuries de chez nous."

FRÉGAULT, GUY. *Jean Delanglez, S. J., 1896-1949* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (2), sept., 1949, 165-71). An obituary article on Jean Delanglez, formerly of the Institute of Jesuit history at Loyola University.

HARRIS, LEILA and KILROY. *Let's read about Canada.* Illustrated by RICHARD GRINGHUIS. Grand Rapids: Fideler. 1949. Pp. 112. A volume in the "Life in Other Lands Library."

Institut d'histoire et de géographie de l'Université Laval (éd.). *Collection de cartes anciennes et modernes pour servir à l'étude de l'Amérique et du Canada.* Préface par MARCEL TRUDEL. Québec: Tremblay and Dion. [1949.] Pp. viii, 91.

KRAUS, MICHAEL. *The Atlantic civilization: Eighteenth-century origins.* Published for the American Historical Association. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1949. Pp. xi, 334. \$3.75.

LITTOOY, G. *Canada: Aspecten van het land en zijn economische ontwikkeling.* Eindhoven, Netherlands: Uitg. Mij. "De Pelgrim." 1949. Pp. 158.

MACGOWAN, KENNETH. *Early man in the new world.* With drawings by CAMPBELL GRANT. New York: Macmillan Co. [Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada]. 1950. Pp. xv, 260. \$5.75.

MORIN, CONRAD M. *La formation archivistique de l'historien* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (1), juin, 1949, 3-8). On the importance of archives and archivists to historians.

ROBBINS, ROY M. *Our landed heritage: The public domain, 1776-1936.* New York: Peter Smith. Reprinted 1950. Pp. x, 450. \$5.50.

ROBINSON, Mrs. ANNA M. *Canadian character and education: Influence of the frontier tradition* (Commonwealth and Empire review, LXXXIV (532), Apr., 1950, 51-6).

SLEEN, WICHER GOSEN NICOLAAS VAN DER. *Canada.* [2, geheel herziene druk.] Tilburg, Netherlands: Nederland's Boekhuis. [1947.] Pp. iv, 304.

TRUDEL, MARCEL. *Comment écrire l'histoire d'une paroisse* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (4), mars, 1950, 485-92).

TURNER, FREDERICK JACKSON. *The significance of sections in American history.* With an introduction by MAX FARRAND. New York: Peter Smith. Reprinted 1950. Pp. ix, 347. \$4.25.

## (2) Discovery and Exploration

Documents inédits: *Codicille au testament olographe de Lamothe Cadillac, 18e juillet, 1705* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (3), déc., 1949, 447-8).

MADARIAGA, SALVADOR DE. *Christopher Columbus, being the life of the very magnificent Lord Don Cristobal Colón.* London: Hollis and Carter [Toronto: McClelland and Stewart]. Reprinted 1949. Pp. xi, 498. \$4.50.

MOOD, FULMER (intro. by). *Radisson and Groseilliers: A newly discovered historical essay by Frederick J. Turner* (Wisconsin magazine of history, XXX (3), Mar., 1950, 318-26). Reprints a popular account of Radisson and Groseilliers written by F. J. Turner in connexion with his M.A. thesis and originally published in the Milwaukee *Sentinel* of September 2, 1888.

#### (3) New France

CORRIVAUT, CLAUDE. *Le père Jacques Marquette* (B.R.H., LVI (1, 2, 3), janv.-fév.-mars, 1950, 46-8).

DELANGLEZ, JEAN. *Louisiana in 1717* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (1), juin, 1949, 94-110; III (2), sept., 1949, 256-69; III (3), déc., 1949, 423-46). Reprints an account of Louisiana written at the end of Cadillac's administration by François Le Maire who was a missionary mainly in the French and Spanish settlements on the coast.

DEROSIER, L.-P. *Officiers de Montcalm* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (3), déc., 1949, 367-82). A posthumous work of Aegidius Fauteux containing biographies of a large number of Montcalm's officers will be published by Les Dix. This article contains extracts from the projected volume.

GROULX, LIONEL. *Note sur la chapellerie au Canada sous le régime français* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (3), déc., 1949, 383-401). An account of the hat-making industry in New France.

KLEIN, ADA PARIS (ed.). *Ownership of the land under France, Spain, and United States* (Missouri historical review, XLIV (3), Apr., 1950, 214-94). An account of land policy in the territory which is now Missouri.

LE BER, JOSEPH. *Documents inédits: De Caen* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (4), mars, 1950, 586-97). Prints some documents dealing with the capture of Quebec by the English in 1629.

LONGPRÉ, ANSELME. *L'influence spirituelle de monsieur Henri-Marie Boudon aux origines de notre histoire* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (2), sept., 1949, 200-9).

MACDOUGALL, ANGUS J. *An historical sidelight—Quebec, 1658* (Culture, XI (1), mars, 1950, 15-28). A play staged in honour of Governor Argenson in 1658 may be considered the first original Canadian drama.

PELL, ROBERT THOMPSON. *Montcalm in America, 1756-1759* (Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum, VIII (5), winter, 1950, 194-235). Part I of this article on Montcalm appeared in the preceding issue of the *Bulletin*.

STANLEY, GEORGE F. G. *The policy of "Francisation" as applied to the Indians during the ancien régime* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (3), déc., 1949, 333-48). The religious orders and the civil authorities of New France failed in their attempt to make Frenchmen out of the Indians because they were large in numbers and imbued with a strong will to survive as a race.

*Testament de Marie des Réaux, veuve de Jean Léger de la Grange, le fameux Corsaire (1738)* (B.R.H., LV (1, 2, 3), janv.-fév.-mars, 1949, 23-6).

#### (4) British North America before 1867

BELOFF, MAX (ed.). *The debate on the American Revolution, 1761-1783.* (The British Political Tradition, edited by ALAN BULLOCK and F. W. DEAKIN, book I.) London: Nicholas Kaye. 1949. Pp. xi, 304. 12s. 6d. Reviewed on p. 196.

BOGUE, ALLAN G. *John Newton comes to Canada* (Western Ontario historical notes, VII (4), Dec., 1949, 42-7). The Lawson Memorial Library has recently acquired the journals of John Newton, who settled in Halton County, Ontario, in 1842 and established a woollen manufactory. They deal mainly with his voyage from Liverpool to Canada and are a valuable addition to the Library's holdings of source material on the Atlantic migration of the eighteen-forties.

BRIDENBAUGH, CARL. *The colonial craftsman*. New York: New York University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. xii, 214. \$4.25.

BURLEIGH, H. C. *A tale of Loyalist heroism* (Ontario history, XLII (2), Apr., 1950, 91-9). The story of Sarah Kast McGinnis, an example of Loyalist heroism during the American Revolutionary War.

CARELESS, J. M. S. *Who was George Brown?* (Ontario history, XLII (2), Apr., 1950, 57-66). The author's "only desire is to show up less well-known sides of Brown by seeing him in several capacities, other than the political, in the hope that in the end we will achieve a fuller view as to who George Brown actually was."

DOUGHTY, HOWARD. *Parkman's dark years: Letters to Mary Dwight Parkman* (Harvard Library bulletin, IV (1), winter, 1950, 53-85). The correspondence, in the eighteen-fifties and early sixties, between Francis Parkman and Mary Parkman, his cousin-in-law, contains important new biographical facts and throws fresh light on Parkman's difficulties during an obscure period of his life.

French and Indian war diary of Benjamin Glasier of Ipswich, 1758-1760 (Essex Institute historical collections, LXXXVI (1), Jan., 1950, 65-92). Benjamin Glasier joined in an expedition against the French and Indians in New York State. His diary contains daily entries from February 28 to November 20, 1758, and also covers part of another expedition in 1760.

GRAHAM, G. S. *The naval defence of British North America, 1739-1763* (Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th series, vol. XXX, 1948, 95-110).

HEFLINGER, W. M. *The War of 1812 in northwestern Ohio: Background and causes* (Northwest Ohio quarterly, XXII (1), winter, 1949-50, 8-24).

HÉLIOT, PIERRE. *La campagne du régiment de la Sarre au Canada, 1756-1760* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (4), mars, 1950, 518-36). Prints sections from the writings of Louis-Auguste-Alexandre Prévôt de Lontaubert de Merleval which describe the activities of the Sarre Regiment in Canada during the Seven Years' War.

JACOBS, WILBUR R. *Was the Pontiac uprising a conspiracy?* (Ohio state archaeological and historical quarterly, LIX (1), Jan., 1950, 26-37). Points out that the "conspiracy of Pontiac" was actually a war for Indian independence.

METZGER, CHARLES H. *Some Catholic Tories in the American Revolution I, II* (Catholic historical review, XXXV (3), Oct., 1949, 276-300; XXXV (4), Jan., 1950, 408-27).

PRATT, JULIUS W. *Expansionists of 1812*. New York: Peter Smith. Reprinted 1949. Pp. 309. \$3.25.

RADDALL, THOMAS H. *Tarleton's Legion* (Nova Scotia Historical Society, Collections, vol. XXVIII, 1949, 1-50). An account of the part played in the American Revolution by the British Legion, generally known as Tarleton's Legion—the best led, the most enduring, and the most successful of the Loyalist regiments.

ROCHELEAU-ROULEAU, CORINNE. *La feuille de route d'un galonné français, Guadeloupe, États-Unis, Canada, 1776-1784* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (1), juin, 1949, 81-93). Extracts from the route papers of J.-Augustin Florat de Florimont, a French captain who participated in the American Revolution.

SAW, REGINALD. *Sir John H. Pelly, Bart.: Governor, Hudson's Bay Company, 1822-1852* (British Columbia historical quarterly, XIII (1), Jan., 1949, 23-32).

SÉGUIN, ROBERT-LIONEL. *Biographie d'un patriote de '37: Le Dr Luc-Hyacinthe Masson, 1811-1880* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (3), déc., 1949, 349-66).

TRUDEL, MARCEL. *Le traité de 1763 laisse le Canada à l'Angleterre* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (2), sept., 1949, 179-99). An extract from M. Trudel's volume entitled *Louis XVI, le Congrès américain et le Canada, 1774-1789*.

WALLACE, W. S. *The first Scots settlers in Canada* (B.R.H., LVI (1, 2, 3), janv.-fév.-mars, 1950, 52-62). Prints a document containing a complete list of the non-commissioned officers and men of Fraser's Highlanders who were discharged in America after the Seven Years' War. It gives some idea of the number and identity of the Highlanders who settled in Canada and formed the original nucleus of Scottish settlement.

WOODWARD, F. J. *Joseph René Bellot, 1826-53* (Polar record, V (39), Jan., 1950, 398-407). This young Frenchman, who was lost on an expedition in search of Franklin, was one of the most colourful personalities to engage in these searches.

#### (5) Canada since 1867

ANGLIN, GERALD. *Canada unlimited*. Toronto: O'Keefe Foundation. 1948. Pp. 134. The aim of this small volume is to portray in clear and simple language the growth and expansion of Canada as a nation.

BAKER, EVERETT. *Historic sites: A tour of rebellion battlefields* (Saskatchewan history III (1), winter, 1950, 30-3). To locate the sites of the battles of the Rebellion of 1885 you have to go to books or to the few remaining old-timers; the people who live where the events occurred usually know nothing.

BOISSONNAULT, CHARLES-MARIE. *Colère en Saskatchewan* (Revue de l'Université Laval, IV (6), fév., 1950, 489-504). Deals with the Second North West Rebellion of 1885.

BROWN, GEORGE W. (ed.). *Canada*. (United Nations series, ROBERT J. KERNER, general editor.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1950. Pp. xviii, 621. \$6.50. Reviewed on p. 188.

Canada, House of Commons. *Official report of debates, fifth session, twentieth parliament, 13 George VI, 1949. In three volumes. Index volume.* Ottawa: King's Printer. 1950. Pp. xiv, 220.  
— *Official report of debates, first session, twenty-first parliament, 13 George VI, 1949. Vols. I - III.* Ottawa: King's Printer. 1950. Pp. 3169.

Canada, the Senate. *Official report of debates, 1949, first session, twenty-first parliament, 13 George VI.* Ottawa: King's Printer. 1950. Pp. xviii, 488.

CLEVERDON, CATHERINE LYLE. *The woman suffrage movement in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1950. Pp. xiii, 324. \$4.50. To be reviewed later.

ENGLAND, ROBERT. *Twenty million world war veterans*. London, Toronto, New York: Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. vii, 227. \$3.00. To be reviewed later.

GREY, RODNEY. *Bureaucracy and Ottawa* (Queen's quarterly, LVII (1), spring, 1950, 88-98). A survey of the federal bureaucracy and its problems.

GROULX, LIONEL et al. *Documents inédits: Louis Riel* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (1), juin, 1949, 111-18).

LEDERLE, JOHN W. *Party forms in the Senate* (Queen's quarterly, LVII (1), spring, 1950, 21-32). While a few senators have cast off party ties on appointment to the Senate, the majority of them have not conducted themselves in a manner evincing independence of party.

*List of members of the House of Commons with their constituencies and post office addresses, second session, twenty-first parliament, corrected to February 13, 1950.* [Ottawa: King's Printer. 1950.] Pp. 70.

MCHENRY, DEAN E. *The third force in Canada: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-1948.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. viii, 351. \$4.00. To be reviewed later.

MORTON, W. L. *The Progressive party in Canada.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press—Saunders. 1950. Pp. xiii, 331. \$4.75. To be reviewed later.

SAINT-PÈRE, EDMÉ RAMEAU DE. *Voyages au Canada* (Revue de l'Université Laval, III (6), févr., 1949, 527-41; III (8), avril, 1949, 722-32; IV (1), sept., 1949, 75-86; IV (2), oct., 1949, 175-86; IV (3), nov., 1949, 273-85; IV (5), janv., 1950, 464-8; IV (6), févr., 1950, 551-64; IV (7), mars, 1950, 656-61). Prints an account, written by a Frenchman, Rameau de Saint-Père, of two trips which he made to Canada in 1860 and 1888.

SHARP, PAUL F. *When our West moved north* (American historical review, LV (2), Jan., 1950, 286-300). By 1890 free land of good quality was rapidly disappearing in the United States. For nearly three decades after this date, however, the mass movement of Americans in search of free land continued into the Canadian West.

WEEKES, MARY (as told to). *Trader king.* Regina and Toronto: School Aids and Text Book Publishing Co. 1949. Pp. 182. \$1.00. The story of the life in the fur trade of William Cornwallis King who entered the service of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1862 and remained in its employ until his retirement in 1903.

#### IV. PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL HISTORY

##### (1) The Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland

BAILEY, ALFRED G. *Creative moments in the culture of the Maritime Provinces* (Dalhousie review, XXIX (3), Oct., 1949, 231-44). Explains the occurrence in New Brunswick around 1880 of the Fredericton school of poets and compares this movement to that in Nova Scotia in the eighteen-thirties and forties.

— (ed.). *The University of New Brunswick memorial volume published on the occasion of the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the granting of the first charter of incorporation February 12th, 1800.* Together with messages from the Right Honourable Lord BEAVERBROOK, chancellor of the University and the Honourable J. B. McNAIR, premier of New Brunswick. A foreword by ALBERT W. TRUEMAN, president of the University. Fredericton: University of New Brunswick. 1950. Pp. 125. To be reviewed later.

BELL, WINTHROP. *A Halifax boyhood of one hundred and twenty years ago* (Nova Scotia Historical Society, Collections, vol. XXVIII, 1949, 106-32). Prints extracts from the autobiographical sections of an unpublished manuscript of John A. Bell (1816-1901), an important figure in the Halifax civil service.

BIRD, WILL R. *This is Nova Scotia.* Toronto: Ryerson Press. 1950. Pp. viii, 299. \$3.50. See p. 220.

CHISHOLM, JOSEPH. *Three chief justices of Nova Scotia* (Nova Scotia Historical Society, Collections, vol. XXVIII, 1949, 148-58). Deals with the careers of Charles Morris (1711-1781), Jeremy Pemberton (1741-1790), and Sampson Salter Blowers (1743-1842).

COX, GEORGE. *John Alexander Barry and his times* (Nova Scotia Historical Society, Collections, vol. XXVIII, 1949, 133-47). During the second, third, and fourth decades of the nineteenth century, John Barry's activities as a leader in business and in the church, as a writer and lecturer, and as an active and forceful politician made him one of the best-known men in Nova Scotia.

DAIGLE, L.-CYRIAQUE. *Histoire de Saint-Louis-de-Kent: Cent cinquante ans de vie paroissiale française en Acadie nouvelle*. Moncton, N.B.: L'imprimerie Acadienne. 1949. Pp. 247. A history of the parish of St. Louis in Kent County, New Brunswick.

DAVIS, HAROLD A. *An international community on the St. Croix (1604-1930)*. (University of Maine Studies, Second series no. 64.) Orono: University Press. 1950. Pp. xi, 412. \$2.75. To be reviewed later.

FLEWWELLING, Mrs. R. G. *Immigration to and emigration from Nova Scotia, 1839-1851* (Nova Scotia Historical Society, Collections, vol. XXVIII, 1949, 75-104).

GALLAGHER, EDWARD L. *History of old Kingston and Rexton*. Sussex, N.B.: Maritime Publishing Co. 1948. Pp. 51. Rexton, formerly known as Kingston, is a village in Kent County, New Brunswick. This small brochure, prepared by the Alumni Association of Rexton Superior School, is an attempt to preserve "in permanent form historical facts about the old home town."

Hall, C. W., and Co. *Builders of Fredericton*. Fredericton: The Company. 1948. Pp. 28 (mimeo.). A radio script prepared by C. A. Moore.

LEITCH, ADELAIDE. *Village with a mission: Nain, Labrador* (Canadian geographical journal, XXXX (3), Mar., 1950, 102-13). The village of Nain on the Labrador coast is the last sizable place but one on the way north to Ungava Bay.

LEVY, GEORGE EDWARD. *The diary of the Reverend Joseph Dimock* (Nova Scotia Historical Society, Collections, vol. XXVIII, 1949, 61-74). The diary of Rev. Dimock, a Baptist clergyman at Chester from 1793 until 1846, has many shortcomings but does provide some interesting and valuable sidelights on life in Nova Scotia from 100 to 150 years ago.

MERKEL, ANDREW D. *Co-operative newsgathering in Nova Scotia* (Nova Scotia Historical Society, Collections, vol. XXVIII, 1949, 51-60). An account of Nova Scotia's "long and proud history" in the development of co-operative newsgathering.

Nova Scotia Historical Society. *Collections*, vol. XXVIII. Halifax: The Society. 1949. Pp. xv, 158. Articles are listed separately in this bibliography.

OLIVER, W. P. *Cultural progress of the Negro in Nova Scotia* (Dalhousie review, XXIX (3), Oct., 1949, 293-300). A short account of the origins and the present condition of the Negroes in Nova Scotia.

WEBSTER, JOHN CLARENCE. *Those crowded years, 1863-1944: An octogenarian's record of work*. Shédiac, N.B.: Privately printed for his family. 1944. Pp. 51. In the foreword of this account which is addressed to Dr. Webster's daughter and son, he explains that "though autobiographical in nature [it] is in no sense a *Journal intime* and has to do only with outward performance in two fields of endeavour, viz., medicine and Canadian history."

## (2) The Province of Quebec

BONNAULT, CLAUDE DE. *Histoire du Canada français (1534-1763)*. (Colonies et Empires, Première série, Études coloniales 6.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. 348. To be reviewed later.

*Les cahiers des dix*, no. 14. Montréal: Les Dix. 1949. Pp. 303. Reviewed on p. 197.

COURTEAU, GUY and LANOUË, FRANÇOIS. *Une nouvelle Acadie: Saint-Jacques de l'Achigan, 1772-1947*. [Montréal. 1949.] Pp. 398. A history of the parish of St. Jacques in Montcalm County, Quebec, which was founded in 1772 by a number of Acadians who returned there from exile at Boston.

FERLAND-ANGERS, ALBERTINE. *La citadelle de Montréal, 1658-1820* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (4), mars, 1950, 493-517). Montréal had for a time a citadel, the history of which is traced here.

FRASER, BLAIR. *Labor and the Church in Quebec* (Foreign affairs, XXVIII (2), Jan., 1950, 247-52). An examination of the recent changing relations between labour, the Church, and the government in Quebec.

HÉBERT, CASIMIR. *The old Denis house in Neuville, Que.: Notes on the Dombourg-Neuville seigniory, its seigneurs, its pioneers, etc.* Neuville, Que.: Jeanne Beland. 1948. Pp. 32. 50c. Episodic notes on the seigniory of Dombourg from 1653 when it was granted to Jean Bourdon until present times. There is also a French edition of the brochure.

LEGROS, HECTOR and PAUL-ÉMILE, Soeur. *Le Diocèse d'Ottawa, 1847-1948.* Ottawa: Imprimerie "Le Droit." 1949. Pp. 905. \$10.50. This lengthy work is divided into four parts: mouvement général, les paroisses, les communautés religieuses, les œuvres laïques.

MORIN, VICTOR. *La légende dorée de Montréal.* Montréal: Éditions des Dix. 1949. Pp. 216. Recalls "la mémoire des 'saints' qui ont auréolé l'histoire canadienne en se dévouant aux œuvres de découverte, d'évangélisation, de colonisation et d'épanouissement de Montréal."

PROVOST, HONORIUS. *Le fief Miville sur la Chaudière* (B.R.H., LVI (1, 2, 3), janv.-fév.-mars, 1950, 5-13). Locates the fief of Miville, granted in 1672, on the Chaudière River.

Québec, Province de. *Rapport de l'archiviste pour 1947-1948.* Québec: King's Printer. n.d. Pp. 362. To be reviewed later.

RICHARD, LOUIS. *Jacob de Witt, 1785-1859* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (4), mars, 1950, 537-55). Biographical article on Jacob de Witt, iron dealer of Montreal, president of the Banque du Peuple, and member of the Legislative Assembly.

The Standard, Montreal. *Ten years, 1938-1948: The Standard data book.* Montreal: The Standard, 231 St. James St. W. 1948. Pp. 98. Includes sections on the history, editorial content, readers, circulation, etc., of this Montreal newspaper.

### (3) The Province of Ontario

BENSON, LILLIAN REA. *An O.A.C. student in the 1880's* (Ontario history, XLII (2), Apr., 1950, 67-80). Deals with the letters and diary, written between October 7, 1880, and March 22, 1881, of Edward Folkes who was a student at the Ontario Agricultural College in Guelph during this period.

CAMPBELL, ARCHIBALD M. *Fractional currency instituted by W. and J. Bell, Perth, Upper Canada, in 1837* (Western Ontario historical notes, VII (3), Sept., 1949, 18-22). On the outbreak of the Rebellion of 1837-8, the government suspended specie payments. To meet this situation W. and J. Bell, Perth merchants, issued a large amount of script which was accepted without question though it was never officially recognized.

CLAY, CHARLES. *This is Ontario* (Atlantic guardian, VII (3), Mar., 1950, 37 ff.). Explains Ontario to Newfoundlanders.

CROPP, MARJORIE E. *A history of Beachville.* (Western Ontario history nuggets no. 14.) London: Lawson Memorial Library, University of Western Ontario. 1949. Pp. 49. Beachville is a village in Oxford County, Ontario, on the River Thames.

HAMIL, FRED COYNE. *The Gardiners and the village of Cashmere* (Western Ontario historical notes, VII (4), Dec., 1949, 30-6). Singleton Gardiner came to the Talbot settlement in 1816, and built a grist and saw mill in Mosa Township on Lot 28. A village of about 100 inhabitants called Cashmere was established here by 1856, but it has subsequently disappeared.

JOYNT, CAREY B. *Social change in Huron County, 1880-1945* (Western Ontario historical notes, VII (3), Sept., 1949, 23-6). Discusses the effect on social life in Huron County of such factors as the westward migration of the last decades of the nineteenth century, the First World War, and the advent of the automobile and radio.

KERR, WILFRED BRENTON. *From Scotland to Huron: A history of the Kerr family*. Seaforth: Huron Expositor. 1949. Pp. 55. \$2.00. An account of the author's family which is typical of many of the God-fearing and hard-working pioneers who are responsible for the development of Ontario.

LANGTON, H. H. (ed.). *A gentlewoman in Upper Canada: The journals of Anne Langton*. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, and Company. 1950. Pp. xv, 249. \$3.00. To be reviewed later.

MACLEOD, ROB ROY. *Cinderella Island*. Buffalo: The author. 1950. Pp. 52. Reviewed on p. 202.

MORRISON, NEIL F. *Fair of the Malden and Anderdon Agricultural Society* (Western Ontario historical notes, VII (4), Dec., 1949, 37-41). Reprints an extract from the Amherstburg *Courier*, October 20, 1949.

POPHAM, ROBERT E. *Late Huron occupations of Ontario: An archaeological survey of Innisfil Township* (Ontario history, XLII (2), Apr., 1950, 81-90).

THOMAS, REDMOND. *The beginning of navigation and the tourist industry in Muskoka* (Ontario history, XLII (2), Apr., 1950, 101-5).

WAY, RONALD L. *Old Fort Henry: The citadel of Upper Canada* (Canadian geographical journal, XXXX (4), Apr., 1950, 148-69). Old Fort Henry at Kingston, Ont., built as protection against the United States during the War of 1812, is now invaded by increasing numbers of American tourists.

(4) **The Prairie Provinces**

CAMPBELL, MARJORIE WILKINS. *The Saskatchewan*. Illustrated by ILLINGWORTH H. KERR. (Rivers of America, edited by HERVEY ALLEN and CARL CARMER; as planned and started by CONSTANCE LINDSAY SKINNER; associate editor, JEAN CRAWFORD; art editor, FAITH BALL.) New York, Toronto: Rinehart and Co. [Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co.]. 1950. Pp. 400. \$4.50. Reviewed on p. 194.

Catholic Women's League of Canada. *A short history of the Catholic Church in southern Alberta, diocese of Calgary, 1865-1948, with illustrations of southern Alberta and the Rocky Mountains, commemorative of the 28th annual convention of the Catholic Women's League of Canada, November 3rd to 8th, 1948*. Calgary: The League. 1948. Pp. 51.

*The city of Saskatoon* (Monetary times, CXVIII (4), Apr., 1950, 26-9).

GIBSON, R. L. *Recollections and reminiscences: A winter in the Lost Horse Hills* (Saskatchewan history, III (1), winter, 1950, 28-9). Recollections of farming in Alberta during 1889 and 1890.

GISLASON, I. *Prairie panorama: A brief study of the Prairie Provinces*. Calgary, Alta.: Western Canada Institute. 1948. Pp. v, 204. \$1.25. An attempt to present a simple, integrated picture of the Prairie Provinces.

Pioneer History Committee of the Conquest Homemakers, Mrs. Edna Sibbald, convener. *This Conquest of ours, 1904-1948*. [Conquest]: Conquest Homemakers. 1949. Pp. 51. \$1.25. Summarizes the activities of the Homemakers since their organization in 1928 and records the history of the Fertile Valley district in Saskatchewan.

THOMAS, LEWIS H. *Lloyd George's visit to the North-West, 1899* (Saskatchewan history, III (1), winter, 1950, 17-22). In 1899 Lloyd George and two other distinguished Welshmen visited Western Canada on the invitation of the Canadian government, who hoped that they would be sufficiently impressed by the country to recommend it to prospective immigrants. Sections of their report are printed here.

## (5) British Columbia and the Northwest Coast

BUCKHAM, A. F. *Indian engineering* (Canadian geographical journal, XXXX (4), Apr., 1950, 174-81). The Indians of northwestern British Columbia built many bridges, some spanning rivers of considerable size.

DRAYCOT, WALTER MACKAY. *Early history of the Burnaby family of Leicestershire, England* (Museum and art notes, second series, I (1), Sept., 1949, 11-21). An account of the Burnaby family after whom Burnaby Township near Vancouver, B.C., was named.

IRELAND, WILLARD E. *The French in British Columbia* (British Columbia historical quarterly, XIII (2), Apr., 1949, 67-89). A preliminary study of the part played by French Canadians in British Columbia's development.

— *An official speaks out: Letter of the Hon. Philip J. Hankin, colonial secretary, to the Duke of Buckingham, March 11, 1870* (British Columbia historical quarterly, XIII (1), Jan., 1949, 33-8). This letter throws light on the attitude of the colonial government officials to the question of British Columbia's union with Canada.

KNAPLUND, PAUL. *Letters from James Edward Fitzgerald to W. E. Gladstone concerning Vancouver Island and the Hudson's Bay Company, 1848-1850* (British Columbia historical quarterly, XIII (1), Jan., 1949, 1-21). J. E. Fitzgerald, before he left England for New Zealand where he became prominent in politics and government, took an active part in the agitation to prevent Vancouver Island from being granted to the Hudson's Bay Company.

MERK, FREDERICK. *The ghost river Caledonia in the Oregon negotiations of 1818* (American historical review, LV (3), Apr., 1950, 530-51). A North West Company map of 1817 pictured a river called the Caledonia with sources nearly as far north as the Fraser, of impressive size, and with a forked outlet in the latitude of 48° 40'. This fictitious river added to the difficulties of reaching an agreement in the Oregon boundary negotiations of 1818.

MORGAN, MURRAY. *The Columbia*. Seattle: Superior Publishing Co. 1949. Pp. 295.

MUNDAY, DON. *The unknown mountain*. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1948. Pp. xx, 268. 21s. The book is the story of the many trips made by Don and Phyl Munday to explore the country around Mount Waddington in British Columbia.

Okanagan Historical Society. *Twelfth and thirteenth reports for 1948 and 1949*. Edited by MARGARET ORMSBY. [The Society, Rev. J. C. Goodfellow, Princeton, secretary. 1948; 1949.] Pp. 223; 200. These two publications contain about sixty articles on the history of the Okanagan area. The Society's *Eleventh Report* was published in 1945.

## (6) Northwest Territories, Yukon, and the Arctic Regions

MALLET, THIERRY. *Exploring the Kazan* (The beaver, outfit 280, Mar., 1950, 22-5). An account of a trip made in 1926 up the Kazan River, a large stream that rises in the Mackenzie District of the Northwest Territories and empties into Baker Lake.

TOMPKINS, STUART R. and MOORHEAD, MAX L. *Russia's approach to America*. Part I, *From Russian sources, 1741-1761* (British Columbia historical quarterly, XIII (2), Apr., 1949, 55-66). An account of Russian exploration of the North American Arctic regions.

## V. GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND STATISTICS

## (1) General

Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. *Canada at the halfway mark of the twentieth century*. (Supplement to the February issue of the *Canadian Statistical Review*.) Ottawa: The Bureau. 1950. Pp. 29. This digest is intended to illustrate some of the essential characteristics of the Canadian economic position today in relation to past years.

HOWARD, C. S. *Canadian banks and bank-notes* (Canadian banker, LVII (1), winter, 1950, 30-66). A survey of a century and a half of banking in Canada.

**(2) Agriculture**

DEASY, GEORGE F. *Agriculture in Luce County, Michigan, 1880-1930: A study of agricultural development in the Upper Great Lakes region* (Agricultural history, XXIV (1), Jan., 1950, 29-42).

**(3) Immigration, Emigration, Colonization, Population, and Population Groups**

HATTERSLEY, A. F. *Migration within the Empire, 1849 and 1949* (History, XXXIV (122), Oct., 1949, 235-45). Examines points of contrast and analogy between the emigration from England to other parts of the Empire in the eighteen-forties and after the Second World War.

**(4) Geography**

CLARK, ANDREW H. *Contributions to the geographical knowledge of Canada since 1945* (Geographical review, XL (2), Apr., 1950, 288-308). The emphasis of this survey is on the writings by Canadians about Canada and particularly the published work of professional geographers.

DE LA RUE, E. AUBERT. *La région de Mont-Laurier, Province de Québec, Canada: Quelques aspects de géographie humaine d'un secteur du bouclier canadien* (Journal de la Société des Américanistes, XXXVI, 1947, 169-94). A study of the geography, population, and economics of the Mont Laurier region, a fertile area within the Laurentians.

**(5) Transportation and Communication**

ARCHER, JOHN H. *Pathfinders of the Trans-Canada Highway* (Saskatchewan history, III (1), winter, 1950, 23-7). An account (particularly of the Saskatchewan section) of two trans-Canada automobile tours made in 1912 and in 1920.

DANIELIAN, N. R. *The St. Lawrence Seaway* (Inland seas, VI (1), spring, 1950, 3-9). Recounts briefly the history of the St. Lawrence Seaway to date.

LINDSAY, GUY A. *History of canals and related subjects*. Ottawa: Department of Transport. 1949. Pp. 61 (mimeo.). This pamphlet is a most valuable and interesting compilation of information concerning Canada's twenty canals. The canal era began in 1700 with the Casson Canal built during the French régime between Montreal and Lachine. It was one mile long and 2½ feet deep. It was a long jump from this to the Welland Ship Canal, begun in 1913, completed twenty years later, and accommodating vessels up to 700 feet in length with a draft of 23 feet. All the canals are in this reference work to be viewed at a glance. [LOUIS BLAKE DUFF]

**(6) Science**

LEBLOND, SYLVIO. *La France et la médecine canadienne* (Revue de l'Université Laval, IV (7), mars, 1950, 571-87). Gives a résumé of the development of medicine in Quebec.

STANLEY, G. D. *Dr. George Malcolmson* (Calgary Associate Clinic, historical bulletin, XIV (4), Feb., 1950, 78-85). An account of the career of an Alberta doctor.

YON, ARMAND. *Pour un IIe centenaire: Du nouveau sur Kalm* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (2), sept., 1949, 234-57). An account of the life and scientific work in Canada of the Swedish naturalist, Peter Kalm (1715-1779).

**VII. RELIGIOUS HISTORY**

CHARRON, YVON. *Itinéraire spirituel de Marguerite Bourgeoys* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, II (4), mars, 1949, 522-39). Marguerite Bourgeoys emigrated to Canada with Maisonneuve in 1653 and founded in Montreal a religious order, known as the congregation of Notre Dame.

DANSEREAU, ANTONIO. *La mission de l'abbé Thomas Maguire à Rome, en 1833-1834* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (1), juin, 1949, 9-29). L'abbé Thomas Maguire was sent to Rome by Joseph Signay, bishop of Quebec, as a special delegate in connexion with the delicate situation created by Rome's rejection of Mgr Turgeon as coadjutor of Quebec after the appointment had been officially announced and confirmed.

GROULX, LIONEL. *Missionnaires de l'Est en Nouvelle-France* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (1), juin, 1949, 45-72). The work of missionaries in the east of New France has perhaps been overshadowed by the more spectacular story of those in Huronia. This is an account of the accomplishments of the eastern missionaries.

MCNAB, JOHN. *Our priceless heritage*. Toronto: Presbyterian Publishers. 1949. Pp. 127. Issued in commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary in June, 1950, of the Presbyterian Church in Canada.

MAURAUT, OLIVIER. *L'église du Canada* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (2), sept., 1949, 227-33). Thoughts on the development of Catholicism in Canada.

SCOTT, ROBERT C. *My Captain Oliver: A story of two missionaries on the British Columbia coast*. Toronto: United Church of Canada Committee on Missionary Education. 1947. Pp. xiv, 200. \$1.25. Tells the story of Captain William Oliver's life and the United Church's marine mission work on the British Columbia coast.

SIMPSON, GEO. W. *Father Delaere, pioneer missionary and founder of churches* (Saskatchewan history, III (1), winter, 1950, 1-16). Father Achille Delaere came to Canada in 1899 to conduct religious work among the Ukrainians in Manitoba and the Northwest Territories.

TURNER, EDWARD. *3000 miles by dog sled* (The beaver, outfit 280, Mar., 1950, 26-31). This account of a missionary journey made by the late Canon John H. Turner is written from his diaries and letters by his brother, with an introduction and notes by L. A. Learmonth.

#### IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY

GRiffin, GRACE GARDNER et al. *Writings on American history, 1939 and 1940: A bibliography of books and articles on United States history published during the years 1939 and 1940, with some memoranda on Canada and the British West Indies*. Washington: United States Government Printing Office. 1949. Pp. xlvi, 984.

LATOURELLE, RENÉ. *Bibliographie: Liste des écrits de Saint Jean de Brébeuf* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (1), juin, 1949, 141-7).

MERCIER, MARGUERITE. *Bibliographie: Pierre Gaultier de Varennes, sieur de La Vérendrye, 1685-1749* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (4), mars, 1950, 623-7). A bibliography of works dealing with La Vérendrye.

ROUSSEAU, JACQUES. *Bibliographie: La cartographie de la région du lac Mistassini* (Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, III (2), sept., 1949, 289-312). The author explains that his article "pour toutes fins pratiques, . . . est presque la bibliographie de la zone subarctique du Québec."

Société des Écrivains canadiens. *Bulletin bibliographique, année 1948*. Montréal: Éditions de la Société des Écrivains canadiens. n.d. Pp. 145.

#### X. ART AND LITERATURE

BELL, ANDREW. *Lismer's paintings from 1913 to 1949 in review* (Canadian art, VII (3), spring, 1950, 91-3).

BONENFANT, JEAN-CHARLES. *Les livres canadiens-anglais* (Revue de l'Université Laval, IV (8), avril, 1950, 736-52). Includes discussion of *Turvey* by Earl Birney, *Rink Rat* by Don MacMillan, *High Towers* by Thomas B. Costain, *The Precipice* by Hugh MacLennan, and *The Book of Canadian Poetry* edited by A. J. M. Smith.

GREENING, W. E. *Wanted: Reciprocity in Canadian literature* (Dalhousie review, XXIX (3), Oct., 1949, 271-4). French and English Canadians have very little mutual understanding and appreciation of each others' literature.

HAMBLETON, JOSEPHINE. *Canadian women sculptors* (Dalhousie review, XXIX (3), Oct., 1949, 327-37).

JACKSON, A. Y. *Arthur Lismer—His contribution to Canadian art* (Canadian art, VII (3), spring, 1950, 89-90).

LE MOYNE, JEAN. *Ringuet et le contexte canadien-français* (Revue Dominicaine, LVI (1), fév., 1950, 80-90). An appraisal of Ringuet's *Le poids du jour*.

MARION, SÉRAPHIN. *Lamartine et l'Institut canadien de Montréal* (Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa, XX (1), janv.-mars, 1950, 23-47). Of the influence of romanticism and particularly of the French writer, Alphonse Lamartine, in Quebec in the middle of the nineteenth century.

POMEROY, ELSIE. *G. B. Lancaster, 1873-1945: A Canadian tribute*. Toronto: The author, 211 College St. 1948. Pp. 16. G. B. Lancaster was the *nom de plume* of Edith Joan Lyttleton who was born in New Zealand and later moved to England. Three of her novels have a Canadian background.

SMITH, OCEAN G. *The Toronto Mendelssohn choir: The history of a Canadian organization internationally famous, 1894-1948*. Toronto: The Choir, 135 College St. 1948. Pp. 19.

## NOTES AND COMMENTS

### JOHN CLARENCE WEBSTER (1863-1950)

On March 16, 1950, John Clarence Webster died suddenly at his home in Shédiac, New Brunswick. Dr. Webster gained so distinguished a place in medical and historical circles, and in the public life of Canada, that it is impossible and indeed unnecessary to attempt any adequate account of his life and manifold activities here. In medicine he had the perhaps unique honour of holding major university appointments in three countries at Edinburgh, McGill, and Chicago. Typical of his later achievements was the award of the gold medal for his thesis written for his M.D. degree at Edinburgh which the college authorities decided to publish at a cost of more than £1,000 in two large volumes for presentation to institutions in various parts of the world.

In 1920 Dr. Webster made the apparently surprising but characteristic decision to resign from Chicago at the height of his medical career and return to his old home at Shédiac where he had received his early education. The decision was in part due to ill health, but the writer recalls Dr. Webster telling with evident enjoyment of the warnings of his colleagues that he would "go to pieces" because he was dropping his work and interests, and of his own retort that he was about to begin a new life and find freedom to do what he wished. His colleagues must have been acquainted with the remarkable combination of high intelligence and intense enthusiasm which he brought to bear on everything he did, but they could scarcely have envisaged the second career of thirty years, so unlike the first and yet packed sufficiently with activity and accomplishment to have made a lifetime in itself. The history of Canada and especially of his beloved Maritime Provinces became the central interest of these last thirty years. To Dr. Webster history was not mere antiquarianism. It was a study to be pursued like medicine with the highest standards of scholarship but in the general interest. Through it not only the scholar but the public at large might come to understand something of the past, and civic pride and patriotism in the best sense of the term might be encouraged. In this view there was no false sentimentality and Dr. Webster did not hesitate on occasion to point out to his fellow citizens something of their shortcomings. Few men in Canada have used history as effectively as Dr. Webster for the high purposes which he had in mind. The record of the offices which he held and the activities in which he engaged is a long one. He was one of those instrumental in getting the Public Archives of Nova Scotia established and he was principally responsible for the establishment of the New Brunswick Museum to which he gave his magnificent collection of paintings, engravings, etc. The museums and restorations at Fort Anne, Fort Beausejour, and Louisbourg were largely of his inspiration. He served as member and later chairman of the Historic Sites and Monuments Commission, as president of the Canadian Historical Association, and as an executive officer of numerous other boards having to do with historical and public interests. His historical publications large and small numbered fifty. We have had in recent years, unfortunately, few men outside academic circles who have contributed actively of their time and money to the promotion of Canadian historical interests. Dr. Webster's contributions illustrate and emphasize our loss in this respect.

In 1944 Dr. Webster had printed privately for his family a short autobiographical account entitled *Those Crowded Years, 1863-1944: An Octogenarian's Record of Work*. A complete bibliography of his writings was included as well as other detailed information. In reply to an inquiry Dr. Webster requested that no mention be made of it in the CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW until after his death. The REVIEW is now pleased to draw attention to it as an item of historical interest and to include it in the List of Recent Publications in this issue. [GEORGE W. BROWN]

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#### CANADIAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING

The annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association was held at the Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, June 7-10. The meeting, which was extremely well attended, was a complete success. The conference opened Wednesday evening, June 7, with a meeting of the Local History Committee under the chairmanship of G. W. Spragge, and a meeting of the editors and the Advisory Board of the CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW. The general session, held the following morning, June 8, took for its theme the influence of revolutionary and republican France on French Canada and the following papers were read: "Lamarthe et la jeunesse républicaine du Canada en 1848" by Séraphin Marion, and "Quebec and the French Revolution of 1789" by Mason Wade. At noon members of the Association were guests of the Kingston Historical Society at a luncheon in Fort Henry. Luncheon was followed by a general session held in the Fort at which Antoine Roy read a paper on "Fort Frontenac ou Catarakoui sous la régime française," and Ronald Way gave a paper on "The Importance of Historical Restorations." After the general session the Fort Henry Guard gave an interesting demonstration of foot and arms drill and gun drill as performed in the manner of a century ago. Thursday evening a dinner was given for members of both the Association and the Canadian Political Science Association by the Royal Military College. Following dinner, Brigadier D. R. Agnew, Commandant of the Royal Military College, presided at the joint session with the Canadian Political Science Association. A. L. Burt gave his presidential address entitled "Wide Horizons," and K. W. Taylor read a paper on "Some Aspects of Population Theory." At the general session Friday morning, June 9, three widely varied aspects of the military theme were presented when the following papers were read: "The Queen's Rangers and Their Contribution in the Years 1776 to 1784" by Harold M. Jackson, "Habits gris et chemise rouge" by Léopold Lamontagne, and "About my Grandfather" by Sam H. S. Hughes. Friday afternoon was devoted to an enjoyable harbour trip aboard H.M.C.S. *Portage*, followed by tea at the Officers' Mess, National Defence College, Fort Frontenac. His Worship, the mayor, and the City of Kingston gave a dinner for members of the Association and the Canadian Political Science Association Friday evening which was followed by papers by James Roy on "The Honourable Richard Cartwright," and Donald G. Creighton on "Sir John A. Macdonald and Kingston." Saturday morning, June 10, the conference was brought to a close with a general meeting of the Association.

The following officers were elected for the season 1950-1: President, G. E. Wilson; vice-president, A. G. Dorland; English secretary and treasurer, David Farr (on leave of absence); acting English secretary and treasurer, William Ormsby;

French secretary, Séraphin Marion. The following four members were elected to the Council of the Association to take the place of those whose terms had expired: W. E. Ireland, W. S. MacNutt, A. Roy, R. M. Saunders.

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PUBLIC RECORDS OF CANADA :  
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT

Mr. W. E. D. Halliday, of the Privy Council Office, and secretary of the Dominion Government's Public Records Committee, read a paper under the above title at the annual meeting of the Society of American Archivists held in Quebec in September, 1949. Mr. Halliday has done a valuable service in describing the steps taken during and since the last war to preserve government records of historical significance. During 1942 the Cabinet considered the question and ordered its Secretariat to investigate the matter. The result was a report recommending the establishment of a permanent Public Records Committee, which in turn was to consider the development of a Public Records Office. (The creation of such an office had been recommended by a Royal Commission in 1914, but the recommendation had never been implemented.) It was also recommended that the responsibility of the various government departments for the preservation of their records be recognized and that narrators should be employed to prepare accounts of the war activities of the various departments and agencies.

A Public Records Committee was duly set up by order-in-council, consisting of the secretary of state, the Dominion archivist, representatives from a number of departments, historians from the Armed Forces, and two representatives nominated by the Canadian Historical Association. "The terms of reference of the Committee are comprehensive and provide, where necessary, for direct recommendation through the chairman [the secretary of state] to the Cabinet."

The Committee soon established a standard procedure for the disposal of public records "either by authorizing destruction or by transfer to the Archives, other departments, and so on." It has also considered the advantages of microfilming records. "A considerable amount of microfilming is being done, but, realizing that it is only one of the aids in records management and capable of considerable abuse, the Committee has not encouraged its application in any universal manner."

The Committee has also promoted the writing of narratives, "for the future use of the government, on departmental war activities." Besides the various histories of the Armed Services already published or under way, the narrative of the Department of National War Services has been completed, while that of the Department of Munitions and Supply (prepared under contract) is now in the hands of the printer; a narrative of the Department of Agriculture is in course of preparation.

The actual establishment of a Public Records Office has not materialized "because little or no public building is being authorized," but it is hoped "that all this will be solved within the next few years."

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REVIEW OF THE DIARY OF SIMEON PERKINS

The following letter has been received from Dr. H. A. Innis:

In the last number of the CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, Mr. Preston criticized the Champlain Society for its failure to include the Diary of Simeon

Perkins to the end of 1783. In fairness to them, the manuscript was prepared to that date but they were compelled because of rapidly rising printing costs to exclude the material.

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#### BOOK-NOTES FOR TEACHERS

*Newfoundland—An Introduction to Canada's New Province* (prepared by the Department of External Affairs in collaboration with the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ottawa, 1950, pp. 142, 25 cents) is published by authority of the Minister of Trade and Commerce. It contains authoritative chapters on Newfoundland's physical geography, history, provincial and local government, public health and welfare, natural resources and industries, labour and employment, foreign trade, transportation and communications, and is illustrated by a wide variety of excellent photographs and five folding maps. It also includes many statistical tables and charts and a useful bibliography. The Departments concerned with its production are to be congratulated on the excellence of this booklet, which should be widely circulated in all the provinces of Canada.

*Blankets and Beads: A History of the Saskatchewan River* (Edmonton, Institute of Applied Art, 1949, pp. 278, \$2.00, bound edition, \$3.75) by James G. MacGregor, is a popular history based on the recognized authorities. Mr. MacGregor is most interested in the early days of prairie history when the river played a more significant role than it has done since the coming of the railway. He quotes extensively from contemporary accounts, especially the journals of Henry and Thompson, which may not be available in a school library. Unfortunately the format of the book is rather drab and the photographic illustrations poorly reproduced, but there are four useful maps and a detailed table of forts and trading posts on the Saskatchewan.

*The Park Country: A History of Red Deer and District* (Red Deer, Alta., the author, Box 563, 1948, pp. ix, 173) by Annie L. Gaetz, daughter-in-law of the founder of Red Deer, the Reverend Leonard Gaetz, is a rather narrow type of local history, written presumably for local readers. The present city of Red Deer, Alberta, only traces its history as far back as 1884 when the Gaetz family arrived from the East and built their homestead; the author herself arrived from Nova Scotia in 1903. Her sources therefore are first hand in the sense that the history of Red Deer lies largely within her own memory and entirely within the memory of members of the family into which she married. The story, which is simply told, is shaped accordingly.

Recent pamphlets in the valuable "Behind the Headlines" series, published jointly by the Canadian Association for Adult Education and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (15 cents each) include the following: *Eastern Europe in Flux* (vol. IX, no. 4, October, 1949) by Gordon Skilling; *World Government—Necessity or Utopia* (vol. IX, no. 5, November, 1949), by Cord Meyer, Jr., national president (United States) of the United World Federalists, Inc., and Crane Brinton, professor of history at Harvard University; *The Challenge of Human Rights* (vol. IX, no. 6, December, 1949) by Charles Malik, Lebanese minister to the United States and rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights; *Western Europe—The Challenge of Unity* (vol. IX, no. 7, January, 1950) by Denis Healey, secretary of the International Department of the British Labour party; *The Adaptable Commonwealth* (vol. X, no. 1, March, 1950) by F. H. Soward.

*This is Nova Scotia* (Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1950, pp. 299, \$3.50), by Will R. Bird, and *Gaspé, Land of History and Romance* (Toronto, Ambassador Books, 1949, pp. xiii, 233, \$4.00), by Blodwen Davies, are both travel books, approaching history by means of the motor car. Mr. Bird takes his readers on a tour all the way around the coasts of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton Island, while Miss Davies makes a similar trip around the Gaspé peninsula from Rivière du Loup to Matapedia. In each case the places visited are the occasion for historical anecdotes. The historical content of Miss Davies's book is rather greater and she roams far beyond the confines of Gaspé. She takes a romantic view of history, but the reader is not reassured to find Charles I of England described as a "royal young rake" and Louis XIII of France as "another royal young scamp." Mr. Bird devotes more space to stories about the many people whom he met along the way. Neither book appears to be of particular consequence from the historian's point of view, but they may both be recommended as entertaining reading, especially for those who intend to visit these two parts of Canada. Both books are illustrated by a wide variety of excellent photographs.

*Huronia: The Cradle of Ontario's History* (Barrie, Huronia Historic Sites and Tourist Association, second printing, 1950, pp. 44, 25 cents) by J. Herbert Cranston (author of *Étienne Brûlé, Immortal Scoundrel* reviewed in the CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, December, 1949) is a popular but informative sketch of the early history of the Huron country, suitable for use in elementary schools. It is illustrated by C. W. Jefferys and contains several maps, including a two-page reproduction of a very useful outline map of the Jesuit missions in Huronia, taken from Dr. Sherwood Fox's *St. Ignace, Canadian Altar of Martyrdom*.

